
Indology

PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE



Edited By

Saroja Bhate

Indology : Past, Present and Future is a compilation of seminar papers in which scholars of India as well as abroad have discussed at length the state of Indology in the past, present and future. Indology which has a history of a little over two hundred years, started and nurtured in the west. It arrived in India along with a few other imported ideologies with the package of modern higher education during the pre-independence period. Since then, a new current of indigenous Indology joined the main current.

With the explosion of knowledge, however, Indology is experiencing a low ebb both in the West as well as in India. Science and technology being the areas of priority in a developing nation like India, Indology and other humanities are bound to have been scaled down in the curricula on different levels. Indology will, as any other discipline, take cognisance of the changing face of the world and to adapt itself to the prevailing situation. Some papers of the volume dealt with the fundamental theme of Indology and some devoted to the status reports on Indology in different countries such as USA, Brazil, Russia, Poland, China and Australia. The topics selected for the seminar offered a wide range of problems based on Indology which is not embracing all aspects of Indian culture. This collection will enable researchers of India and West to work together rather than against each other.

5.3

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Contents

Future of Indology

Indology is a branch of a wider discipline called Orientology which is a western invention. It is the result of the romanticist impulse of the 19th century West. The western acquaintance with India with its rich heritage going far back in antiquity inspired interest in India's culture enchrined in its classical literature as well as in art and architecturel. With the growing interest in the living traditions in this part of the world the western scholarship engaged itself in fathoming the cultural wealth of the Indian subcontinent. Needless to say that 'India' from which 'Indology' is derived represents the Indian subcontinent.

Started and nurtured in the West, Indology has a history of a little over 200 years. It arrived in India along with a few other imported ideologies with the package of modern higher education during pre-indepenence period. Since then a new current of indigenous Indology joined the main current. The contact with the Western Indologists led to India's self-understanding and Indology got firmly rooted in the soil of its motherland. Eminent Indian Indologists contributed a great deal to the establishment and development of this new discipline.

Indology thus flourished under the leadership of erudite scholars, both, Western and Indian, in diverse directions including philological, literary, religious, philosophical and socio-cultural studies. It has also entered the computer age alongwith other branches of knowledge and has occupied a website for itself.

With the explosion knowledge however, Indology is experiencing a low ebb both in the West as well as in India. Science and technology being the areas of priority in a developing nation like India, Indology and other humanities are bound to have been scaled down in the curricula on different levels. The general apathy in the Indian mind towards Indology is mainly due to its less job potential as well as a strong impact of westernizaton. Therefore those who pursue the study of Indology in the present situation do so either because they are committed to the perpetution of the tradition of their nation or because they have

no better choice. As a result, the considerably low standard of the research output, lack of motivation, adherence to outdated research methodologies and absence of insight into genuine problems in different areas of Indology are characteristic of post-independence predicament. A traveller on this path of Indology who is seriously concerned with the future of this discipline has to address himself to the questions such as, Can Indology servive this predicament? Can it face the challenge of the 21st Century? Does it have a future?

The reply to these questions is 'Yes', however, with a proviso. Frst of all, Indology has, as any other discipline, to take cognizance of the changing face of the world and to adapt itself to the existing situation. A few hints may be offered here for the prospective Indologists who would wish to make Indology viable for the coming century.

1. Inter-disciplinary as well as multi-disciplinary approaches should replace the outdated methodology consisting of a mere philosophical approach. While on the one hand a good grounding in the grammar of atleast one of the classical languages is a must for every student of Indology, on the other, he is expected to closely study recent contributions in sociological and anthropological theories and to find out whether they can offer any model(s) applicable to the area of his study. His observation based on linguistic data should, for instance, be supported by archaeological and other kind of evidence.

2. The development of Information Tecnology with a formidable speed has been a matter of both, excitment and anxiety for an academician. He has to be on his alert while receiving knolwedge and information from every corner of the world and, at the same time, save his own contribution from being outdated the moment it is made. Computers, Internet, WWW, network programmes and similar other educational aids have become an indispensable tool for higher studies. A student of Indology cannot affored to shun away from exposure to these modern tools of research. Reference is already made to the special site called Indology on Internet which every student of Indology must visit and enrich by his own contributions. It should be further borne in mind that computers have brought in revolution not only by minimizing

hard manual labour and time span required for higher studies but also by opening new approaches to the tradition, linguistic and philological problems.

3. The most disappointing feature of the current higher studies in Indian Indology is that in most of the cases scholars are engaged in finding a reply to the question 'What'? whereas very few studies have addressed the question 'Why'? In fact after its progress for the last two centuries much more of What-Indology is exhausted, whereas there is lot of scope for Why-Indology. 'Why?' is indeed, central to all research. A scholar writing on Paninian theory of grammar should, for instance, try to seek a reply to the question, why certain letters are not accepted by Panini in his system of *anubandhas* rather than merely listing the *anubandha* letters.

4. Repetition of certain topics is another glaring feature of current Indological research. While on the one hand, great poets like Kālidāsa and great epics like Rāmāyaṇa are repeatedly subjected to studies, on the other, more challenging areas such as inscriptions and Tibetan sources of Sanskrit literature are neglected. Time has come for the senior Indologists to awaken their students to the emerging areas of research including new dimensions added by computer technology. Students and researchers in Sanskrit have to be aware of the fact that Sanskrit is not merely a cultural language of India but it was "found as the paramount linguistic medium by which ruling elites expressed their power from Purusapura (Peshawar) in Gandhara in the northwest of the subcontinent to as far east as Panduranga in Annam (South Vietnam) and Prambanan in Central Java" (Sheldon Pollock, the Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300-1300 : Transculturation, Vernacularization, and question of Identity', *Indology and status of Sanskrit,* ed. Jan E.M. Houben, E.J. Leiden, 1996, p. 198).

Indology in the West is at present at cross-roads, it has recently passed through the impulse of the orientralist discourse which consists of "a form of knowledge that is both different from and superior to, the knowledge that the orientalists have themselves.". (Ronald Inden, "Orientalist Construction of India", *Modern Asian Studies,* 29,

Cambridge, 1986, p. 408). The discourse triggered by Edward Said's book called 'Orientalism : Western Concepts of the Orient' generated a heated debate centred round the question whether the oriental studies in the West reflect the highhanded executive attitude of the European Colonialism or whether the understanding of the East by the West is affected by the hegemonic attitude. In this connection the remark made by Dr. Wilhelm Halbfass, the wellknown scholar of the west is worth mentioning. Dr. Halbfass says, "For Indians as well as Europeans Europeanization of the earth continues to be inescapable and irreversible. For this very reason, ancient Indian thought in its unassimilable, non-actualizable, yet intensely meaningful distance and otherness is not *obsolete*" (*Indian and Europe*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1990, p. 442). The same author in his recent essay entitled "Research and Reflection : Beyond Orientalism" (*Beyond Orientalism* p. 23) observes that the dialogue between the East and West is still being dominated by Europe and that the Indians are yet to participate in this dialogue. In order to understand ourselves better we Indians have to initiate a dialogue rather than merely react to diverse Western discourses. And before we initiate a dialogue we have to change our mindset which is shaped by the Western categories and create a new Indian framework for further studies in Indology. I would, therefore, like to conclude with the words of Dr. Kapila Vatsayana, an eminent Indologist in the real spirit :

"The disourse on Indology at the critical level accepts the categories of disciplines which emerged in the nineteenth century or slightly earlier in the western historical situation and as a result of developments in the domains of science, economics and other social theories, the vast reservoire of primary material and knowledge base of the indigenous systems was either not accepted or not taken cognizance of. The 'cultural other' was understood in terms of categories of the 'self', in this case the 'self' being the 'west' in the age of enlightenment or colonial expansion, call it by any appellation. The institutions and the discourses specially in English and other European languages, whether in the West or the East or home-countries, continue to follow these categories of disciplines and subdisciplines. The methodologies

of research analysis and critical assessment are thus linear and one-dimensional .... A time has come to review the yardsticks, parameters and methodologies .... Each culture must be viewed from its specificity and from evaluative categories from within the culture ...." (Inaugural message for the International Seminar on Indology : Past, Present and Future held in the University of Pune in Jan. 1997). Dr. Vatsayana's message has indeed, thrown a chellange before the leading Indologists of India for creating, or, rather, revealing indigenous models for higher Indian studies.

—Saroja Bhate

Welcome Address

K. SATCHIDANANDAN

Dr. U. R. Anantha Murty, esteemed President of the Sahitya Akademi, Dr. Vasantrao Gowariker, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Pune, Dr. Kapila Vatsyayan, Academic Director of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi, distinguished scholars from the east and the west, Friends,

It is my proud privilege to welcome each and everyone of you to this august assembly of concerned scholars who have arrived in this historic city in order to take part in what apparently is going to be an epoch-making seminar on the past, present and future of Indology. The significance of this event can hardly be overestimated since we are meeting at a time when Indology has lost its innocence and is being viewed as an area of contention like certain other forms of knowledge that are being fast absorbed into the discourses of power, both of the state and of the civil society. Let us not pretend that the issues at stake are purely academic; they have deep social and political implications especially in the present Indian context where the secular fabric of the country is under threat from obscurantist interests masquerading as the guardians of history and civilization. This city itself that has produced some of the finest scholars in the country has also witnessed some of the worst conspiracies in Indian history that have led our pluralistic civilization to the brink of communal combat and division. There is real poetic justice in our meeting here to discuss the whole complex and contradictory range of ideas and ideologies embraced by the umbrella-term 'Indology' that seems to have had its comceptual beginnings in the European discovery of Sanskrit and the founding of the world's first Asiatic Society in Calcutta, though one can hardly deny its pre-history that goes back to the earliest contacts of India with other Asian countries as well as European countries like Greece, Rome, France, Italy

and England all of which produced translations, interpretations and commentaries of classical Indian texts and travelogues that narrated India for the rest of the world while also helping and at times distorting India's own self-understanding. Indology today has gone beyond archaeology, historiography, religion, philosophy and linguistics, art and literature that have been its traditional preserves to include every aspect of knowledge about India from its science to its politics. It has been shaped by different and often mutually opposing worldviews, liberating and oppressive, colonial and post-colonial, orientalist and occidentalist, canonical and non-canonical high-textual and oral-performative, Brahminical-hierarchical and non-Brahminical-egalitarian, hegemonic and subaltern. Understanding Indology today also means understanding the ideologies that constitute it, and deconstructing it in order to reveal its silences, expose its contradictions and foreground its polyphony often subsumed under or even suppressed by a monologic discourse. Indology itself is interdisciplinary, since even to study the structure of an Indian temple, an Indian *raga* or an Indian poem requires the study of Sanskrit, myth, the science of rhythm, ritual usages, iconography, history, aesthetics, religion, philosophy, psychology and politics.

Yes, Indology today is at crossroads. The Romanticist, Orientalist and Eurocentric approaches are being seriously interrogated, while certain ways of interrogating them also may have to be interrogated since the concept of orientalism inevitably produces its opposite, occidentalism, and since Eurocentrism demands better alternatives than neo-Hinduism. However, one thing is clear, that we are all meeting in a world that is fast being westernised, talking in a western language and thinking under conditions and commands shaped mostly by the western discourse. East and West can hardly meet today as equal partners in any intellectual enterprise, since the terms and even the agenda of their meeting has already been set by the West. This makes any genuine dialogue between the East and

the West impossible as the shared medium of communication is already European, affecting and distorting even the non-European participants self-understanding. This medium that is seemingly neutral entails certain specific forms of Western rationality, objectification and representational thought. Going through certain German texts on India from Hegel to Gunter Grass, one may, as I have, come to know how partial, how distorted and prejudiced have been the European understanding of India, in the past as well as in the present. Europe has almost always claimed central and privileged hermeneutic positions for itself : but Europe today is no mere geographic entity; it is the name of a continent of knowledge that embraces all continents; and there are scholars in India or Japan who are as Eurocentric as Europeans themselves and there are several scholars in Europe who are becoming conscious of the dangers of privileging their worldview and imposing it on other modes of perception and kinds of knowledge. While Greek and medieval Eurocentrism may just have been specific instances of ethnocentrism simply coexisting with other culturally bound approaches to people from other continents, modern Eurocentrism expresses itself in the form of universals, universalized claims and principles like the claims and methods of modern science and technology, claims of utter objectivity, theoretical mastery, and of a comprehensive representation of reality in the natural and physical as well as the historical, social and cultural spheres. Husserl and Heidegger have called this process 'The Europeanisation of the Earth', the former positively, and the latter sceptically—sceptically, because these universals are often unwarranted universalisations of certain culture-specific forms of thought and attitude, a parochialization in the garb of globalisation that ultimately amounts to intellectual colonisation — a sequel to the economic globalisation championed by the United States today, perhaps a greater threat in physical and cultural terms. Critical insiders of Western thought, like Michel Foucault have made visible the

implications of power and domination inherent to the European representational, calculating reason, and Said's critique of orientalism and its imaginative geography reveals how the Western approach to non-Western world is inseparable from claims of mastery, superiority and domination. The Orientalists' strategy was to constitute a territory as an object of knowledge, to represent communities as strange and mysterious and use both the knowledge and representation to hold and perpetuate power over it. Let me hasten to add that Said's own justifiable critique of this discursive strategy centred on the European treatment of Islam is blind to Islam's own treatment of other cultures and traditions, especially its creation of its own orient as in the essentialization and the 'othering' of Indian culture in the writings of a traditional Islamic scholar like Al-Biruni. This however does not legitimise the systematic Eurocentrism of say, a Hegel, though European attitude to India itself has passed through several phases as very well traced in a recent study by Whilhelm Halbfass. In the typical Hegelian approach the Orient provides the pre-history of the Occident; India is part of this pre-history. In relation to the European present, it is a matter of the past, not an actual living challenge or alternative. (I often wonder whether Marx's own concept of the still and immobile Hindu society and his widely contested Asiatic Mode of Production were not tainted by the Hegelian notion). Let us not simplify; perhaps there is no single undivided phenomenon called Eurocentrism nor an undivided and undifferentiated discourse called Orientalism; one may have to speak of several Euro-centrisms; several Orientalisms, too.

It is only fair to admit the existence of a parallel ideology that has sometimes been termed 'Indo-centric' but may better be called 'Hindoocentric' since it is a self-representation of an orthodoxy that calls itself Hindu. It is an exclusivist attitude that would consider all foreigners and even non-Hindus, *mlechhas* or *Yavanas*, a tradition that has continued from Varahamihira to the present-day Hindu revivalists. This practice of 'otherness' was

also extended to the so-called lower castes within the community, thus restricting the definition of the Hindu to the upper castes. *Nichal, Chandala, Pariah* were all epithets applied to the so-called 'lower' castes and epithets like *Swetamukha* and *Sitasya* were applied to those from the West. The Hinduism being floated by the revivalists strangely enough is an Orientalist construct. It turns India's pluralistic, polylogic culture into a monolith by selectively suppressing certain texts and trends especially those of the counter-hegemonic *Sramana* tradition and by selectively appropriating certain others from the Vedic tradition to the Bhakti movement — a movement that had a strong subaltern, egalitarian and radical spiritual content. It not only rejects the Buddhist, Jaina and Charvaka traditions of Indian thought but underwrites other non-Brahmanical forms of thought and expression. It attempts to concoct, from a mosaic of varied voices, cults and forms of belief and worship a single religion modelled on the Judaic religions with a holy book, a prophet some basic tenets and collective forms of prayer and celebration. This macabre construct also tries to retrieve the supremacy of Sanskrit and to legitimise the *varna* hierarchy and invites the oppressed within the religion to upclass themselves culturally by accepting the Vedic ideology and condemns to oblivion or opposition all the vital contributions made to Indian culture by other religions including Islam and Christianity.

The central question being posed by this seminar appears to me to be the possibility of evolving a modern concept of Indology that is free from the constraining impact of both the Eurocentric/Western approach and the revivalist neo-Hindu nationalism. I feel confident that the scholars assembled here are up to the task and will be able to suggest modes of modernizing, secularizing and Indianising the multi-disciplinary science of Indology. I welcome all of you once again in the name of Sahitya Akademi, the chief organiser of the event and of our co-organisers.

Indology's Mistaken Past

MARJA LUDWIKA JAROCKA

For centuries, the part of the world which today calls itself the West established two impassable limits : the philosophers, the humanists and the scientists demanded that one not look beyond Greece because, according to them, all human knowledge came from that nation; as for the priests, who at one time burned or murdered those who disobeyed them, they demanded that one not look beyond Judaea.

For the former, all that was not Greece was barbarian; for the later, all that was not judaism or Christianity was paganism, idolatry or witchcraft.

That is why when, at the close of the 18th century, the first Europeans interested in India and in Sanskrit [Sir William Jones (1746-1794), H.T. Colebrooke (1765-1837) C.E. Wilkins (1759-1836) and others] set to work, and in 1784 on the 15th January, the Bengal Asiatic Society met in Calcutta and set to work, Europe was dumbfounded.

Charles Wilkins wrote the first direct and complete translation of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, published in London in 1785, and two years later completed the translation of the *Hitopadeśa*. *Śakuntalā* translated by Jones in 1789, as well as the Gīta *Govinda* in 1792, astonished Europe which, through these works came into contact with Indian thought and Indian poetry.

So great is the interest in Indian literature that in 1832, at the start of the 19th century, William Schlegel boasts of the fact that more is known about India in his century than in all the twenty-one centuries that have elapsed since Alexander the Great. Suddenly, the interest of great writers and thinkers is aroused. Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, Schopenhauer, La Fontaine, Victor Hugo and many others enthusiastically embark on the study of *Śakuntalā* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and sing their praises.

And if until that moment, when speaking of 'Oriental languages' only Semitic languages were meant, Sanskrit now enters triumphant on the stage of universal culture.

But one must not think that the reaction of the great minds of the world before Sanskrit culture was a general attitude. There were other reactions : those of the racists, the spiteful and the mediocre.

England, the England of the 18th and 19th centuries, is particularly interested in rejecting Sanskrit culture and all it implies because it cannot admit that, under the pretext of carrying out a 'civilizing mission', it is occupying and exploiting a nation far more civilized than she.

Europe has discovered something which injures its pride : its civilization is not only not the only one, but there are others, particularly India's, which have a literature and a profundity of thought equal or superior to hers.

And two tendencies arise among those humanists and members of the clergy who set the greek and Judaic limits. The first tendency is that of the ignorant who claim, against all logic, that as there cannot be any civilization, any religion, any literature equal or superior to the European ones, it must follow that all that is Indian has been borrowed from Europe.

So it is that a certain Father Bouchet writes to the Bishop of Avranches in France saying that the Vedas have been copied from the Law of Moses, and a priest by the name of Pons, in a letter dated the 23rd November 1740, explains *om, śāntiḥ, śāntiḥ hariḥ* as follows :

> You doubtless know that the syllable *om* contains the Trinity of God, and that the rest is the literal translation of *sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, dominus. Hariḥ* is a name for God which means 'ravisher.'[1]

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1. Schwab, Raymond : *La Renaissance Orientale*, Payot, Paris : 1950, page 150.

The other tendency was that of the indophobes, those who hated India with all their heart. These, naturally, were British. And it is strange that one of the most fervent enemies of India, of those who denied Indian culture any value, was no less than Rudyard Kipling, who took for his own and rewrote so many Indian stories and tales in such excellent English. Of course he never mentioned the fact that the plots of his stories were not his own but belonged to the country where he was born and for which he bore such a violent phobia.

The most important representative of the indophobes was Baron Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), who wrote a note on public education which disappointed the young people who were interested in studying the culture of India, and which reads as follows :

> *The matter now facing us is simple ... we must not learn languages in which, according to general opinion, there are no books on any subject that deserve to be compared to ours; if we can study European science, we must not study systems which, according to general opinion, when they differ from those pertaining to Europe, it is because they are worse; nor must we, when we can favour a healthy philosophy and an authentic history, stimulate, at the expense of the State, medical doctrines which would shame an English veterinarian, an astronomy which would make girls from an English boarding school laugh, a history in which kings thirty feet tall and thirty thousand-year-old queens abound, and a geography which speaks of oceans of treacle and oceans of butter.*[1]

It would be an offense to our four-footed friends to call such a distinguished British official a quadruped, equal only to the first Governor General of India, Lord William Cavendish Bentinck (1774-1839), who had the brilliant idea of demolishing the Taj Mahal in order to auction off the marble, an idea which he did not put into practice because a similar experience with the Agra palace produced very little money.

But the initial mistakes of Indology were not confined to people such as these. The problem was that although European scholars were enthusiastic about the literature, the Sanskrit language and the depth of Hindu religious thought, all worthy of

1. Schwab, Raymond : *Opcit,* page 209.

study and praise, these elements do not constitute all of Indian culture.

The pundits dedicated themselves exclusively to spirituality. However, the pundits were not all of India, only one of its aspects. Doubtless the most valuable, the most worthy of being studied, of respect and interest, but they were only a part of India, only one facet of the enormous and thrilling personality of this great country.

What about the rest of the Indians? They had to live with the problem of the British occupation, of a foreign invasion which did not allow the country to develop itself because its economy was totally subservient to British interests. They were religious, but did not know Sanskrit. The average Indian could not explain to the Europeans the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, nor the *Śulvasūtras* nor so many other texts which are extraordinary proofs of the talent and culture developed by the Indian civilization.

The European scholars, for their part, had no interest in showing up these aspects of India because, deep down inside, they were all more or less Eurocentric, or racist or, in the best of cases, they had that superiority complex of which many Europeans are unaware and that goes beyond their natural kindness and their desire to understand, a phenomenon with which we are most familiar in Mexico.

This partial or incomplete approach is at the very root of Indology, this is its principal mistake and we are still seeing its consequences today.

Average Europeans, as well as the average inhabitants of the Americas who are subject to European cultural influence, do not receive information on India similar to that which they are given on Greece and Rome. Of Greece they are told about Pericles, Hippocrates, Aristotle or Plato, and of Rome they are told about the republic and the empire, about the great legislators and the great generals.

But of India the only thing they know about is its spirituality, its inclination towards metaphysics, meditation and Yoga. All of this is, in effect, important, but it is obviously one-

sided. Ordinary people in the West know nothing about Aśoka, the Guptas or the Mauryas. Nor do they know about medical science in ancient India, which was so advanced, nor about Indian contributions to astronomy and mathematics.

And while other nations are regarded as highly civilized and capable of participating in all aspects of culture, India is relegated to Yoga, meditation and metaphysics. Of this we, who love India but live abroad, are very much aware.

For those westerners who are dedicated to the adoration of the dolar, who are now running the world, India is a backward country and this is what they transmit to those lower down the ladder. But they do not refer to India's being behind other countries in some aspects, something which is true of many nations, including my own country, Mexico. They mean 'backward' in a derogatory manner, a treatment India, with all its highly advanced institutions, is nuclear power plants and submarines and its wealth of history and culture, does not deserve.

This state of affairs is due to the origins of Indology, to the early days when India began to be studied by foreigners. And those Europeans, as well as the pundits, forgot that although there very well may be a *puruṣa*, there is also a *prakṛti*.

All of this has various important aspects, one of them being that this denial or omission of India's great values reduces her to being one of those countries whose culture and civilization have no transcendence or continuity beyond its own geography. This is evidently false.

In effect, there are many nations on this planet which have nothing in common with the ancient civilization which occupied their territories. Mexico itself could be our very first example. The Mexico of today has nothing in common with the ancient Maya or Mexica civilizations, except for a common geography, But there are other examples, although perhaps not so apparently notorious. The Greece of today is not that of Homer or Pericles, nor is its language the same as theirs. And Italy is not Rome.

Many of the world's countries have suffered or are now suffering a Westernization which is destroying their own culture

bit by bit. And the passage of time has already divorced them from their origins.

But there is one exception, unique among the great nations of this planet : India. India still retains its religion, a religion that is at least four thousand years old, although it passed from the Vedas to the Upaniṣads as the Christian religion passed from the Old to the New Testament.

Furthermore, India still retains its oldest customs, its costumes, its traditions, its ancestral civilization, the same civilization that was outstanding as much due to its science as to its spirituality. But the unfortunate beginnings of Indology have left their mark in that, to mention just one example, the great majority of Indians today believe the *Āyurveda* was a system based exclusively on medicinal herbs. The *Suśruta Saṃhitā*, a surgical marvel at a time when surgery was in its early stages the world over, is not known by the very descendants of those who created it. And the rest of the world is unaware of it for obvious reasons.

Europe, self-satisfied, studies Greek drama and proudly displays it before the rest of the world, but knows nothing of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*; it praises Heraclitus of Ephesus for having taken notice of the opposites, but does not know that the *Ṛgveda* had noticed them at least a thousand years before.

And all because Indology stopped at metaphysics. Why didn't Hellenism stop at philosophy?

It is absolutely necessary to remind the Western world that the civilization of India has no break in its continuity, that the India of ancient glory is the same one we have today, and that the discovery of zero and the deep mathematical thought which goes back to the Yajurveda is the natural origin of nuclear plants.

My conclusion is simple : although two hundred years late, we must correct Indology's initial mistakes.

The Future of Indology

JUAN MIGUEL DE MORA

The *Gentlemen's Magazine* of London published, in 1774, the description of the surgical operation called rhinoplasty which physicians of the East India Company had learned from the Indian surgeons who applied the methods of the *Śuśruta Saṃhitā*.

This publication led other European surgeons to become interested in the matter. One of them, Joseph Constantine Carpus, published in 1816 the results obtained. Europe was thereby introduced to plastic surgery, now called reconstructive surgery, which in ancient India was not limited to the nose, but included ears and other parts of the body. This is just one of India's many contributions to Western science and culture.

And as I have given a medical example, I could add that anaesthesia was used in ancient India hundreds of years before it was applied in Europe in the 19th century. A drug called *sammohini* desensitized the patient, leaving him practically asleep, and another, sañjīvini, served to accelerate his return to consciousness. The root of the name of the first drug is related to 'stupefaction,' 'confusion' or 'unconsciousness.' In the name of the second, we find ideas such as 'give life,' 'animate' or 'revive.'

On the other hand, the *Śuśruta* suggests that those parts of the body which are to undergo surgery be shaved beforehand, that a strict cleanliness be observed, and many other basic measures which the wise European physicians, despite their enormous top hats, had yet to understand when the British Empire was occupying and exploiting India in the 19th century.

If we move on from the field of medicine to one as removed and different as that of literature, we find that the

visible and notorious influence of India on universal literature has been immense, despite the fact that, in many cases, this influence has not been acknowledged or other nations have been attributed what they took from India. A case in point is that of that jewel of Arabic literature called *The Thousand and One Nights.* It contains many beautiful Arabian stories (and quite a few from India) but its literary structure, that of 'stories within stories' like boxes within boxes, is originally Indian and has spread throughout the world from the motherland of Śiva and Viṣṇu.

The *Pañcatantra* attracted the attention of foreigners from the first half of the 6th century of the common era, when a Sassanid prince, Khosru Nuschirvan, who reined in Persia, heard about it and asked a wise physician, Barzuyeh, to search for it and translate it. The book was carefully preserved until the destruction of the kingdom by the Arabs in 652. A century later, the caliph Almanzor found a copy which had escaped destruction and asked Abdallah ibn-Almokaffa, a Persian converted to Islam, to translate it into Arabic. And that is how the Arabic translation called *The Book of Kalila and Dimna* came into being and later travelled throughout Europe in Hebrew and Spanish translations.

But it was not only the *Pañcatantra* : many other Indian tales go forth into the world. The *Hitopadeśa* is translated into English by Wilkins in 1787 and by William Jones in 1791.

There is practically no European writer of fables or stories who is not indebted to India. Many take some elements from Indian stories, like Andersen, the Grimm brothers, etcetera. Some admit it, like La Fontaine; others hide it, like Rudyard Kipling, a frenzied imperialist born in India.

There are at least two tales from Aesop's collection which proceed from the *Pañcatantra*: the one about the donkey

wearing the skin of a panther, and the one about a heartless and earless donkey. On this subject, Louis Renou, no less, observed that from the smallest details one can tell they are Indian stories. For example, the jackal as the minister of the lion is more justifiable than the fox of the Western fable. Furthermore, the structure of stories within stories is another peculiarity of Indian tales.

Should we want to speak in depth of the immense literary influence of India on the West, we would have to write a very thick volume which, by the way, would be necessary and useful. Even a universal genius like Miguel de Cervantes received, through Italy, an Indian influence which can be appreciated as much in *Don Quixote*, for it contains box-like stories within stories, as in one of his exemplary novels, *The Deceitful Marriage and the Dialogue of the Dogs* where, besides presenting the same structural phenomenon, he has two dogs conversing between themselves, an evident evocation of the *Pañcatantra* jackals.

Regarding linguistic and grammatical matters, Pāṇni is a universal example who cannot be ignored by any of the world's universities because his grammar has no parallel or equal. And more than one eminent scholar considers him the father of linguistics.

There is no space, in a mere paper, to go into all of Indian influences on world culture in depth. I shall therefore go on to speak of what has been the basis of most of humanity's scientific advances: mathematics.

It seems incredible but even today, at the end of the 20th century and in various parts of the world, pettiness or ignorance (rather the former than the latter) are still denying India what is perhaps its greatest contribution to humanity : the zero.

Of course in China, around the 14th century to the 11th centuries before the common era, there existed a decimal

numeration which some say is 'of a hybrid type.' In it, ten fixed signs combined to indicate units and myriads, but zero was unknown.

This Chinese system became stable at the beginning of the Christian era, as far as the number notation was concerned, assuming practically the same form as the modern Chinese system. The procedure offered many difficulties and zero did not appear in China until the 13th century of the c.e.

At a possibly earlier period than that of the Indians, the Maya established a numerical system which included zero. The system had only three signs : a dot for 1, a bar for 5 and a sign for zero (for example, two bars and two dots equalled 12). The Maya counted by twenties, that is, their system was vigesimal. They also accorded value to signs according to their place, but vertically, counting from the bottom upward, with the numerical value at the base of the column.

However, if this is indeed unquestionable proof of the very high standard of Maya culture and civilization, it has no significance with respect to the history of humanity because the Maya did not transmit their discovery to any other culture, not even to the closest ones in time and place within the territory which today is Mexico. For that reason, humanity owes the zero and the decimal system, the basis for almost all the technical and scientific discoveries of the present-day world, to the Indians and not to the Maya.

The discovery of zero was in India, not the product of mere chance, but rather a logical consequence within a civilization which from earliest times advanced more than any other known culture in the realm of numbers. From Vedic times, long before the Christian era, *gaṇita* was, in India, the very first among the sciences.

As early as the second Veda, the *Yajur* or 'Veda of the

sacrificial formulas,' we find the names of numbers which had not been reached by any other civilization at the time, nor by the most important later ancient cultures. The date in which the *Yajur Veda* was composed is not determinable, according to Louis Renou. It is the second Veda, coming after the Ṛk, and therefore one of the two oldest. The Czech scholar Maurice Winternitz (1863-1937) estimated that the Vedas began to be written between 2,500 and 2,000 before the c.e. and the most conservative Sanskritists, acknowledging that the workers are earlier, place, however, the date of elaboration of the texts between 1200 and 800 b.c.e.

Now the *Yajurveda Saṃhitā* contains the names of numbers upto a million millions, that is, a billion by British standards and a trillion by those of the United States. In the *Pañcavimśa Brāhmaṇa*, a treatise in twenty-five sections on the ritual in the *Sāmaveda* and whose antiquity can be set between the 10th and 6th centuries b.c.e., we find numbers on the ascending decimal scale expressed with their names in Sanskrit, viz. *eka*, one; *daśa*, ten: *śata*, a hundred; *sahasra*, a thousand; *ayuta*, ten thousand; *niyuta*, a hundred thousand; *prayuta*, a million; *arbuda*, ten million; *nyarbuda*, a hundred million; *samudra*, a thousand million; *madhya*, ten thousand million; *anta*, a hundred thousand million and *parārdha*, a billion or a million millions.

In this respect, it is important to point out that the name for the highest number among the ancient Greeks, at the peak of their culture (between the 5th and 4th centuries b.c.e.), was myriad, that is, ten thousand. The Romans used, for the highest number, the name of a thousand: *mille*.

Later, in their classical period, the Indians reached *mahākṣauhini*, a word which means one hundred thousand trillion, and let us recall that a trillion is a million billions.

In the year 595 c.e., an inscription in Gujarat indicated the

date using the system of nine numbers and zero, giving the numbers of place value.[1] It would be absurd to think that zero was discovered the same year. The inscription, therefore, is simply the oldest ever found.

For a long time, the discovery of zero was attributed erroneously to the Arabs because of the following set of circumstances: Around the beginning of the 9th century, there lived in Baghdad a great Arab mathematician named Muhammad ibn-Mūsā al-Khwārizmī who, in a celebrated treatise entitled *Book of Algebra* (*Kitab al-Djabr wa'l Muḳabala*), used the Indian decimal system with full knowledge of its origin and acknowledging it. Around the 12th century, the book was translated into Latin by Rudolph Chester and Gérard de Crénome and circulated throughout Western Europe.

Al-Khwārizmī always referred to zero as the 'Indian number.' Adelard of Bath, an English scholar of the 12th century, translated another work of his under the title *Liber Algorismi de Numero Indorum*. It is clear that neither the Arab mathematician nor his translator hid the fact that zero, and with it the decimal system, had its origin in India.

Nevertheless, the Europeans fell into attributing zero and the decimal system to al-Khwārizmī, whose great mathematical talent employed them but did not create them. The Arabs never pretended to appropriate these discoveries and even called the logarithm *hindisat*, which means 'the Indian art.' In this regard, we would do well to note that although Arabic is written and read from right to left, its numbers are always written from left to right, as they are in Indian texts and inscriptions.

At the beginning of the 13th century (in 1202), Leonardo Fibonacci, called Leonardo da Pisa, learned the Indian numerical system from the Arabs and set it forth in his arithmetical work *Liber Abaci* (Book of the Abacus), which became very popular and was used as a text book. It consists of

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1. Arthur L. Basham, *La civilisation de l'Inde ancienne*, Librairie Arthaud, Paris, 1976, page 342

fifteen chapters, the first of which presents the numeration with nine numbers and zero saying they are Indian. However, even in the heart of the twentieth century, Fibonacci's book is summarized by saying that he 'introduced into Europe the system of Arabic numeral... which Fibonacci calls 'Indian'.'[1] As a boy, Fibonacci studied in Algeria, where his father worked in the customs service, and it was there that he learned the decimal system that the Arabs, as ever, attributed to their true inventors, the Indians.

At that time, Europe used the abacus and, true to the habit of certain people of not accepting anything new, those who used the abacus firmly opposed the decimal system regarding which, as Basham states, "the debt of the West of India could not, then, be overestimated. Most of the great discoveries and inventions of which Europe is so proud would have been unachievable without an elaborate mathematical system."[2]

The fact is that from the 13th century onwards, the Indian place value decimal notation established itself in Europe and little by litte became universal, although it only prevailed from the 16th century onwards.

Today no specialist is ignorant of the origin of zero and the decimal system and so we may read in Anawati, one of the most eminent scholars of the Arabic culture :

> From the second half of the 8th century, the Arabs were acquainted, through Indian texts which had reached Baghdad, with the decimal numeration and the use of zero. Towards the year 830, al-Khwarizmi systematically describes the numbers and the rules of the 'Indian calculation' in a book whose Latin translation, *Algoritmi de numero indorum*, made the first principles of place value numeration penetrate into the West.[3]

1. Laffont-Bompiani, *Dictionnaire des Oeuvres de tous les temps et de tous les pays*, Société d' Édition de Dictionnaries et Encyclopédies, Paris, 1958, Vol. III, page 252.
2. Basham, *Op. Cit.*, pages 343-344.
3. Georges C. Anawati, director of the Dominican Institute of Oriental Studes, Cairo, and member of the Institute of Egypt, in "*Les sciences dans le monde musulman*" in *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, Encyclopaedia Universalis France, S.A., Paris, 1985, Corpus Vol. 10, page 247.

If we are going to speak of the influence of India on the West, we cannot forget that Hindu spirituality has little by little reached its highest level of influence in the 20th century. Thousands of Westerners feel attracted by diverse aspects of the Hindu religion, a phenomenon which attained its highest expression in the sixties, and that has generally maintained its level since then.

From all that has gone before, I now draw my conclusions: I believe the time has come for Indology to embrace all aspects of Indian culture and not only, as has generally been the case upto now, those considered the most 'exotic' by Westerners.

It is good that linguistics is studied through Sanskrit; it is indeed excellent that the wealth of Sanskrit literature should become known throughout the world; it is wonderful that the enriching Hindu spirituality should spread over the whole planet. But all of this should be studied as part of a great civilization which was the Indian civilization, just as one studies Greece and Rome in the West.

In other words, the Indology of the future, in the West, must stop being a pastime for dilettantes, an exclusively linguistic matter, a curiosity for idle scholars or a rare and special field explored in a handful of universities.

The Indology of the future on this planet, which is now called a 'global village,' must become a part of world history in all top-level universities and it must contain everything that has been ignored or hidden due to what an eminent indologist, Arthur L. Basham, rightfully called 'a conspiracy of silence.'

It would be well worth our while to recall that without zero there would be no binary system, and without a binary system there would be no computers, no Internet and no trips to the moon.

Remarks on Western Terms for Translating Indic Texts

ALEX WAYMAN

There are two kinds of Western terms for translation purposes—philosophical terms, especially Aristotelian; and ordinary words, say English words. An Indian pioneer in pushing the use of Western philosophical terms is Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. He did this in his work, *A History of Indian Logic* (1920), but of course also used ordinary English words, e.g. translating *svabhāva* as 'identity'. In more recent years, some scholars claimed that Western philosophical terms were necessary for Indian philosophical text to be understood in translation. I need not mention such scholars, because that would require me to go into their works, and thus lead me astray from my present object. But clearly, such a theory did motivate those scholars who proceeded to use such Western terms in their translations, and/or expositions of Indian philosophy. A section of Vidyabhusana's book (beginning p. 511) even claims that the logical theories of Aristotle migrated from Alexandria into India during 175 b.c. and a.d. 600. But to back this up, Vidyabhusana would have had to show the use of Greek words in the Indian syllogism, as indeed we do find some Greek words adopted in Indian astronomy/astrology, such as *horā*, for which the Greek original found its way into English as our word 'hour' for parts of each day. Being unable to cite such logic borrowings from Greece, his claim of the migration of such logical theories into India just amounts to a position that it must be true because he says so, which would render true everything said by scholars because they said it. Indeed, the basic part of a syllogism does not need borrowing, because in every language known of, people

say something is the case (i.e. the thesis) because ... (i.e. the reason, the *hetu*). Whether they go on to add an example does not matter because there was a dispute in India as to whether the example was necessary for what is called the 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*).

Now it is a fact that not all well-known authors adopted this terminology of Western philosophy for rendering Sanskrit terms. For example, Gangantha Jha has a basic work called *The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini* (Varanasi, Delhi, 1979); and going all through this fine work I could not find a single case of such imposition by Western terms. In Ganganatha Jha's *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources* (Varanasi, 1964) he does use the word 'universal', but rather as an English word, comparative to 'individual' (see pp. 65, ff.). His books remain fine reference works.

Then there is Raja Ram Dravid's book *The Problem of Universal in Indian Philosophy* (Varanasi, 1972), whose book is loaded with the terms 'universal' and 'a particular' mentioning (p. 35) the universal (*jāti* or *sāmānya*) of the Nyāya. Later, when discussing the Buddhist logic divisions, again he uses the term 'universal' without providing the Sanskrit equivalents, but other writers apply the word 'universal' to the Buddhist term *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, and the word 'particular' to the Buddhist term *svalakṣaṇa*.

But observe the failure of even these two Western terms as applied to Buddhist logic. When an author like Dravid or anybody else applies the one word 'universal' to *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*— which has two terms, *sāmānya* and *lakṣaṇa*; and applies the one word 'particular' to *svalakṣaṇa* a compound of *sva* and *lakṣaṇa* we immediately notice the contradiction. If the 'universal' is just for the *sāmānya*, and the 'particular' is just for the *sva*, then to the users of such Western terms the word

lakṣaṇa in both cases is superfluous — that is, to the users of the Western terms, but not superfluous to the authors of Buddhist logic. And Dravid has apparently applied the word 'universal' both to the individual term *sāmānya* and to the two-term compound *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*.

I myself have had to face the professed value of such Western philosophical terms because finishing a work that had been started many years ago called 'A Millennium of Buddhist Logic'; and finally finishing the first of two volumes, devoted to texts (while the 2nd volume will consist of topics and opponents). I found those terms inappropriate for translation of the particular texts I had chosen. But that left a problem to be solved, namely, if those Western terms are not employed, then how translate those terms? This problem much delayed the completion of my Volume One of Buddhist logic, because each Sanskrit expression that previously had been represented by such a Western expression took time before I could come up with a satisfactory substitute. Thus, for those two terms already mentioned, I use the renditions 'generality character' for *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and 'individual character' for *svalakṣaṇa*. To suggest the superiority of such substitute renditions, let us take the example of a debate, when the person who has announced the thesis looks at the challenging opponent. So as to look, there is demanded in Buddhist logic that one must use 'direct perception' (*pratyakṣa*), which has as its object the *svalakṣaṇa* already mentioned. Now, what do you suppose that opponent would rather be called an 'individual character', which is my rendition or a 'particular', the rendition by users of the Western terms?

A render should not ask a translator for the meaning of the Western terms, since the latter probably uses them because someone else used them. Ordinarily one must be a specialist in

Western philosophy to know those selected terms in their classical senses. It follows that a translator such as Ganganatha Jha, who entirely avoids such Western philosophical terms, sets the stage for better comprehension of the text. So I too have concluded that my complete avoidance of such Western terms will enable the reader of my book on Buddhist logic, when it appears, to better comprehend Buddhist logic.

Now I wish to set forth some more of the renditions I have employed instead of those Western terms. Previously, I pointed out that Vidyabhsana claimed that a term of Buddhist logic, *svabhāva*, means 'identity'. But in Buddhist logic I always render it 'individual presence'. So, in Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* Chap. II on *svārthānumāna*, there is set forth the three kinds of evidence, with the second one called the *svabhāvahetu*, as I render the definition : "Individual presence is a reason when the thesis feature has a presence that amounts to the (concrete) existence of itself." This is followed by an example "as, e.g. "This is a tree, because it is an Aśoka." Here, the Aśoka is the individual presence and so the reason for tree-ness, i.e. the class of trees. Hẹre, the Aśoka is the concrete existence of itself — the tree. I found this rendition of 'individual presence' for *svabhāva* to clarify numerous sentences of Buddhist logic where the expression occurred, while such a rendition as Vidyabhusana's 'indentity' would have obfuscated those many sentences.

As to some other renditions, I take *sādhya* as 'thesis' others the 'major term' the predicate', the `probandum'. Then, *hetu* as `the reason'; others, the 'middle term'. The term *anvaya* as 'similar presence'; others 'affirmation'. The term *vyatireka* as 'dissimilar absence'; others, 'negation'. The term *pakṣa* as locus; others 'minor term.' Then *sapakṣa* as similar locuses;

others, as 'homologue.' While *asapakṣa* (=*vipakṣa*) as 'dissimilar locuses'; others, 'heterologue.' Then, for the two kinds of example, *sādharmya* as 'feature concordance'; others, 'homogeneous.' And *vaidharmya*, 'feature discordance'; others, 'heterogeneous.' Finally, of those I shall here mention, *bhādaka*, 'annulment'; others, 'sublating.'

I could of course go on with examples of other technical terms of the Buddhist logic system; but could not make the point of my renditions being superior unless presenting sentences with such terms, suggesting the increased clarity by way of my choices of renditions. That is why I waited until having actually finished the first volume of a Millennium of Buddhist Logic on texts that I dared give a talk like this.

However, it is not necessary to present sentences from the texts to discuss the renditions of the terms *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. The Hindu Nyāya school criticized Dignāga for explaining *pramāṇa* as a result, namely, of the two kinds of *prameya*, which are the very expressions discussed above, which I render 'generality character' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and 'individual character' (*svalakṣaṇa*;). The critics assert that *pramāṇa* is an instrument, not a result. In my own assessment of this quarrel, I assume that the dispute is really what *pramāṇa* means out of its possible meanings. I studied the range of meanings that the term could have; and had to agree with the 'realists' that it had an instrumental meaning, to wit, as shown by various definitions of the term; but that it also had a resultant meaning, to wit, by other definitions of the term. Therefore, the 'realist' authors have a perfect right to employ the term *pramāṇa* in an instrumental fashion, while Dignāga has a perfect right to employ the term in a resultant fashion. If we are to criticize persons for using Sanskrit terms in contrasting manners, when in fact the Indian lexicons present multiple meanings of a single

defined word, we would have to criticize medical and astronomy books for using various words in different ways than they are used in Indian literature. Since I am here setting forth the position of Buddhist logic, I shall simply give my rendition of the term *pramāṇa* as 'authority', employing this term in a resultative sense, as the result of its object *prameya*, which I render 'sanction'. Thus, the two objects, 'individual character' and 'generality character' are the respective sanctions for 'direct perception' (*pratyakṣa*) and for 'inference' (*anumāna*), the two *pramāṇas*.

I trust that the foregoing justifies my departure from the Western terms used by many authors, so as to clarify the texts of Buddhist logic.

Indology in the United States Past Present and Lessons for the Future

RICHARD J. COHEN

In this paper I want to use the history of Indological studies in the United States in order to frame the apparent dilemma that Indology now faces. The criticisms and challenges which confront Indology today are being traced by some to the discipline's Eurocentric epistemological basis, and its origins in a colonial world which invented its own distinctive, idiosyncratic theories of 'world history' and 'progress,' as well as methodologies of 'scientific research.' All of this crystallized before the notion of relativism tempered theories of race, religion, language and socio-economic development. However, it would be naive to think that the latest trends in cultural and literary criticism alone have necessitated the need for this discussion. The weakened position of Indology today is the result of many factors coming into play simultaneously. Some of these factors certainly can be traced to Indology's western epistemic origin. However, the paucity of government and private funding, a crisis of leadership in the American educational system, as well as a dominant interest in vocationalism amongst students who might otherwise elect Indological work as a career have probably been the immediate major factors in the present decline in the United States. The current attitude towards specialized humanistic studies and 'area studies' found among the major private foundations such as Ford and Mellon clearly shows an interest in and a sympathy for the process of 'globalization.' This has resulted in the foundations discouraging the kind of discretely focused studies that Indologists and area specialists tend to do. In their place, multiarea comparative studies are being encouraged. The idea is

to have interdisciplinary projects employing specialists to create globally-oriented knowledge which allegedly harmonizes with the apparent trend towards transnationalism and cultural hybridization. While it is important to respond to these changes in the world political, economic and cultural situation, we must be advocates for the need to provide the type of training which is required to produce a scholar who is capable of contributing to the kind of comparativist studies now in vogue. One cannot gainsay the fact that specialized knowledge of culture and language requires years of study and the practice of using such knowledge. Our goal is to sustain and promote that activity. Simultaneously, we have to approach the foundations and government agencies to argue for our perspective.

Here, I wish to focus on the particularized intellectual forms and scholarly infrastructures which developed from Indology's nineteenth century origins into 'South Asian Studies' in the United States. I believe the future of Indology, if it is to be successfully nurtured globally, is to be found in a concerted effort which explores possibilities for comparative and integrative epistemological practice, fostered through cooperative individual and institutional support. The practice of pre-suppositional history and social science is fading as globalization facilitates communication and cultural re-mixing. We must seek the point at which epistemic reality changes or possibly can change. Are western ways of thinking actually taking over the world, or are we unable to see 'difference' locally negotiated and effected?

Indology is dependent on interdisciplinary work. Although it largely draws from the methods of philology and history, its origins show, as well as its needs demonstrate, that it incorporates art history, archaeology, philosophy, folklore, anthropology, even economics and law. In the United States, we

have something similarly structured to Indology, called 'American Studies.' Such departments and programs are everywhere under threat of being cut. It appears to be almost impossible for academic institutions to coalesce and coordinate the coalitions of faculty needed to work for the goal of interdisciplinary enterprise. At the heart of this problem is the very design of the American university which emphasizes the collectivity of scholars around a singular discipline. This kind of emphasis encourages scholars to identify solely with their disciplinary department and its faculty. At the University of Pennsylvania the History Department has approximately forty faculty, thirty-five of whom specialize in various aspects of American history. The non-western world is represented by three faculty at a major American university which claims to be a world-class institution responding to the latest trends, such as internationalization of the curriculum.

Interdisciplinarity is difficult, nearly impossible to achieve.

The American system of higher education began to transform itself after 1870. Small colleges were combined and expanded into universities often with the help of state governments. The German idea of the 'university' served as a model for expansion in the higher education sector. The decision to organize scholars on the basis of disciplines had a profound effect. Indology with its roots in philological practice quite naturally came into the domains of historical linguistics, history and religion. Intellectually and methodologically, Indology in the United States borrowed heavily from its Germanic version. Scholars such as William Dwight Whitney and Maurice Bloomfield imported continental Indological practice through their studies in Germany. They had received the bulk of their training in classical languages and cultures such as Greek and Latin, and travelled to Germany primarily to learn Sanskrit.

Although Harvard, Yale and Johns Hopkins bacame the early bastions of 'Indian Studies' in the United States, Sanskrit was offered in quite a few universities, usually taught by the professor of Greek or Latin. Such was the case at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1890's. By 1912, Franklin Edgerton, a student of Maurice Bloomfield's, was appointed to a Sanskrit chair at Pennsylvania. In 1926, he left Penn to accept the Sterling Professorship of Sanskrit at Yale University, as it was a more prestigious position. Another student of Bloomfield's, W. Norman Brown, who was also a close friend and colleague of Edgerton's, was appointed to the Sanskrit chair at Penn. Brown would use the Penn Sanskrit chair to launch many attempts to expand the mission of Indology by creating new academic formulations. Soon after settling in, Brown tried to convince the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) in 1929 to support an American School of Indo-Iranian Studies, much along the lines of the American schools in Athens and Cairo. His attempt was unsuccessful, although he managed to get the Council to meet formally and deliberate the issue, thus priming the pump for later initiatives which he made and successfully saw to fruition. Brown was very active and productive during the 1930s. He was an unusual Indologist in that he had many intellectual interests and projects in addition to a Sanskrit focus.

In 1930-31, Brown completed a major monograph which he called by several names, two of which were 'The Will of India' and 'Crisis in India.' It is essentially an overview of India's cultural history, but it does include discussion of the contemporary situation. Brown never published this monograph, probably because it contained criticism of the British colonialization of India. Brown's father, who was also an Indologist, as well as a missionary who had worked many years in Jabalpur, wrote his son a letter critiquing the monograph,

suggesting that he not publish it unless he removed the material critical of the British. As many other projects in Brown's career were broached early on and later realized, so this monograph came to life in the 1950s when he published essentially a similar work under the title *The United States, India and Pakistan.* It went through many editions, the last one appeared a few years before his death in 1976.

In 1935, Brown attempted to launch an archaeological expedition in the lower Indus Valley in order to build on the new discoveries that had been made at Mohenjodaro. He got funding from the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. He proposed to dig the mound at Amri. He was denied permission for the site, as well as the post of project director by the Indian Archaeological Survey, probably due to his known anti-colonialist stance. A year later, after much persistent work, a University of Pennsylvania sponsored archaeological expedition did begin work at Chanhudaro under the direction of Ernest MacKay, who was placed in charge by Brown who remained the primary force behind the project.

Brown published a very important document in 1938 which attempted to take stock of the institutional and intellectual resources for the study and representation of India in the American educational system. The essential premise of the monograph is that India's civilization is too complex and important to be shouldered by one faculty member, such as the Sanskritist. He argued that colleges and universities which attempted to offer coverage of 'India' needed to hire several academics specializing in language, literature, history, archaeology, art, along with economics, geography and other social scientists. In this same volume he surveyed the libraries with significant collections on India and suggested where

improvements were needed. He convinced the Library of Congress to establish an Indic Section within the Orientalia Division and saw to it that his student Horace Poleman was appointed to the post.

In 1941, we find Brown attempting to convince his colleagues in Penn's Oriental Studies Department to create a multi-faceted syllabus, offering a concentration on the "Regional Study of the Orient'. The goal was to produce new Ph.Ds with more comprehensive understanding of Asia while encouraging the faculty to enter into collaborative interdisciplinary research. The Oriental Studies Department (founded in 1931) had been formed from the various classicists specializing in Asian (Semitic, Indo-Aryan and Chinese) languages and civilizations. Brown believed the time was right to combine the efforts of Asianists into a more holistic approach to the region. Apparently the idea was considered too 'modern' as his initiative was not accepted by his colleagues. Immediately thereafter the world was pitched into a war, highlighting Brown's colleagues' failure to recognize the need for a better understanding of Asia.

New forces and personalities were combining in American universities to form coalitions which redefined intellectual boundaries and teaching responsiblities. World War II is the transformative event which catapults Indology into the modern world, de-linking it from the colonial environment and the classicist academic milieu. It necessitated negotiation with partner disciplinarians, especially in the social sciences. W. Norman Brown was the most influential personality in the development of Indology and South Asian Studies in the United States. It is in his early writings and proposals on the subject of intellectual coalitions that we find innovative suggestions designed to modernize the discipline of Indology.

During the war, Brown divided his energies between the University of Pennsylvania and the office of Strategic Services (the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency). He became involved in working groups, mostly comprised of academics, which designed training programmes for various personnel. It was from this experience that Brown developed a proposal to stage an intensive summer course programme on South Asia at the University of Michigan in 1943. The University of Michigan was a leading institution in the new field of 'area studies'. He solicited the opinion and support of many of his colleagues around the country. Some were skeptical of combining the humanities with the social sciences; such as Franklin Edgerton who felt that social scientists talked a lot but didn't say anything of value. In 1944 Brown got his chance to put together an interdisciplinary programme of South Asia courses when the War Department decided to run its Army Specialized Training Program at the University of Pennsylvania. Henry Hoenigswald, the noted historical linguist, was recruited to design the Hindi and Bengali language courses, and Brown's student, Ernest Bender, taught the Hindi syllabus. After the war, in 1947, Brown carried forward what he had learnt about implementing interdisciplinary programmes and held a summer institute at the University of Pennsylvania called 'Indian Regional Studies'. He was also busy recruiting support from the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations and The Viking Fund to aid in the development of an academic department at Penn which would be called 'South Asia Regional Studies'. The department opened in the Fall of 1948, offering M.A. and Ph.D programmes which were taken by a mixture of government and civilian students. The former group soon disappeared from the ranks of incoming students when it became evident that the programme was not designed to emphasize 'national security' issues, but focused on a more intellectualized approach.

In 1949, the Social Science Research Council sponsored a major conference on the state of South Asian studies. It was held at the University of Pennsylvania, and W. Norman Brown and his faculty and students hosted the event and provided logistic support. Position papers for each major discipline were written and delivered by specialists. Discussions were moderated and recorded, then edited and mimeographed for general distribution later.

The notion of a collective of scholars possessing at least some training or 'retooling' in South Asian Studies working in an interdisciplinary mode for the common good found different expressions depending on the university. Mostly it seems the local infrastructures, especially the manner in which faculty were organized by the administration, and the way they organized themselves as a polity, helped to determine the format in which they gathered to pursue their interdisciplinary work. At the University of Pennsylvania the pursuit of South Asian Studies found expression in the form of an academic department as early as 1948; at Berkeley also, a short time after the Penn initiative, the study of South Asia was formally made part of an academic department, although it was combined with other areas of Asia; at the University of Chicago it was in the form of a committee, called the 'Committee on South Asian Studies', established in 1955. The name was later changed slightly to the 'Committee on Southern Asian Studies,' perhaps in an effort to be more comprehensive. This concern for 'southern' was also manifested at Columbia University, where the study of South Asia was established through the vehicle of an institute called the 'Southern Asian Institute'.

All of these programmes faced the challenge of organizing their faculty and students around the notion of interdisciplinary intellectual activity. At Penn, the challenge

was addressed through the establishment of a seminar which met weekly on a topic which remained the same throughout the academic year. This seminar began in the first year of the department, and has run continuously to the present. Although the Penn South Asia Seminar has been operating more like a lecture series on a unified theme for several decades, it was originally designed as a working seminar with a goal to produce specific kinds of knowledge. Faculty and students were divided into 'cells' each of which was assigned a specific research agenda. Working separately, members of the cells further subdivided the information gathering into manageable portions. Early seminars focused on estabilishing baseline databanks for various disciplinary foci. For example, in the first years, the creation of bibliographies was a high priority. After the early seminars provided the ground work for further study, the seminars began to focus on major intellectual problems facing the South Asian countries. The themes of these seminars tended to be on 'contemporary' issues such as economic development, constitutional questions, politics and elections, and linguistic issues. By the late 1950's, theoretical questions became of interest, such as in what terms could one define 'region' in India. This topic had been prompted by the division of the Indian states on the basis of language.

As noted above, South Asian studies in the United States, like most other areas studies programs, soon developed in a direction away from an emphasis on 'national interest' issues towards broad humanistic concerns; away from pragmatic, useful expertise to influencing men's ideas about one another, as Richard Davis has said (*South Asia at Chicago : A History*, Chicago : Committe on Southern Asian Studies, 1985, p. 39). However, the influence of government educational policy on area studies cannot be ignored. The Soviet Union's entry into the

'space race' with the launching of 'Sputnik' in 1957 triggered a flood of funding.

The National Defence Education Act of 1958 was the first in a long series of bills which provided funds to American higher education for area studies. With this support, and additional help from the Ford, Mellon and Rockefeller foundations during the 1960s, the South Asia programmes flourished, adding faculty and students.

In 1961, W. Norman Brown realized his goal first broached in 1929 before the ACLS of creating an institution the mission of which would be the training of Americans in India. The American Institute of Indian Studies began with funds provided primarily from the rupee account generated by the PL 480 wheat shipments. Perhaps more than any single programme, the AIIS is responsible for generating and preserving American expertise on India. It has benefited from enlightened leadership from both countries, and has succeeded at supporting a full range of interdisciplinary activities.

It should be noted that the 1970s witnessed a diminution of financial support for area studies. This was a reaction to the shifting of national priorities away from the United States' international involvements towards domestic problems. Such a shift among the foundations and government agencies, however, revealed a dependency of area studies programmes on 'soft money'. The universities alone were not able to fund the programmes at the levels attained during the 1960s. The situation was further complicated and made worse by an over abundance of doctorates generated by the areas studies programmes, as well as a failure to keep the channels of interdisciplinary work and discussion open between the humanists and social scientists. Here, the position of Indology and its outlook is partly to blame as Indologists have more often than not held the directorships of the South Asia programmes.

As the 1990s close, we find ourselves at a crossroads. More than ever, vocationalism has become the goal of students at the higher education level, and the universities, including the well-known research universities, seem to be succumbing to the demand for an emphasis on undergraduate education over graduate studies. This trend should not preclude the serious study of South Asia, but we need to modify pedagogical techniques and research trajectories. Indology, in the final analysis, cannot ignore the imperative to preserve the best of its proven methodological tools while, at the same time, responding to the challenge to make its focus more inclusive.

Linguistical Explorations in Indian Languages in Russia

ZAKHARYIN

Linguistical studies of Indian languages have started already by the second half of 19th century in Russia, but the philologists working at the Academy of Sciences of Russia were mostly interested in languages of Classical India (Vedic, Sanskrit and to some extent Pali); the languages of Modern India were left aside by them, and purely linguistical problematics did not seriously attract their attention. The greatest achievement in the field of linguistical explorations in Indian languages in those days has been acquired in lexicography after publishing (in seventies) the world-famed 'Sanskrit–German Dictionary' by Otto Bohtlingk in S. Petersburg.

Next stage starts after the revolution of 1917 in Russia and the end of World War I when the interests slowly shift from exclusively classical data towards modern languages as well and to a greater degree towards linguistical tasks proper. Two phases might be established for this, second, stage :) (a) the pre-World War II and (b) the post-World War II periods. Let's discuss the (a)—phase first.

The investigators' efforts of those days are characterized by broadening of the exploratory range; this was manifested by, first turning to modern, non-literary samples of NIA, namely, to Gypsy dialects, and second, by taking into account the facts of not only the Indo-Aryan but of the Dravidian languages also. The first direction of the linguistic search is marked by the name of A. P. Barannikov who after a few years of roaming with Gipsy tribes in the Ukraine has published linguistical notes and articles on garmmatical and lexical peculiarities of Ukrainian Romany. The second one is signified by A. M. Mervart who was

the first one in Russia to introduce Dravidian, namely Tamil, data into the linguistical research sphere. Leningrad (S. Petersburg) becomes the main centre of Indological studies, and these latter are carried on in Leningrad University as well as in Leningrad Academy of Sciences. This period in general might be determined as the period of collecting data and of acquainting with the new material. The works published in the twenties-thirties were mostly articles dedicated to different concrete problems of Indian (predominantly Indo-Aryan) languages and also manuals and practical grammars on such Indian languages as Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Marathi and Tamil. The exploratory method used may be called a 'spontaneous descriptive' one, quite typical rather for the epoch as such. Though in Russia its 'spontaneousity' was determined by additional ideological factors as, due to the 'iron curtain' established by the Bolshevik rulers, any contacts with India (the colony of Great Britain in those days) were excluded, and any scientific contacts with the West were greatly limited. The pseudo-scientific teaching by Marr and his follwers (being the philological replica of the notorious ideology of 'victorious socialism') by the thirties has become the dominant doctrine (and, actually, the only one allowed) in linguistical research, and even works by Soviet Sanskritologists (such as 'Vediyskie zametki' (Vedic Notes) by R. Shor, 1935, or V. Kalianov's 'Slozhnye slovav sanskrite' (Compounds in Sanskrit), 1940 have been up to the brim satiated with the corresponding ideological references, quotations, allusions, etc.

Meanwhile, in spite of all this, the work of teaching the Indian languages to Russian students and of-simultaneous-solving some concrete linguistical problems by Russian scientists was in progress, and, it should be marked, that without this 'preliminary' phase (a) the next, post World War II, phase (b) could not be possible.

The postwar period was marked by the utter defeat of 'Marrism' organized (by the end of the forties by Stalin himself) and by the two, 'extralinguistical' (but nevertheless important) events : the political change towards greater liberalization (Kruschev's 'thaw' after Stalin's death) inside the country and in outer politics an attempt to strengthen ties with the 'third World' countries, independent India including. Through this more productive atmosphere for linguistics as such and for Indian languages' studies, in particular, has been created.

The Sixties-Eighties may be called the period of culmination of linguistical explorations in Indian languages in Russia. According to Dr. V. M. Beskrovniy calculations (see his article in 'Yazyki Indii, Pakistana, Nepala i Tseylona' (The languages of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka), Moscow, Academy of Sciences, 1968, pp. 18-32), about 250 works on Indian languages have been published by - totally–80 authors during the post-war phase b) (see Beskrovniy's review mentioned, p.23). In addition to above enlisted Indian languages works dedicated to grammatical problems of Oriya, Assamese, Gujarati, Sindhi, Punjabi, Nepali, Kashmiri, Sanskrit, Pali, Malayalam, Kannada and other Indian languages have appeared. The broadening of the data was taking place step-in-step with the deeper and deeper insights into the systems and structures of the corresponding languages : not only the traditional phonetics and morphology were attracting the specialists, but the totally new trends in linguistical Indology of Russia (such as phonology, syntax, lexicology, sociolinguistical studies, structural and stylistical studies etc.) have also appeared.

A great success of linguistical Indology of Russia has become a series of grammatical sketches of different—old and new languages of India under the general editorship of Prof. G. P. Serd 'uchenko. Such works were written in Hindi (by T. E.

Katenia), Punjabi (by N. I. Tolstaya), Urdu (by Z. M. Dymshits), Assamese (by V. D. Babakaev), Oriya (by B. M. Karpushkin), Marathi (by T. E. Katenina), Singhalese (by V. V. Vykhukholev) Telugu (by Z. N. Petrunicheva), Tamil (by M. S. Andronov) Malayalam (by Ch. Sekhar and Y. Y. Glazov), Kannada (by M. S. Andronov), Nepali (by N. I. Korolev), Sindhi (by R. P. Egorova), Gujarati (by L. V. Savel'eva), Bengali (by E. M. Bykova), Kashmiri (by B. A. Zakharyin & J. I. Edelman), Sanskrit (by V. V. Ivanov & V. N. Toporov) and other languages of South Asia. The majority of these sketches were published in sixties-seventies, and each of them was supposed to follow one and the same methodological pattern : the information on phonetics, graphics, lexicology, morphology and basic syntax was to be supplied plus (in agenda) a text-sample (in national graphics and in transliteration) together with the grammatical commentary and the translation into Russian was to be given.

One of the most original works in this series was a sketch by Ivanov and Toporov (1960) 'Sanskrit' destined to become one of the first examples of structuralists 'ideas' applications towards classical language in Russia. This pattern was later followed by 'Pali' by T. Y. Elizarenkova and V. N. Toporov (1965) and by Zakharyin's portion of 'Kashmiri' (1971), written in co-operation with Edelman, who was more inclined to follow the traditional pattern of description.

Some of the Indologists have been demonstrating for years strict adherence to only one language (or to a group of closely related languages) while the others preferred to investigate different problems in differing (groups of) languages. Among the first pattern linguists the late Dr. E. M. Bykova must be mentioned who has dedicated life to grammatical studies in Bengali. One of her well-known works on Bengali syntax was 'Podlezhashchee i skazuemoe v bengal'

skom yazyke' (The subject and predicate in the present-day Bengali language), 1960, followed by numerous articles and essays on different problems of the Bengali language. The other author of this type is V. P. Liperovskiy who has been dealing with Hindi (and Hindi dialects) since the beginning of the sixties when (in 1964) his first monograph 'Kategoriya nakloneniya v sovremennom literaturnom hindi' (The Category of Mood in the Present-day Hindi) was issued. Later this was followed by the other important books of the author : 'Imennye chasti rechiyazyka hindi' (The Nominal Parts of Speech of the Hindi Language), 1978; 'Glagol v yazyke hindi' (The Verb in Hindi Language), 1984; 'Sintaxis sovremennogo hindi' (The Syntax of Contemporary Hindi), 1987 and by other publications. We should also mention the other authors of this, first, group B. M. Karpushkin, who was dealing with only Magadhian languages, namely with Bengali and Oriya; I. A. Svetovidova and L. M. Chevkina exploring the Bengali Grammar; V. A. Chernyshev dealing with Hindi syntax and later with Hindi dialects as well; M. S. Andronov whose numerous monographs and articles were mostly dedicated to Tamil language and who later shifted to the comparative grammar of the Dravidian languages in general. The main works by Andronov are : 'Grammatika tamil skogo yazyka' (The Tamil Language Grammar), 1987 (second edition); 'Razgovorniy tamil skiy Yazyki ego dialekty' (The Colloquial Tamil and its Dialects), 1962; 'Yazyk braui' (The Brahui Language), 1971; 'Sravnitel naya grammatika dravidiyskikh yazykov' (The Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages), 1978, second edition in 1994; 'Yazyk malayalam' (The Malayalam Language), 1933.

All the linguists of this group have been working in a quite traditional manner, following the standards of the classical descriptivism and making no attempts to imply in their search

the methodology suggested by the Transformational or Generative Grammars. Due to this, the field they were ploughing was mostly limited to surface structure phenomena only, and no theoretical insights may be attributed to them. Besides, trend towards what may be called 'prozelythie systematicity' is typical for almost all of them, that is the desire (conscious or unconscious) to treat the well-known facts on equal grounds with the less known or unknown at all and, by thus 'systematizing' them, to 'acquaint' the Russian linguistic auditorium with the 'exotic' languages', data. But a certain eclecticity of these linguists, being a serious shortcoming in their work, is expiated by at least one evident merit : all of them have been for decades working with the strict conviction that only absolutely reliable samples (preferably taken from the literary works by quite renoun authors) do deserve the linguist's attention. Thanks to it, even now-a-days the works published in sixties or seventies still remain quite trustworthy in what the data analysed concerns and in this respect they differ very much from the research works provided by their American (and sometimes Indian also) colleagues where often one and the same set of samples (sometimes obtained from casual informants representing the most backward and illiterate strata of the society) is being transfered and repeatedly cited by so many authors.

One line in linguistical work of sixties-seventies must be marked specially : the dictionary-making. A great number of bilingual (from Russian to a certain Indian language or vice versa) dictionaries has been published. Among them : Urdu-Russian Dictionary by S. V. Bi'ulev, Y. N. Vinogradov, A. V. Efimova, B. I. Kl'uev (1964); Russian-Urdu Dictionary by B. I. Kl'uev, A. I. Akimov, N. V. Glebov, V. S. Meresh (1959); Russian-Punjabi Dictionary by F. F. Anufriev (1979); Telugu-

Russian Dictionary by S. Y. Dzenit, Z. N. Petrunicheva, N. V. Gurov (1972) and many others. The traditions has been started already in the thirties-forties under the guidance of academician A. P. Barannikov himself, but the most distinguished place in it is rightly occupied by V. M. Beskrovniy whose whole life got dedicated to the problems of Hindi-Urdu lexicology and lexicography see such works by him as his and V. E. Krasnodembskiy's Urdu-Russian Dictionary of 1951, his Hindi-Russian Dictionary of 1959 and specially the real masterpiece of Indian dictionary-making in Russia, two volumed Hindi-Russian Dictionary by A. S. Barkhudarov, V. M. Beskrovniy, G. A. Zograf, V. P. Liperovskiy under the general editorship by V. M. Beskrovniy.

The old Russia's tradition of historico-comparative studies in Indian languages that had flourished in nineteenth century was broken after the revolution of 1917 and revived more or less only after World War-II. One of the most distinguished in this field scholars was V. S. Vorob'yov-Des'atovskiy whose book 'Razvitie lichnykh mestoimeniy v indo-ariyskikh yazykakh' (Development of Personal Pronouns in Indo-Aryan Languages) 1956 is still of importance. He was followed by T. Y. Elizarenkova who in her work 'Issledovaniya po diakhronicheskoy phonologii indo-ariyskikh yazykov' (Investigations in the Sphere of Diachronic Phonology of the Indo-Aryan Languages) have traced back the origin and the development of some phonological DF, basic for the history of Indo-Aryan (1976). This work is also remarkable in that the author has been following the structuralists' approach towards the linguistic data analysis and has demonstrated some typological implications in phonology as well. Two years later, in 1978 (second, reworked, edition came in 1994), the monograph by M. S. Andronov 'Sravnitel'naya Grammatika

Dravidiyskikh yazykov' (The Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages) came into light. The main interests of the author were concentrated on 'historical phonetics and morphology' and the methodology applied was rather an archaic one, coming back to one suggested by the fathers-founders of comparativistics of Bopp and Rusk's type. Possibly, because of this fact or rather because two few dravidilogists have always been working in Russia, the work remained an isolated one, and (besides the author himself) there has followed no continuation of it.

The other example of applying traditional historico-comparative method combined with the descriptive one is belonging to the same period — the work by A. N. Shamatov 'Klassicheskiy dakhini' (The Classical Dakhini), 1974, where the author characterises linguistically the poetical works in Dakhini of the seventeenth century and also makes efforts (not quite successful ones) to provide comparisons (mostly, on form-to-form grounds) between Classical Dakhini and Hindi-Urdu. It should be noticed that this monograph by Shamatov is factually the only one serious analytic treatise suggested by the whole bunch of Central Asian scholars elaborating the Indian linguistics' problems.

In the sphere of applied linguistics a lot of manuals and text-books for teaching different languages have been and still being published in Russia since early thirties. One of the first was A. P. Barannikov's practical grammar of Hindustani published already in 1934. Later came grammars of Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, Punjabi, Marathi, Sanskrit, Telugu and other issued by Indologists of mostly Moscow and Leningrad Universities.

The field work on Indian languages has also not been completely forgotten : I. M. Oranskiy have discovered and then described linguistically the language Parya of Central Asia

belonging to the NIA stock (see, for example his : "Indiyskiy dialekt gruppy par'ya' (The Indian Dialect of Parya Group), Moscow, 1963. And T. V. Venttsel in her attempt to continue Gipsy studies started in the Twenties by Barannikov has published a grammatical sketch of the dialekt of Northern Russia Gipsies—'Tsyganskiy yazyk' (The Gipsy Language), 1964. Both these linguists are gone already and, unfortunately no one has ever tried to continue what has been founded by them.

The studies of the languages of Classical India (Sanskrit and Prakrits) have continued in post-war period. Besides already mentioned 'Sanskrit' by Ivanov and Toporov and 'Pali' by Elizarenokova and Toporov (the English translation of the latter one is also available) the works by Elizarenkova in Vedic should rightly occupy the beginning of the list after her early 'Aroist v Rigvede' (Aroist in Ṛgveda) 1960 and after publishing many an article on special problems of Vedic during the sixties-seventies (as well as numerous works on Hindi-Urdu and other NIA languages) she came with her 'Grammatika vediyskogo yazyka' (The Grammar of the Vedic Language) in 1982. Later followed her other works on Ṛgveda and her commented translations of the latter text into Russian (till now the first 8 mandalas have been translated). The only pity is that these works philologically original as they do not deal with linguistical problematics as such. In this connection the grammatical description of Prakrits by V.V. Vertogradova (see her 'Prakrity',. 1967) should also be mentioned. In the sphere of teaching Sanskrit a remarkable event was a new manual suggested by V. A. Kochergina in 1994 'Unchebnik sanskrita' (Sanskrit Manual). This one together with her Sanskrit-Russian Dictionary, 1978 (second edition-1987) have allowed to essentially refine the whole system of teaching Sanskrit to Russian students and to make it more productive.

The typological (or, to be more exact, characterological) studies in Indian languages have also been provided. One of the first here was B. A. Zakharyin whose pioneer work on the typological status of Hindi was one of the attempts to apply J. Greenberg's quantitative typology methods towards Indian data (1965). This was followed by the above mentioned work on diachronic phonology of Indo-Aryan by Elizarenkova (1976) where important problems of phonological typology were among others touched upon. Two years later (in 1978) G. A. Zograf published his book 'Morphologicheskiy stroy novykh indoariyskikh yazykov' (The Morophological Structure of the NIA Languages). The work was based on typical for non-structuralists 'Word-and-Paradigm' approach : the morphologically marked grammatical categories together with the sets of corresponding morphemes in different NIA languages have been analysed, but (contrary to the author's declared 'special interest in functions') the work has remained an exercise in formal typology only. Some turn towards content oriented typology has happened only by the beginning of the eighties when two books by B. A. Zakharyin have been issued. One was 'Stroy i tipologiya yazyka kashmiri' (The Grammar and Typology of the Kashmiri Language) 1981, where the content-oriented typology methods were applied upon the data of Kashmiri, the only literary language among the Dardic. The other book by the same author came in 1987 under the title 'Tipologiya yazykov Yuzhnoy Azii' (The Typology of the Languages of South Asia). There the languages of all the four main families present in South Asia were analysed, and it was demonstrated that the three basic language-types known to the content-oriented typology are manifested in South Asia Languages Area, and the corresponding concrete languages of the subcontinent, implying the Active, the Ergative and the

Nominative (Accusative) language-types, are characterised at different levels by the bunches of the necessary features- co-ordinates. It was also shown that the condition of the lingual 'melting pot' so typical for South Asia is an objective reality not only from socio-linguistical point of view but on typological grounds as well.

Explorations in Indian socio-linguistics have started in Russia by the end of sixties. One of the first was the work by V. P. Chernyshev 'Dialekty i literaturniy hindi' (Literary Hindi and Hindi Dialects), 1969, dedicated mainly to the problems of elaborating literary Hindi the centre of the formation of which (Varanasi) was situated inside the Avadhi speaking area; the book also deals with the problems of dialectal borrowings into the literary Hindi.

A few years later (in 1974) L.V. Khokhlova, who had previously published some articles on the subject, submitted her Ph.D. thesis 'Funktsionirovanie yazykov hindi i rajasthani v shtate Rajasthan' (The Functioning of Hindi and Rajasthani Languages in the state of Rajasthan). The first chapter of this treatise was a survey of the languages situation in Rajasthan in both, synchronic and diachronic, aspects. The second one dealt with the basic structural simmilarities and dissimilarities between Hindi and Rajasthani. The third one was describing the impact of the extralingual factors upon the grammatical structures of Hindi and Rajasthani.

Explorations in socio-lingual problems of Hindi area have been continued in the eighties; V.M. Beskroniy's 'Ocherki funktsional' nykh stiley hindi' (Essays on the Functional Styles in Hindi) has appeared in 1984 and the same year P.A. Barannokov's book 'Yazykovaya situatsiya v areale yazyka hindi' (The Language Situation in Hindi Area) got issued. A well documentated and highly elaborated work by Beskrovniy

though lacking in high-brow theoretical constructions serves a good introduction into the problematics of functional styles' variation in Hindi, Barannikov's book, based mainly on official surveys of India, lacks in fresh ideas as well as in reliable data. No great works on the subject have appeared since the middle of the eighties but judging by some articles published and by the Indologists, participation in international conferences on socio-linguistics (the last one, for example, has taken place in fall 1996 at the Institute of Linguistics, Russian Academy of Sciences) the work on Indian socio-linguisitcs' problems is being continued.

The most recent are explorations in the field of historical typology. Upto the data the only author working productively in this sphere is L.V. Khokhlova see, for example, her article 'Trends in the Development of Ergativity in New Indo-Aryan' (Osmania Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 18, 1992, pp. 71-97) or her report (for SALA-XIII, N. Delhi, 6-9.01.1997) 'Changing Dominant Features in the Syntactic History of Rajasthani and Punjabi' and other publications. After analysing thoroughly the main factors determining the internal evolution of patient-oriented (that is, ergative, passive, gerundive etc.) syntactic constructions in NIA languages of Western India starting from the period of fourteenth-fifteenth centuries and until now-a-days, the author successfully formulates the basic language stimuli governing the development of the corresponding languages from earlier Ergative language-type towards later Accusative one, demonstrating also a lot of rudimental oppositions, more essential for the languages of the active type, preserved or newly formed in Western NIA.

Conclusions : Almost all the branches of linguistics have been and still remain presented in studies on Indian languages in Russia. The main virtue of them is the high degree of reliability

in everything concerning the language data analysed and the conclusions made, and the basic shortcoming at the majority of them is some neglect towards modern research methodology. Too little attention has been paid by Russian linguists to typological proper (specially to historico-typological) problematics and in what concerns Indo-Aryan languages to exploring absolutely concrete problems of grammatical (specially, syntactic) evolution of the separate NIA languages or of the particular sectors of the Indo-Aryan languages continuum. Also too little efforts by Russian scholars have been taken in describing textual-stylistic variation of the languages concerned (actually, the only happy exception are the works by Elizarenkova on Vedic and namely, on structure and meaning of the Ṛgvedic hymns). One sphere of studies remains now-a-days almost completely neglected, specially in the field of research, that is the linguistical tradition of Classical India (Panini, Paninians and the alternative schools and linguists of the past). Professor Zakharyin has introduced the teaching courses in Classical Indian linguistics at Moscow University, and Professor Kochergina is also working in the field, but they both are actually novices in this and for the time being not followed by anyone in Russia, Due to this not a single research on the subject has up to date been provided in modern Russia. In this, as in many other branches of linguistic research on Indian languages (as well as in tasks of teaching them as foreign languages), a tight co-operation between linguists of different countries and traditions, and, first of all, co-operation between scholars of India and Russia, is most desirable.

Indological Studies in Australia[1]

TAMARA DITRICH

This paper presents an overview of Indological studies in Australia with a particular focus on Sanskrit studies. Australia has about ninety academic specialists on South Asia,[2] the majority of whom concentrate on India. The main areas of academic research on South Asia are : history, economics, commerce, demography, politics, strategic and defence studies, anthropology, sociology, geography, literature, languages and art. Many Australian universities teach or conduct research in at least one of these areas, usually within other programmes. The areas of research often reflect the interests of individuals rather than a large project or programme. Indian history has been, and remains, the predominant Indological field of study in Australia. Historical research has until recently focused on the colonial period, but at present attention has largely shifted to contemporary India. During this decade interest in Indian economics has been growing rapidly. Indian religions and philosophy[3] are also taught and researched within various frameworks, often in departments of Philosophy, Religious Studies, Asian Studies, History, Anthropology etc. While traditionally Indologists concentrated mainly on editions and translations of old Indian texts, Australian Indologists now tend to apply various forms of cultural analysis to Indian texts.

At present there are some 38 universities in Australia and

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1. Different areas of Indological studies are presented according to the information that was a given to me by many Australian specialists on South Asia and other closely related fields (see Acknowledgements). The Sanskrit studies are discussed in more detail; the paper attempts to present all the past and present Sanskrit courses in Australian Universities with their teachers and their areas of research.
2. Vicziany 1995, p. ix.
3. Bailey 1989; Bilimoria 1995.

four of them offer Sanskrit courses. Sanskrit has been taught within the departments of Religious Studies, Asian Studies, Philosophy and Classics.[1] Prior to the 1960s, Sanskrit had been taught in several Australian universities, within various departments, but most commonly in Classics departments where it was usually introduced as a part of Indo-European comparative philology, Although there are several Sanskritists in Australia, the future of Sanskrit studies seems quite uncertain.

The mid-1960s marked the commencement of a dynamic period for Sanskrit studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.[2] A. L. Basham, who was appointed to the Chair of Asian Civilisations in 1964, strongly promoted interest in Indian studies and Sanskrit, although he never taught Sanskrit himself. In 1965 J. W. de Jong was appointed to the Chair of South Asian and Buddhist Studies.[3] The Department was soon enlarged by other members : A. Yuyama in 1965, T. Rajapatirana in 1966. L. A. Hercus (née Schwarzschild) in 1968, and R. Barz in 1972. De Jong is a renowned scholar in the wide fields of Buddhology, Sanskrit philology, Tibetan and Indian philosophy. He has made a substantial contribution to the understanding of Mahāyāna Buddhism, working mainly with Tibetan, Sanskrit and Chinese sources. He also taught Sanskrit at undergraduate level and supervised many postgraduate students. Yuyama, who worked in the Department till 1973, carried out research in Buddhist philology. Hercus's research area is Middle Indo-Aryan studies

1. Bailey 1993.

2. Indological studies at the Australian National University are presented in more detail since it used to be the biggest centre for South Asian studies in Australia. See also Foster and Varghese 1996, pp. 303-305.

3. In 1983 a restructuring of the Faculty took place; the departments were abolished and new centres were introduced. Since 1983 South Asian studies have been within the South and West Asia Centre.

where she made important scholarly contributions. She also conducted Sanskrit courses and taught Prakrit languages. Rajapatirana, whose main interest is Buddhist literature, taught courses in Sanskrit, Pāli, Classical Sinhala, Tibetan and an Introduction to Buddhism. Barz has been teaching Hindi and Urdu and also conducted courses in Hindi and Urdu literature. His main area of research is medieval Bhakti literature.

The Department offered a full programme in Sanskrit as well as lesser programmes in Prakrits, Pāli and Classical Tibetan. Many postgraduate students were attracted: they were mostly from overseas, many from Japan, also from India, the USA and other countries. Postgraduate research was mainly in Buddhist philology : critical editions of various Buddhist texts were produced, using for sources unpublished manuscripts in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and also Chinese. Other areas of postgraduate research included Vedānta, Theravāda Bhddhism, Pāli, Prakrits, etc. Postgraduate and research work was philologically oriented, continuing the European philological tradition in Sanskrit studies. The Department made substantial scholarly contributions, especially in critical editions and translations of Buddhist literature as well as in other areas of Sanskrit studies. Over the past thirty years one of the best Indological libraries in the world was built up at the Australian National University. Throughout this period de Jong has been one of the chief editors of the *Indo-Iranian Journal* and has contributed extensively to that journal. The Faculty of Asian Studies also published numerous works on South Asia; some books were published independently,[1] some as a part of the Faculty of Asian Studies Monograph Series[2] and some were

1. E.g : *Indological and Buddhist Studies : Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, and many others.
2. E.g. : *Colleced Articles of L. A. Schwarzschild on Indo-Aryan 1953-1979*, etc.

brought out in the Faculty of Asian Studies Occasional Paper series. When A. L. Basham, the former head of the Department of Asian History and Civilisations, retired in 1979, the University established an occasional series of public lectures, named in his honour. The lectures have been delivered almost every year by various outstanding scholars in a variety of areas of South Asian studies. Most of those lectures have also been published by the Faculty of Asian Studies. In 1971 the Faculty of Asian Studies hosted the 28th International Congress of Orientalists, which was attended by over 1000 people. This conference, presided over by Basham, presented the work of many of the world's best researchers on Asia and also highlighted the prominent place held by the Australian National University in the field of Indology.

The 1960s were certainly a period of great expansion of Indology. The growth was not limited to the Australian National University but was evident in other universities as well. In 1960 a special department for Indian studies was established at the University of Melbourne, in consultation with the Government of India and with advice from H. Kabir. Another highlight of this dynamic period was the foundation of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia in 1971. It was the first Asian studies organisation to be established in Australia. The Association launched a journal, *South Asia*, which developed an international reputation.[1] The main focus of the journal is modern social studies. Prominence is given to South Asian history, politics, economy, sociology, anthropology and occasionally articles on arts, early history and other subjects are included.

The retirement of de Jong in 1986 marked the beginning of

1. At present H. Brasted is the editor of *South Asia* and he is also the Secretary of the Association.

a major decline in Sanskrit studies in the Australian National University. De Jong's position was not replaced: he was thus the first, and so far, the only professor of Sanskrit in Australia. In 1991 L. A. Hercus retired, and was followed in 1992 by T. Rajapatirana; their positions were also not replaced. Only the Hindi lecturer R. Barz remains in the Department. Since the retirement of Rajapatirana the entire Sanskrit course has been taught by two sessional lecturers, P. Pecenko and T. Ditrich. Pecenko's area of research is Pāli and Theravāda Buddhism, while Ditrich's main interest is Vedic and Pāṇni's grammar. Students can still take a major sequence in Sanskrit and can also study at postgraduate level. During the last three years various courses were taught for undergraduate students besides basic Sanskrit : selected texts from the *Mahābhārata, Upaniṣads*, Vedic, Introduction to Buddhism, Introduction to Pāṇini.[1] Currently there are two postgraduate students, one working on Sanskrit, and the other on Prakrit languages. The number of students has been always low and lately no major changes in enrolment have been observed. But since there is no tenured position for Sanskrit, the future of Sanskrit studies in the Australian National University remains very uncertain.

The Department of Asian History and Civilisations[2] in the Faculty of Asian Studies at the Australian National University has experienced very similar developments. In 1965 A. L. Basham was appointed to the Chair of Asian Civilisations and headed the Department of Asian History and Civilisations from 1965 to 1979. Large numbers of students were attracted; in 1968 total enrolments in the Faculty of Oriental Studies[3] doubled. The

1. Pāṇini's grammar was taught for the first time in this University and the response was very good. A Seminar on Pāṇini was also given by T. Ditrich in the Department of Linguistics.
2. In 1983 this Department was abolished and a new Asian History Centre was established.
3. Since 1970 it has been called the Faculty of Asian Studies.

Department of Asian Civilizations had three scholars who also taught and researched on South Asian history : A. L. Basham, J. T. F. Jordens and S. A. A. Rizvi. Basham was one of the most distinguished scholars of the history and culture of the Indian sub-continent, and every Indologist is familiar with his *The Wonder that was India* which he had published in 1954, well before coming to Canberra. Jordens taught Indian religions and was an expert on modern Indian history and religious movements. Rizvi's expertise was Islamic Indian history, his well-known work is *A History of Sufism in India.* The courses taught in this Department offered a very good insight into Asian history but students were given very little knowledge about contemporary Asia, where Australia's political and economic interests were growing rapidly. In 1979 Basham retired and his position was not replaced. When Rizvi and Jordens retired their positions were not replaced either. In the mid 1970s enrolments in Asian Studies started to decline throughout the country. The Faculty of Asian Studies was under a review which sought to determine how Asia should be studied. Among the key issues were the importance of modern languages vis è vis classical languages as well as the place of classical studies. As a result of this review a major restructuring of the Faculty took place. Old departments were replaced by new centres, and more broadly based degrees were introduced, combining various disciplines relating to Asia. This restructuring started in the early 1980s and in the beginning looked promising. But student numbers continued to decline and retiring staff were not replaced. In 1993 yet another review of the Faculty was done, indicating the uncertain position of Asian Studies. In 1995 J. Powers, whose main interest is Buddhist philosophy, was appointed in the Asia History Centre. He has introduced several popular courses which attract good numbers of students. There

is some hope that these courses could perhaps increase the demand for classical languages.

The Australian National University has been also offering various courses on subjects that are to some extent related to Indology. The Faculty of Arts has been teaching courses in Indian religions within the Religious Studies programme. In the Department of Anthropology courses on South Asia had been offered in the past but have stopped lately due to the rather low interest and consequent low student numbers. The courses on South Asia were taught in the past by C. Gregory, who has been working on an anthropological village study in Madhya Pradesh. Anthropological research on South Asia has been carried out largely by Indian nationals, whose research fields reflect their personal interest. Currently the main focus in this Department is directed to Aboriginal Australia, Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Indian Art is included in the course the Introduction to Asian Art in the Department of Art History at the Australian National University, taught by R. Maxwell, an expert on Indian textiles.

The Research School of Pacific Studies[1] was established within the Australian National University as a centre for the study of the cultures and societies of Asia and the Pacific, focusing on history, politics, geography, anthropology, linguistics, strategic and defence studies and economics. It is devoted entirely to research and to postgraduate training. The School also ran a South Asian History section which conducted research mainly on the modern social, political and economic history of South Asia. This section was started by D. A. Low (Vice Chancellor of the ANU from 1975-1982) who remained the Head of the Section till 1983. His scholarly interests were in the modern history of the South Asian subcontinent and in the

1. Since 1994 it has been called the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies.

study of peasant societies in Asia and Africa. Many researchers, postgraduate students and visiting scholars worked in this section. Various seminars, conferences and other activities were organised, and many important publications on various aspects of South Asian history were produced. The Research School launched the series ANU South Asia Monographs—publications on modern South Asian history, sociology, politics and anthropology. In 1980 an eminent Indian historian R. Guha was appointed in the section. He made a major contribution to Indian History initiating Subaltern Studies, an internationally renowned school of thought. In 1983 the South Asian History Section became a part of the Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History which reflected the fact that the primary focus of the Research School has been East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. After R. Guha's retirement in 1988 the research work on South Asian history virtually stopped. In 1994 the Australia South Asia Research Centre was established as an initiative of the Division of Economics. The primary focus of the Centre is economics. The establishment of the Centre is in recognition of recent changes in the economies of the South Asian countries, particularly of India. The main objective of the Centre is research of the economic development and political economy of South Asia, taking into account Australia's economic interests.

There have been courses in Sanskrit at three universities in Melbourne : The University of Melbourne, La Trobe University and Monash University. At the University of Melbourne Sanskrit was taught in the Classics Department before the Second World War as a part of the Comparative Philology Programme. The Department of Indian Studies was established in 1960, in which R. Slonek taught Sanskrit from 1975 till 1989. Slonek's main interest is in Indo-European comparative philology. In the Department various courses were

taught at first, including Indian philosophy,[1] Indian history and literature. In addition to Sanskrit, Hindi and Bengali were also offered. Later the interests in the Department shifted to modern Bengal, politics and art. The Department was closed down in 1989 and since then there has been no programme on South Asia in the University of Melbourne.

At La Trobe University Sanskrit was introduced in 1984. It has been taught by G. Bailey, whose main interest is in Sanskrit literature and Indian religions, and till recently also by E. Franco, who is a specialist in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. There is no Sanskrit department at La Trobe University. Sanskrit was initially taught within the Department of Religious Studies, and since 1993 within the School of Asian Studies. La Trobe is currently the only University in Melbourne which offers a complete Sanskrit programme. Students can take a major sequence in Sanskrit and there is also a postgraduate programme in which several postgraduate students are enrolled. In 1992 Hindi was introduced at La Trobe University and it is currently taught by S. Joshi. La Trobe University has also several other specialists for South Asia, whose research and teaching is mainly in the areas of Indian history, politics and law.

At Monash University Sanskrit was taught by R. Slonek of the Russian Department from 1970 till 1974. Although Sanskrit is no longer offered there, several specialists on South Asia work in this University. Some of them use Sanskrit sources in their Indological work, which is primarily in the fields of Indian history, philosophy, anthropology and music.[2] Several

1. Indian Philosophy was first taught by A. S. Ayyub in 1960-1961; it was the first course in Indian Philosophy in Australia. In 1962 he was followed by J. T. F. Jordens who taught there till 1969 when he left to join the Australian National University.
2. The Department of Music is the only one in Australia where the Indian music is researched and taught.

courses related to Indology are taught in this University, e.g. Topics in Indian Philosophy; Buddhism, Ethics and Society; History of Buddhism etc.

At Deakin University (Victoria) Sanskrit has been occasionally taught since 1994 by R. Slonek in the School of Social Inquiry. This school offers also programmes which include Indian Philosophy and Religion, taught by P. Bilimoria whose main interest is in Asian and comparative philosophy.

In 1994 La Trobe University, Deakin University, and the Australasian Association of Sanskrit Studies hosted the 9th World Sanskrit Conference in Melbourne. Approximately 300 people attended the Conference and the papers covered a wide range of Indological topics. A special panel was also devoted to contemporary Indology and cultural analysis, examining the present state of Indology and new possibilities in Indological studies.

At the University of Sydeny Sanskrit has been taught within various departments since 1947. Initially Sanskrit was taught in the Classics Department as a part of course in Indo-European Comparative Philology. In the 1960s Sanskrit was introduced in the Indonesian Department where it was taught by P. Worsley. In 1978 Indian Studies were founded in this University as an inter-departmental programme which included one year of Sanskrit, taught by Worsley, and also Indian history, religion and anthropology. In 1988 the Department of Indian Subcontinental Studies was established where Sanskrit was taught by M. Comans whose main interest is in Vedānta philosophy. Although Sanskrit was not offered every year it was possible to take a major sequence in Sanskrit. This Department also offered Hindi, Indian history and philosophy. Since 1995 a full Sanskrit programme is taught in the School of Asian Studies by P. Oldmeadow, whose main interest is in Indian Mahāyāna

Buddhist philosophy. Students can take a major sequence in Sanskrit and also a postgraduate programme is offered with an increasing number of postgraduate students working on various areas of Buddhism, Sanskrit and Pāli. At present a restructuring within the University is taking place. The so-called small programmes, like Sanskrit, are being included within larger programmes in an attempt to ensure their existence. Next year a Centre for South Asian Studies will open, organised by the Department of Economics. Besides the study of economics the Centre will also include South Asian history, art and South Asian languages. In this University many Indological disciplines have been taught and researched at various times. Currently the fields of interest are South Asian history, anthropology, languages (Sanskrit, Hindi and Urdu) and economics. Although the areas of research have been quite diverse the focus of interest has recently shifted to contemporary India and its relevance to Australian society. In the Department of Music, Indian classical music was taught from 1975 till 1983.

In the past Sanskrit was briefly offered in the German Department at the University of Queensland. Since 1983 Sanskrit has been taught continuously at the University of Queensland, in the Department of Studies in Religion. Apart from Sanskrit, Pāli has also been offered and recently Tibetan. In the past Sanskrit was taught by R. Bucknell and at present R. Reat. Bucknell's research interest is primarily in Buddhism (philosophy and psychology in Theravāda Buddhism), And Reat's research is in history of Buddhism and Hinduism. In this Department the focus of studying languages is to gain sufficient reading skill to work with primary religious texts. Recently the student numbers have increased and there are also several

postgraduate students working on various Sanskrit, Pāli and Tibetan texts.

At the University of New England in Armidale (New South Wales) Sanskrit was taught in the Classics Department at undergraduate and graduate level from 1960 till 1984 by A. Treolar whose main interest is in comparative philology, both Indo-European and Semitic. When he retired his position was not replaced and therefore Sanskrit is no longer taught there. Since 1984 the University of New England has had the largest group of specialists on South Asia in Australia: their work is in the areas of Indian history, religious studies, politics, sociology, geography and planning, and psychology.[1] In the History Department a course entitled the Great Traditions of India is offered. Several other courses also include some aspects of Indian history. Studies in Religion, taught in the Philosophy Department, also include in their courses Indian religions. Asian Studies offer an interdisciplinary programme allowing an emphasis on Asia in the course of studies in economic history, economics, geography, history, politics, sociology and agricultural economics.

In the Classics Department at the Universiry of Tasmania, Sanskrit was briefly taught in 1959 by A. Treolar. At the University of Newcastle Sanskrit was introduced in 1966 in the Classics Department by G. Tanner, whose interests are in the Veda, the Upniṣads and Kālidāsa, although his main research is in Greek and Latin studies. Sanskrit-I has been offered yearly and occasionaly also Sanskrit-II and III, although there have been no postgraduate students. Since Tanner's retirement Sanskrit is no longer taught. In the past Indian history, sociology and anthropology were also taught, but at present South Asia is no longer taught or researched in this Universiry.

1. For more information on South Asian studies at the University of New England, see Brasted 1996.

At Murdoch University in Western Australia V. Mishra of the School of Humanities has taught occasional courses in Sanskrit. His interests are in the literature of the Indian diaspora, Indian popular cinema, and Indian aesthetics. In the Theatre and Drama Studies D. E. R. George has been teaching and researching Indian drama and theatre for twenty years. At present he teaches two courses on Indian drama as well as courses on Buddhist philosophy and meditation. Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia has many specialists on South Asia covering a wide area of interests: anthropology, history, literature, politics and business. Western Australia has been the centre of Indian Ocean Studies with much interest and research in maritime history. The Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies at Curtin University and the University of Western Australia promotes research and publications on various issues in contemporary South Asia.

Australian Indologists have also contributed to Pāli and Prakrit studies. F. L. Woodward spent most of his productive years in Tasmania, editing and translating numerous Pāli texts for the Pali Text Society. Currently two Pāli scholars in Australia work for the Pali Text Society : P. Masefield from Sydeny works on translations of Pāli commentaries, and P. Pecenko of the Australian National University is currently working on a critical edition of a Pāli subcommentary. At present Pāli is taught only in the University of Qeensland. In the past it was also taught and researched in the Australian National University. Prakrit languages were taught and researched only in the Australian National University. L. A. Hercus made a very important contribution to the area of Middle Indo-Aryan studies. C. Mayrhofer of the Classics Department has been working on Prakrit languages and literature, lately mainly on Apabhraṃśa. R. Wiles, a postgraduate student at the Australian University, is

currently working on Jain canonical literature in Ardha Māgadhī.

After the big expansion in South Asian studies in the 1960s and the continued growth in the 1970s, a gradual decline has started. In the 1980s the decline became very evident. Since the 1980s over thirty Australian academics,[1] teaching in the field of South Asian studies, retired and have not been replaced. Observing the major decline and marginalisation of South Asian studies which has been especially drastic at the Australian National University, obvious questions have to be asked; what are the causes for such a decline, what are the reasons that not a single position in Sanskrit studies and South Asia history has been replaced, why has Sanskrit been under threat for the past few years? There is no simple answer, many factors have contributed to the present situation in South Asian studies. It seems that economic factors have played the most important role. To understand this we have briefly to look at the past. After the second World War a big expansion in academic life started in Australia as new universities were established and much support was given to research work. The Australian National University, established in 1946, was particularly research-oriented. There was no shortage of funds, since the Australian economy was flourishing and many scholars from overseas were attracted. In 1987, largely as a result of economic problems in Australia, a major restructuring of the higher education sector took place : minimum enrolment levels were set as a condition for funding, also fees were charged for students to cover, in part, the costs of their tuition. As the number of students has become one of the criteria for funding courses, small languages now face the increasing problem of low enrolment. Since the number of Sanskrit students had

1. Brasted 1994b, p. 332.

always been low, it is not surprising that Sanskrit studies severely affected by the 1987 economic rationalisation.

Another factor that contributed to the decline of Indological studies has been the shift of the Australia's economic and political interests to the East and Southeast Asia region. A corresponding relocation of recources took place : the funding of courses and research work on East and South East Asia received priority. Australia's political and economic interests in South Asia have been minimal. Only in the 1990s, with the liberalisation of the Indian economy, have Australia's interests in India started to grow.

Australian universities were founded on European models, built on centuries of tradition. Like their European counterparts, Australian universities established departments of classical languages. The first changes to this tradition occurred in the 1960s when the universities started to be largely reshaped as politics and economics began to play a major role in the direction of research interests and funds. This shift was carried out quickly because the mere 200 years of European settlement had not given rise to a strong independent academic tradition in Australia. Australian universities have become increasingly an instrument of government economic policy, which ignores the cultural role that has been associated with universities in the past. New links have been established with commerce and industry, as higher education became more and more perceived as a marketable commodity. Unfortunately, governments have overlooked the fact that the economy of country also depends on the cultural and educational level of its population. The economic and political changes in Australia have been most unfavourable for the continuance of classical studies. Australia has never had a strong tradition of language learning. Primary and secondary schools teach languages very poorly and every

teacher of Sanskrit (or of any other language) finds students not very well prepared for language study. In Sanskrit courses only English textbooks can be prescribed, in most cases students do not have access to the excellent Indological resources in other languages, and this is often the case even with postgraduate students. In such a cultural climate the study of classical languages has not been given much support. Here Sanskrit shares its destiny with other classical languages like classical Chinese, classical Greek and Latin, all of which face similar problems of survival. One Department of Classics, for example, has been trying to increase the student numbers by introducing more popular courses which do not require any knowledge of classical languages. Similar attempts have been made in other universities : popular courses (like Meditation, Mysticism, etc.) are introduced in order to attract more students and thus justify the funding of courses. Modern South Asian languages face similar problems. There is only one tenured position for Hindi in Australia, whereas other modern South Asian languages are not taught at all. One of the reasons for this very poor interest in modern South Asian languages is the fact that India is perceived by most people, often even by academics, as an English speaking country.

There are other factors contributing to the low interest in Sanskrit studies. Low enrolment in Sanskrit studies could be a result of the increasing unemployment rate in Australia; students look at job prospects when they enrol at university. South Asia is also poorly presented in Australian public life since the Australian media has taken very little interest in South Asia. Australian schools have not included South Asia in their programmes and only recently attempts have been made to improve the situation in schools with the establishment of the Asia Education Foundation working on projects to produce

teaching material about India for Australian primary and secondary schools.

Sanskrit studies at the Australian National University were philologically oriented (with three philologists working in the Department) and they did not integrate well in the wider academic circles working on South Asia in Australia, nor did they make enough attempts to popularise South Asian studies. In the 1960s and the 1970s many young Australians became interested in India, its cultural and spiritual heritage, but universities did not offer courses that would attract potential students with such interests. It seems that the interest in Indian spiritual traditions and culture especially in Buddhism, Hinduism, Ayurveda, Indian art and music is still growing in Australia, reflecting a cultural crisis within the consumer-oriented society. Universities, guided by economic and political interests, have mostly failed to respond to this growing need. Only lately have some attempts been made to introduce more popular and often less demanding courses, with the main objective to increase student numbers. However, the main reason for the decline and marginalisation of South Asian studies in Australia, and of Sanskrit studies in particular, seems to be economic since every aspect of Australian culture is now approached primarily in economic terms. If Sanskrit is to survive in Australia it has to prove its feasibility in economic terms.

Quite a few areas of South Asian culture are explored outside academic life. Cultural links with South Asia have been present for a long time and cultural activities often reflect the efforts of South Asian communities in Australia. There are many Indian classical dance started in the 1960s, first in Bharatanāṭyam, later also in other classical styles. Indian classical dance has been appearing very little within university

curriculum[1] and it is not incorporated in dance training programmes in schools, universities, or other government-funded teaching institutions. Currently the focus is on fusing Indian dance with other dance forms. Indian art has been taught and researched in universities for a long time. An expansion took place in the 1960s but in the 1970s the focus shifted to East and South-east Asia. Indian art was included within courses on Asian civilisation, history, anthropology and architecture. Research on Indian art has been an expression of individual interests rather than an organised programme or project. All four major Australian galleries have collections of Indian art, some of them have started their collections in the last century. A few major exhibitions of Indian art have been organised as well as some smaller ones. Lately there has been an increased interest in contemporary Indian art in conjunction with the economic liberalisation of India. In 1997 two conferences on Indian art and one major exhibition of Indian art in Sydney are planned. Generally, it seems that there has been a gradual increase of public interest in Indian art, music and dance, although far more attention is focused on East and South-east Asian art.

It is often said that in the 1990s a revival of interest in South Asia has been taking place. This new interest is almost entirely economic since India has started to represent a new potential market for Australia. The liberalisation of the Indian economy since the early 1990s has been the main factor behind the rapid increase in business and professional exchange between the countries. As a result of this accelerated economic exchange, the Australia-India Council was established by the Australian Government in 1992 to enhance the relationship

1. It is offered as an elective in the Western Australian Academy of Performing Arts, also at the University of Western Sydney (Nepean-Dance Department), and as a component of a degree at Monash University.

between the countries in areas such as commerce, science, technology, culture, education and sport with a view to generate economic opportunities. In 1993 the National Centre for South Asian Studies was established— a consortium of eight Australian Universities,[1] promoting South Asian studies, also the study of the languages of South Asia, the production of teaching material for primary and secondary schools improving links between academic expertise and Australian governments and other institutions. The main objective of the Centre is to support and build up Australia's expertise on South Asia with a number of specific programmes. It especially encourages research in the areas of economics, business studies, politics, and science and technology. The Centre underlines the fact that no Asian studies programme in Australia can be sustained unless there are economic and political imperative driving those programmes.[2] The Centre represents a direct link between the Australian government and the universities. Its projects can be presented under four broad programmes : the Schools Programme, the Language Programme, the Universities Programme and the Government, Business, Trade Union and Media Programme.[3] The most important project under the Schools Programme is the development of a teaching kit about modern India for Australian secondary schools, The immediate objective of the Language Programme is to support and promote the teaching of Hindi at the university level in Australia. The University Programme aims to promote scholarship by inviting

1. The eight universities are : Australian National University, Curtin University of Technology, Deakin University. La Trobe University, Monash University, Swinburne University of Technology, University of New England and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.

2. Vicziany 1996, p. 125.

3. Vicziany 1996, p. 128-129.

overseas fellows to Australia, hosting work-ships, publishing papers, and encouraging links with universities in South Asia.

It is difficult to predict the future of Indology in Australia. Indological studies in Australia are diverse and often fragmented, partly because of the size of the country. It remains to be seen whether the new initiatives, such as the National Centre for South Asian Studies, can shift the long standing trend towards individual research in the direction of co-operative research programmes. Apart from the increasing interest in Indian economy and politics, other areas of Indian studies—which could still be called Indology in the classical sense—continue to exist. Although the current political and economic climate, based entirely on economic rationalism, is not encouraging for Indology, a number of Australian academics still retain a surprising amount of enthusiasm for research work on South Asia. However, we can see a sharp decline in classical Indology. Studies in Classical Indian civilisation and languages do not have a very bright future and the once flourishing philological studies have been greatly reduced. Since the 1980s the 'Orientalist' critique has been also present in Australia, generating discussion of various theoretical models, new methodologies and new paradigms. This critique has questioned the philological orientation of Sanskrit studies and stimulated new methodological approaches in South Asian studies. At present there is not one strong academic tradition but rather several, focusing on philology, structural analysis, anthropological methodologies and others.[1]

A very definite shift of interest from classical India to contemporary India has been taking place in Australian universities for some time. However, there has been an increase of activity in the areas of Indian art and music outside the universities. The recent economic interest in India may

1. Bailey 1989; Bilimoria 1995.

accelerate some areas of South Asian studies, but most likely only those areas that are closely linked with the economy. The establishment of the Australia-India Council and the National Centre for South Asian Studies in the 1990s certainly gives a boost to South Asian studies, but at present assists primarily the fields of politics and economics. In the current political and economic climate in Australia there is still very little space left for Indology, and of all Indological branches perhaps the least to Sanskrit. It seems that Indology, changed and redefined, will remain in Australia. As to the future of Sanskrit studies, it looks quite uncertain. Perhaps Sanskrit will not disappear altogether, but if it does we can hope that it will reemerge, as Kṛṣṇa says :

yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir bhavat, bhārata,
abhyutthānam adharmasya tadā' tmānaṃ sṛjāmyaham.

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Philosophy and Philology East and West : Need and Basis for a Global Approach*

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1. Introduction : Europeanization or rationalization plus globalization?

1.1

In this paper I propose to start from a statement made in the announcement of this seminar,[1] and to proceed to present and organize some of my thoughts regarding the past and present position of Indology, and its prospects for the future, paying special attentiion to the Indological sources which have a bearing on philosophical and scientific problems. In the course of my reflections, I will have to go far beyond the boundaries of

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1. The announcement appeared in the *Newsletter of the International Institute for Asian Studies* (IIAS), (Leiden : IIAS, autumn 1996) and else-where.

Indology, but this is only natural if we want to place Indology in the context of the academic world and the world at large. The boundaries of Indology or South Asian studies moreover, have never been hard and fast borderlines, and it is unlikely they will ever become so.[1] At the end of my deliberations, however, I will return to Indology and try to formulate some practical 'recommendations' to those who are in a position to give direction to Indological research, i.e. the Indologists themselves and educational administrators.

1.2

Discussing Edmund G. A. Husserl's claim that the "'Europeanization' of mankind is the destiny of the earth", Wilhelm Halbfass observed in his book *India and Europe* (1988-440) "In the modern planetary situation Eastern and Western 'cultures' can no longer meet one another as equal partners. They meet in a Westernized world, under conditions shaped by Western ways of thinking."

With reference to this observation it has been asked in the announcement of the present seminar, whether this should also mean that the only discourse possible in Indology is the Western discourse, and that no Indian discourse would be possible.[2]

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1. See note 17 below on the difficulties involved in characterizing Indology (or South Asian Studies).

2. The relevant passage in the announcenment is :

"It has been said by W. Halbfass (*India and Europe*, First Edition, Delhi : MLBD, 1990, p. 440) that "In the modern planetary situation Eastern and Western 'culrures' can no longer meet one another as equal partners. They meet in a westernized world, under conditions shaped by western ways of thinking."

If this is true, is 'European' or 'Western' discourse the destiny of Indology? Will the Neo-Hindu attempts to actualize ancient Indian teachings for the present succeed in establishing a stronger alternative? Will there be an Indian discourse in Indology? Will it serve as the best solution for the present predicament? Indologists today have to address themselves to many questions of the kind mentioned above. It is proposed to offer a forum for Indologists to discuss these and many other issues related to Indology."

1.3

This question presupposes that we are indeed living in a Europeanized or Westernized world. But in what sense can it be said that this really is so? Whatever it means, it cannot mean that nowadays Europe or the old 'Western world' occupies a special position in it.[1] Since the decolonizations in this century and especially since the increase in economic power of Asian countries like Japan, Thiland, etc., Western Europe does not play a more important political or economic role than other parts of the world. No does it have a special role to play in the field of science and education.

One of the earliest forms of democracy was first put into practice in ancient Greece, and in that sense it can be said that democracy is a Greek institution. But that does not give a special place to modern Greek democracy among the democracies in the world. Large scale industrialization was first applied in England in the late 18th and 19th centuries, but on the long run that did not give the British industries an advantage over countries like Germany which industrialized later. Rather on the contrary, countries which industrialized later could make use of newer and more effective technologies and were therefore in a better position than Great Britain. Similarly, if at all we can speak of a Europeanized and Westernized world it is

1. Here I agree largely with a point made by Professor Bronkhorst in his opening lecture to this seminar. "The 'scientific' and 'industrial revolutions' took first place in Europe, but obviously transcend any regional culture..." In this context, I would like to emphasize the importance of a statement which Bronkhorst cited (forthc., ms p. 2, note 2) from E. Gellner (1995:4) "This inequality of cognitive styles does not engender a hierarchy of peoples and cultures. It is not the by-product of the genetic equipment of any particular population pool. The population or culture where this style was born would have been wholly incapable of producing it a few generations earlier than it actually occurred; and since it has happened, other populations have acquired this style with ease, and some of them have conspicuously surpassed the originators of science, when it comes to the business of technological application of the New Science."

only in a historical sense.[1] But synchronically this is of no advantage to the old Western world. Searching for an economically and politically strong country which plays also a leading role in science and technology we will not find it in the old Western world, i.e. Western Europe. At present we find it in the U. S. A., although those who know its internal social problems may doubt for how long it may be able to hold on to that position; in the near future we may find it in Asian countries like Japan and China, perhaps also in India.

1.4

To some extent, this was also recognized by Halbfass, who wrote on the same page from which the above mentioned passage was cited the following :

> *In a sense, Europe itself has been 'superseded' and left behind by the modern Westernized world. It is certainly no longer the master and protagonist of the process of 'Europeanization' Europe is turning towards those non-European tradtions which it tried to master, supersede, 'understand' and 'explain'; it tries to enlist them as allies against developments initiated by itself. The West is turning towards the East for new inspiration, or even for therapy.*

If this is recognized, we cannot continue to speak with Husserl and Heidegger of a 'Europeanization of the earth and of

1. In other words, the question which Halbfass (1988:440) asked : "Was the expansion of European ways of understanding the world and mastering nature, was the globalization of European science and technology only an episode?" can be briefly answered with : "Yes, and nothing more." In a slightly more elaborate answer one might say : it was a unique and important episode in world history, just like many unique and important episodes before (such as the episode of Islamization, this generally repressed but crucial precondition for the episode of Westernization— the West came into full contact with 'its' ancient Greeks only via the Muhammedan Arabs; and before this the episodes of Latinization, Hellenization, Persianization, etc.) and just like important episodes afterwards, which are now still difficult to discren and characterize historically. As far as the old West and the rest of the world are concerned, in any case, the Westernization is now largely a matter of the past.

mankind',[1] nor can we follow Halbfass when he says on the next pages that "there is no escape from the global network of 'Europeanizations'," and that "For Indians as well as Europeans, the 'Europeanization of the earth' continues to be inescapable and irreversible.'[2]

1.5

If we want to characterize the modern world synchronically, it is not Europeanized or Westernized but rather rationalized and globalized.[3] Just as someone is not automatically committed to

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1. Halbfass 1988:441, and cf. 167-169.

2. Halbfass 1988:441-442; the latter statement which is unequivocally made on Halbfass's own account indicates his agreement with the former which appears in a paragphrase of Heidegger's view.

3. That is to say, in Halbfass's discourse, and in Husserl's and Heidegger's discourse as cited by Halbfass, if Indian is said to have become 'Europeanized', what is usually meant is that it has opened up to global modernity and to rationality in the form of science and technology. Cf. Halbfass 1988 on Europeanization, rationality and globalization, e.g. 143, 167, 217, 439-442.

There is another element to this so-called Europeanization which has been almost entirely neglected by Halbfass, namely 'commercialization'. The institutions which nowadays promote the processes of rationalization and globalization to the highest degree and most powerfully are not state governments or universities but commercial institutions and especially multinational companies. A lot of power is concentrated in these institutions which promote the massive reproduction of 'cheap' cultural products, a phenomenon which involves obvious dangers for enterprises with little direct commercial but high cultural value, such as take place under the label of Indology.

In view of the present importance of the U.S.A. as pointed out above, historians will perhaps at one time regard the decades after the second World War as a period of 'Americanization'. But in view of the importance of the general importance of multinational companies, whether they have their original seat in the U.S.A. or Japan or elsewhere, we might also speak of a periode of 'multinationalization'. This does not alter the character of the processes which the synchronical observer can perceive : the processes of rationalization, globalization, commercialization.

To the claim that the Europeanization of the modern world truns out to be a globalization and rationalization of the world if we see it in a synchronic perspective, it should be added that these processes of globalization and

all or even just any of the philosophical and metaphysical ideas of Newton if he accepts and applies Newton's Laws of Gravity and Motion.[1] in the same way a Japanese businessman or a Taliban soldier may use respectively economical and weapon-technological techniques and even accept the necessary scientific theories on which these techniques are based, without committing himself to philosophies or life attitudes which were valid in the countries where these techniques and scientific theories were first developed.[2] On the other hand, if there are further similarities between his life attitudes and those held typical for the West, this does not mean he has borrowed them from the West. If some country or some person actively participates in this globalized and rationalized world, this country or this person has not automatically become

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rationalization appear together with powerful countercurrents, especially numerous trends of traditionalism and regionalizations (also in the "old Western World").

1. And Newton did have quite peculiar metaphysical ideas usually unknown to those who refer to his achievements in physics. Cf. Staal 1993.
2. Because some doubts were raised at the seminar regarding my claim that Japan's modern economy cannot be regarded as merely an instance of 'Westernization', I quote some supportive observations from a recent article in the *Times of India*, Feb. 7, p. 1 of the special 'Times of India Country Report'. In the 20th century, Japan occupies a unique position in the economic history of nations. A number of pioneering and trendsetting industrial achievements that Japan has to its credit, is perhaps unmatched by any other nation in the world today.... Not just innovative products and high technologies, even the Japanese management systems, their shrewd marketing strategies, their uncompromising devotion to quality, the rapidity with which they launch new products and their unerring eye for sleek design, have had a revolutionary and profound impact on the way companies all over the world operate... Paradoxically, Japan is probably also the only example of a country that has managed to blend the strengths of the past with the promises of the future. The country has preserved and revered the traditions of its over 2000. year-old civilisations and is simultaneously the most advanced, rapidly changing and modern nation."

'Westernized'.[1] Halbfass seems to have been insufficiently aware of this important distinction and of the necessity to clearly separate the diachronic and the synchronic perspective, which is at the basis of this distinction (1988, esp. concluding chapter 'In Lieu of a summary', 434ff.).

1.5.1

The application of techniques and technologies which were often partly or wholly developed in the West, but which work just as well in other parts of the world, has greatly facilitated communication and reduced the distances between different parts of the world. Whether we like it or not, distant countries have become close neighbours. In this sense the world has become globalized. But the present day globalization is entirely unprecedented in all of the known history of mankind, although we do have well-documented cases of incipient— and later stagnating—globalizations. Some excellent examples are provided by South Asia's past : Aśoka's military, and later religious conquest of (large parts of) the (then known) world, and the Sanskritization of Central, East and Southeast Asia in what Pollock has termed the 'Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300-1300 CE" (Pollock 1996). Globalization is in any case not a Western phenomenon, nor is it an instant of Westernization.

1.5.2

As for rationalization, this term would mean the increasing importance and increasing application of rationality. The concept of rationality has always played an important role in characterizations of the West, both positively and negatively, and both in characterizations by 'Westerners' and by others (cf. Halbfass 1988 : 120, 143, 232, 255). At the same time it has

1. Although his concept of rationality remains rather unarticulated (according to Bronkhorst it seems to mean: readiness to accept criticism in scholarly discourse), there is little room to dispute the statement that rationality "is not a foreign product that was introduced into India with modern scholarship. India has had a long rational tradition ..." (Bronkhorst frothc.).

always been a quite problematic concept; it was understood differently by thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Hume and others. 'Rational actions' or 'actions based on reason' have been opposed both to 'actions based on the passions' (Plato) and to 'actions based on tradition or authority' (Hume). Rationality may be thought of as being mainly limited to mathematical and logical reasoning (Hume), or as having a wider scope which includes ethical and aesthetic thinking. In the South Asian Sanskritic tradition, rationality or 'reasoning' (*tarka, anumāna*) was usually seen as one of the means of gaining knowledge (*pramāṇas*), together with direct preception (*pratyakṣa*) and traditional lore (*āgama*). Our understanding of rationality and its nature and scope, is likely to gain in depth and universal validity if the rich South Asian material dealing with these problems is seriously taken into account. For the present purpose, however, it should suffice to follow Halbfass in his usage of the term, and to observe that his 'rationality' is somehow closely connected with the sciences (natural and social), and with technology.

It can be said that nowadays any important field of the world and of human life has become the subject of specialized sciences; physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, psychology, social sciences. Science, it should be pointed out, is of course not an exclusively European phenomenon, as has been rightly emphasized and substantiated by Staal in some recent publications (Staal 1993, 1995). At present, however, unprecedented progress has indeed been achieved by sciences which took shape in the West, while sciences in for instance early China and South Asia have stagnated for some still unclarified reasons. If a science i.e. any science whether in the present or in the past provides a sufficient grasp on the problems in its field, technologies can be designed to solve these problems and to produce useful and desirable results.

Let us here pay some attention to the process through which science and technology spread over the globe. This spreading of science and technology inevitably involves the acceptance of a successful science and technology by persons and communities, but also the rejection of some body of less successful knowledge, at least for the limited area in which the new science and technology are accepted. The rejected body of knowledge may go under many names : magic, superstition, or unsuccessful and stagnated science.[1] But to the extent that the successful science or technology is rational, a conscious choice to accept it—a North American Indian who accepts European weapons, a new Guinea Papua accepting 'Western' medicine, etc.—should also be considered rational, even if numerous non-rational factors play a role in the decision.[2] Formulated differently, if modern science and technology are indeed as rational as they are usually claimed to be, then the acceptance of modern science and technology on the basis of demonstrable results is to be considered a testimony to the rationality which is already present in the person or community which accepts them, rather than a case of Westernization. If, on the other hand, we would deny that the acceptance of science and technology on the basis of demonstrable results is a rational decision, science and technology would lose their entitlement to the predicate of rationality and become undistinguishable from 'myth' and 'magic'. Therefore, as in the case of globalization, we have to

1. The borderline between science, religion and magic is extremely problematic, cf. Tambiah 1990.

2. In the sixties of this century, Thomas S. Kuhn argued that even within science non-rational factors play a major role in the choice between competing theories and paradigms. Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper accepted some of Kuhn's points but argued that rationality holds nevertheless a primary position in these processes of scientific choice. It can similarly be argued that rationality plays an important role in the decision to adopt modern scientific theories and technologies where one formerly followed traditional beliefs and techniques.

conclude that rationalization, especially in the form of the spread of modern science and technology, is not a Western phenomenon either: nor is it an instance of Westernization.

2. Indology in a rationalizing and globalizing world

2.1

If the world has indeed become increasingly rationalized and globalized but not really Westernized nor subjugated or controlled by the West, is Indology then a special field where there is nevertheless a Western discourse which excludes or opposes an Indian discourse? There is no denying that some decades ago, especially before India's independence, Western Indological discourse was closely connected with Europe's wish to rule, and to continue to rule, India, although the role played by Indologists both in creating an intellectual, scholarly counterpart to the political objectification and subjugation, and in creating and presenting the images which induced India's self-conscious reaction to Europe's suppressive presence in India, is far too complex to be discussed in a few lines.[1] It can indeed be said that at least part of the motivating power behind the enormous efforts invested in the unearthing and exploring of the data regarding South Asia's past was generated by the ideological wars between Europeans and Indians who all wanted to appropriate a glorious past of 'origins representing symbolic power',[2] As the *devas* and *asuras* in the churning of the

1. Here, again, Halbfass (1988, 1991) has collected a great amount of important material.

2. This becomes clear in the works of authors like Max Müller, R. Grabe (both arguing for the crucial importance of the Judaio-Christian tradition), L. von Schröder, W. Wüst (both emphasizing an original Indo-Germanic superiority), Rammohun Roy (contrasting a degenerated modern India with its ideal origins), B. G. Tilak (locating the home of the Aryans at the North Pole), Aurobindo (attempting to demonstrate the perfection of Vedic Sanskrit). On the concept of 'symbolic power' cf. Bourdieu 1991.

primeval ocean in Hindu mythology, the opposing forces provided the energy needed to bring to light the precious data from the ocean of South Asia's past.

In the new, post second World War planetary situation as sketched above, however, these ideological wars have shifted and to a considerable extent subsided. In anti-European speeches of some representatives of the Hindutva-movement the ideological war still continues—occasionally we also find an anachronistic 'colonial' attitude among Western Indologists of the present day— but generally speaking Europe and the West are not interested in the challenge of Hindutva-rethorics, and still less in (re) investing in an institutionalized Indology which could do the work necessary to counter such unconvincing ideological attacks, However, the stake of the 'origins representing symbolic power' is still there, so it is more than likely that new ideological and intellectual wars will at one time be fought around it; perhaps they have already started, but it is not yet clear—at least not to me—which major opposing forces are being formed to involve themselves in the fight.[1] In view of the modernization of India, however, and the shifting interests of the West, there is no reason to believe that the major opposing forces will simply correspond to 'India' and 'the West'.

2.2

Synchronically, therefore, I do not see a Western discourse which excludes or opposes an Indian discourse. Rather, there are several distinct Western European Indological discourses, namely French, German, British, Dutch, Italian, Polish and other

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1. One area of a present day 'ideological war', closely related to Indological data although not pertaining to the pre-Vedic origins of South Asian culture, is Tibet and its relation with India and China. It is clear that the P.R.C. government promotes a view according to which Tibetans have originally been a Chinese people, whereas others promote the view that they were ethnically, linguistically and culturally independent and/or more related to India.

ones, and there are North-American and Latin-American Indological discourses, and there are Indian, Nepalese, Pakistani, Chinese, Japanese and other Indological discourses, which all have both local aspects and global aspects. Each of these discourses deals in its own way with what is traditionally the subject matter of Indology—that is, the linguistic, literary, social, political etc. past and present of what may presently be called in a politically netural way 'South Asia'.[1] Each discourse has to take into account its own local conditions and relations with the past and present of South Asia, as well as, hopefully, the international consensus of scholars in the same field. Of course, the countries which nowadays occupy the geographical space of South Asia, especially Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangla Desh, and Sri Lanka, and also those which have important borders with South Asian countries, especially China and Russia, have a very special relation with the past and present of South Asia— which gives them special privileges and responsibilities in the study of South Asia, and perhaps occasionally also the drawback of being too close to the object of study. India and Nepal are even more special since these countries have still retained an appreciable number of

1. While one may base a rough characterization of Indology on its central geographical area, there are a number of important episodes in its field which are to be studied while transcending the boundaries between this and other areas. This applies for instance to Buddhism and to the 'Cosmopolis' Sanskritization of East and Southeast Asia. In the modern approach of 'Area Studies', the subject matter of Indology is or should be covered by 'South Asian Studies, although some of its traditional subjects would be more at their place in disciplines such as linguistics, philosophy, medicine, etc. It has indeed always been difficult to define Indology or South Asian Studies—as a unitary discipline or field, and this will probably remain so for ever. Some kind of unity is nevertheless provided by the nature and richness of data. As far as methods are concerned (philological, linguistic, socio-linguistic, archeological methods etc.), Indology is of course not a unitary discipline either. Indology is therefore better characterized as a 'field' of studies than as a discipline, although the peculiar nature of its data does require the mastery over specific constellations of skills and methods.

representatives of the śāstric tradition. This brings them in even closer contact with important sources of Indology, but it also confronts them with an urgent and difficult task of reconciling tradition with an in many respects apparently incompatible modernity.

2.3

If this is the present situation in the world and in Indology, what does this mean for the future of Indology? Since we are indeed living in an increasingly globalized and rationalized world, with numerous urgent social, ecological and philosophical problems to be solved—and since, moreover, the great 18th and 19th century ideological wars around South Asia's (vis-à-vis Europe's) past and origins have to a considerable extent subsided—is there any justification left, except curiosity for the past, for investing time and energy in Indology? If no justification can be found, a rationalized world will not support such a study. Whatever reasons there were in the past to establish an institutionalized Indology will be superseded by rational considerations to do away with it—and this is precisely what we nowadays see all too often in the old Western world.[1]

3. Rational justifications for Indology

3.1

There are indeed still important rational justifications for Indological research, even if professional Indologists are not always sufficiently interested in these when they remain within the Ivory Tower of their research projects to practice *l'art pour*

1. Cf. in recent years the disappearance of chairs for Indology in France (the oldest chair in the West, that in the Collège de France, was abolished in the seventies — personal comm. by Prof. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya) in the Netherlands, and perhaps in the near future in several other European universities as well; also although it is not part of the 'old Western world' Indology in Australia has met the sad fate of having lost almost all its chairs in the last decades (Mr. Royce Wiles contribution to this seminar).

l'art. The justifications are there, but in order to be able to formulate them in a convincing manner a theoretical alertness based on an active participation in what is going on in the world, in the sciences and in philosophy, is indispensable.[1] However, one sometimes feels that Indology, which used to be a fountainhead of creative ideas for the linguistic and at that period

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1. To illustrate my point I will mention one recent work, which, though it is a good scholarly contribution on the specific Sanskrit texts which are studied, displays a certain lack of theoretical alertness apparently arising from a lack of participation in relevant and recent scholarly discussions on the part of its author. In what follows I make use of some of my own contributions to a discussion on 'magic' on the E-mail Indology list (indologyaliverpool.ac.uk), May 1996. In *Die altindische Etymologie nach dem Verständnis Yāska's und seiner Vorgänger*, the author Max Deeg rightly emphasizes that the ancient South Asian discipline of Nirukta is to be understood in its own traditional context (Deeg 1995:419), and not to be measured according to the standards of modern etymology. The main concept which the author introduces to distinguish ancient Indian from modern etymology is 'Magie', but the author makes no attempt to go below the surface of this extremely problematic concept. He merely refers to L. Petzoldt's *Magie und Religion* (published 1978, consisting of articles of various authors mainly written between 1910 and 1968 and one in 1978) and to a definition of Hutton Webster (1973, an earlier edition appeared in ca. 1948). Also more generally, no secondary literature after ca. 1980 is mentioned in this book which appeared in 1955. While it had already become clear to L. Petzoldt that the 19th century ideas on an evolution from magic pre-animism through animism to theistic religion (cf. Frazer's *Golden Bough*) are untenable (Petzoldt p. X), M. Deeg's presentation of facts seems not to go beyond such an outdated evolutionary scheme (at least I do not see any explicit reflection on the problems involved). One wonders why no reference was made to more recent material such as Stanley J. Tambiah's *Magic, Science and the Scope of Rationality* (Tambiah 1990) who points out (p. 2) that "we have to confront today the question whether or not the categories of magic, science and religion may be 'tendentious' and their analytical value rendered suspect by their historical 'embeddeness.'" Of course one need not agree with the direction of modern discussions on 'magic', but this too deserves to be stated and preferably argued, and for this the ancient South Asian sources would perhaps provide highly relevant material. In short : why is so much energy invested in studying the data (digging gold) and hardly any in a critical reflection

newly emerging social sciences in the 19th century, has become an area of muddy backwaters of outdated ideas and concepts in the religious and human sciences.[1]

Be that as it may, one major justification lies in the enormous amount of data concerning human developments in South Asia extending over more than 20 centuries. Not only are the questions and problems concerning the linguistic, political, economic and social history of South Asia important in their own

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(refining and processing the product till its value is obvious also to persons outside the limited cricle of Indologists)? Why not participate in modern academic discussions on this subject? This is, very briefly, my criticism concerning the uncritical use of the term 'Magie' in Max Deeg's work which, in spite of the mentioned shortcoming, will certainly remain valuable for Indological specialists. In all fairness it should also be added that the author gives an intersting critique of the use of etymologies in the work of Heidegger, which testifies to his participation in another field of modern discussion.

Finally, I would like to mention a positive example: an author who does display an up-to-date theoretical alertness concerning the problems with which his ancient texts deal : In the recent book *Wrot und Text Bei Kumārila Bhaṭṭa* (Göhler 1995a), the author combines a careful philological study of the sources with a sound alertness for modern (at least 20th century) theories in the philosophy of language, esp. Speech act-theories. The problem of 'comparability' is more explicitly addressed in his article "Gab es im alten Indien eine Sprechakttheorie?" (Göhler 1995b). Although the author (rightly) concludes that ancient India did not have a speech act-theory in the strict sense of the word, he also demonstrates that most of the presuppositions of modern speech act-theories are not as original as they have been claimed to be, and further that this specific comparison is clarifying in both ways, for ancient Mīmāṃsā and for modern theory.

1. It is my impression that this applies more to 'Indological' South Asian Studies, with their traditional 'backward' orientation and their heavy load of extensive ancient data, than to neighbouring area studies (on East Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa etc.) On the other hand, in South Asian Studies which focus on modern problems the full historical dimension is often not sufficiently taken into account. This situation of bifurcation within South Asian Studies is reflected in the major journals dealing with these studies: they can be easily attributed to either one of the two directions, classical-Indological or modern.

right, we may also expect that attempts to answer these questions add an important historical dimension to modern linguistic, political, economic and social sciences, and even contribute to their further critical development.[1]

That there is a great need for more data and a deeper historical dimension in these sciences should be clear to anyone who is familiar with the rate at which their theories are replaced by newer ones without there being a strong sense of progress. This point I discussed in more detail with regard to the linguistic and social sciences in the introductory chapter to the book *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit* (Houben, 1996:1-13), which contains contributions by numerous scholars on the position of Sanskrit from the pre-vedic to modern times.

3.2

At present I would like to draw your attention in addition to a rational justification which arises in a different area, namely philosophy. In spite of all historical and contextual differences between Western and Indian and other traditions, there are some universals of the human condition: we perceive objects through our senses, we experience time, we communicate through impulses created by our organs of action, especially through speech created from our vocal cords, tongue, etc. Thus, language, thought and objective reality in its temporal and spatial dimensions are three factors with which any human being has to deal. Statements on language, thought and objective reality have a relevance for any human being having to deal with these universals of the human condition, in any period in the history of mankind. If such statements implicitly or explicitly claim

1. A programme like the one suggesed here remains within the boundaries of modern scientific discourse, but need not be 'committed to a specifically European orientation' as Halbfass feared for claims and programs of a totally open-minded exploration of the 'human phenomenon' (Halbfass 1988:437). One of the strategies to avoid this danger could be to involve both 'Western' and South Asian scholars in such such programs.

universal validity, they should survive a confrontation with statements on the same topic from different traditions. Here, we are not just interested in data concerning various fields of social and linguistic behaviour, which we can use to build our own theories. Rather, we want to know how thinkers in the past collected and theorized the data available to them. These thinkers of the past are then not just providers of new data, but they become also—perhaps first of all—partners in a dialogue. As in any sincere dialogue, the other may provide challenging new ideas and insights for our own theorizing. He may also give us insight into the strong points and basic conditions of our own successes. Although the past cannot be expected to provide us with instant solutions to the problems which accompany our technological and scientific successes (and blunders), and which nowadays present themselves in unprecedented urgency and in unexpetcted dimensions, it can suggest alternatives and correctives to one-sided developments.

3.3

Put differently : Just as, in order to be able to cope successfully with new biological, medical and agricultural challenges, it is important to maintain and make use of a rich reservoir of bio-diversity, in the same way, in order to be able to deal successfully with new challenges in philosophy and the human sciences, it is important to maintain and make use of a rich reservoir of idea-o-diversity. It is important to remain open for different perspectives on basic philosophical and human problems, and the past especially also the past of South Asia has conserved for us a great variety of powerful perspectives in seedform.

4. Why take into account philosophical perspectives from the past, East and West?

4.1

My argument to show in more detail the rational philosophical basis for taking seriously the perspectives on

reality which the past has conserved for us, consists of three steps, and I will try to present them here very briefly. First, the value of taking these past perspectives especially those of South Asia into account can be demonstrated with the help of a few examples.

4.1.1

First, in the field of philosophical ethics, we see that notions which have nowadays acquired common currency are directly taken from the South Asian tradition, either together with the Sanskrit term for it e.g. *karma, dharma, ahiṃsā*, which have all found a place in the recent and compact *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Blackburn, 1994) as well as in the *Oxford Paperback Dictionary of English*—or with a calque of the Sanskrit term, e.g. 'non-violence' (Eng./French), 'Gewaltlosigkeit' (German), 'geweldloosheid' (Dutch), etc. The fact that these notions and terms which have a long history in South Asian thought have found a well-established place in modern English philosophical (and even in common) discourse is a testimony to their general value and relevance.

4.1.2

Second, a quite different example is provided by a book edited by B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (1994). In this recent publication, which should be of considerable interest to philosophers of language and epistemology as well as to Indologists, the problem how we know and understand from words is addressed with reference to both Western and South Asian philosophical contributions. An enormous amount of our daily working knowledge is based on 'linguistic input', i.e. verbal and written testimonies from authors who are removed from us in time and or space and who have or had at their disposal perceptual sources and/or intellectual skills not available to us. It becomes clear in this book that the Western philosophical tradition has nevertheless only very sparingly dealt with problems of knowledge based on spoken or written

words. The South Asian tradition, on the other hand, has dealt with this universal problem area in a systematic and profound way, and contains in this respect numerous challenges and incentives for modern (Western and non-Western) philosophers.

4.1.3

Third, a more specific example is the following. Since the ancient Greeks, Epimenides, Philetas of Cos, and others, J. Buridanus of the European Middle Ages, etc., the Western tradition of thought has attempted to cope with a family of paradoxes, of which the so-called Liar paradox is most well-known. This paradox arises from a statement like "everything I am saying is false." These paradoxes have presented crucial problems to Russell and others attempting to establish a perfect language for logic and science. Nowadays they play an important role in logic and semantics. As I have pointed out in a recent publication (Houben 1995a and b),[1] the grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari solved the Liar and related paradoxes in a way which is quite original if compared with the attempts which the Western tradition has produced so far. Although Bhartṛhari is concerned with rather simple forms of the paradox, it has interesting implications for the more sophisticated paradoxes of modern logic and semantics. Bhartṛhari's approach seems to come closest to the 'Austinian approach' to semantic paradoxes as proposed by Barwise and Etchemendy (1987).

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1. Recently, in a paper presented at the 10th world Sanskrit Conference in Bangalore, C. Oetke expressed some doubts whether the relevant passage was really dealing with a 'Liar paradox' and tried to propose an alternative interpretation. However, his doubts were obviously based on an arbitrarily strict definition of the term 'paradox', while his alternative interpretation betrayed an insufficient grasp of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of relation and was in direct contradiction with the text. Since the author has started to revise his views in the light of the criticism it received I will here refrain from discussing it in more detail.

4.1.4

These three examples, incidentally, illustrate an important point at which I have hinted earlier : the past cannot be expected to provide us with complete instant solutions to modern problems. At the most, the perspectives of the past can have an important catalyzing function. Problems in the modern world as well as in modern philosophy are in the final analysis to be solved in the present time. Even if ancient texts come close to directly addressing a number of problems which occupy us at present (e.g. because universals of the human condition are involved), there always remains a final step to be made, namely that of adapting and applying the ancient answers to the modern context.[1]

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1. This can also be illustrated with another well-known example of the value of taking past perspectives into account, which, however, does not pertain directly to philosophy, but to linguistics. The importance of ancient South Asian grammar for the developments in linguistics in the 18th and 19th century has often been emphasized. It is nowadays becoming clear that it is mistaken to say that linguistic insights from ancient South Asia have been directly incorporated in the Western tradition. Several important theoretical ideas concerning the analysis of language had already taken form independent from the discovery of Sanskrit, e.g. in the once important but now largely forgotten 17th-18th century Dutch school of linguistics, the *Schola Hemsterhusiana* (J. Noordegraaf, in a contribution to *History and Rationality : The Skövde Papers in the Historiography of Linguistics*, ed. by K. D. Dutz and K. Forsgren, Münster : Nodus, 1995) A closer study of the developments preceding and following the discovery of Sanskrit and its linguistic disciplines seems to suggest that the latter worked—at least initially more as a very important catalyst than as a direct source. This implies, among other things, that the mature Sanskrit linguistic disciplines have not yet been sufficiently studied in their own right, and that they still hold the promise of providing us with relevant 'new' insights, especially in the field of semantics (cf. Houben, forthc. a).

   Similar things apply to Sanskrit and 'environmental studies' : no direct solution for modern problems can be expected from the ancient texts. Prof. G. U. Thite's sharp criticism of scholars who do claim to find direct solutions for modern problems (cf. his paper presented at the seminar) is in this light justified. But one should be careful not to throw away the child with the bathing water : A judicious use

4.2.1

The second step in my argument is to say that it is not only because we can point out some incidental instances where past perspectives on certain problems are still valuable that we should take these past perspectives into account. This we should also do because a rational approach to truth makes it necessary. In one mode of a rational approach to truth it can be said that whenever we have rationally conclusive arguments to arrive at the truth on a certain issue, it is not necessary any more to listen to the proponents of opposing views. If the other does not agree with our conclusion he has apparently failed to understand the logic of our reasoning. Only one truth can be universally valid. If someone contests our 'universally valid' truth, he may do so because it is not really a universally valid truth, or because the other's logic is faulty. In this mode of rationality our own 'universally valid' truth is threatened by the deviation truth perceived by someone else. Even this person

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of the ancient sources may certainly lead to significant contributions to modern discussions on the environment as it can add an important historical dimension to the urgent problems of today. Some valuable suggestions in this direction are found in Jha 1991, e.g. Kulkarni 1991:1, 5-6. "We must not treat these texts as textbooks of environmental science in which we find chapterwise information on (the) environmental problems." If we delimit the term 'environmentally aware' to the technical experts of ecology we cannot call Bhishnoi tribals as aware of their environment... But I would like to say because Bhishnois had religious notions rooted in emotions about trees, they could lead a movement like 'Chipko' ... and (show) their awareness of their surroundings more forcefully than persons like us quoting merely encyclopedic definitions of ecology.... The point is that the religious and superstitious relationships with nature can be utilised more forcefully in promoting environmental awareness so far as a layman is concerned. In the chain man-belief system-human action-environment, ancient texts can inform us on two links (belief systems and human actions), while we may have recourse to archeological data to reconstruct the conditions of the other factors (man and the environment) in a certain period (for an introduction on the environmental history of South Asia see the relevant sections in Kulke and Rothermund 1990).

himself may be considered a threat, something which may lead to verbal or even physical abuse.[1]

4.2.2

However, there is an aspect of truth which makes it not exclusively dependent on the things-as-it-is and the statements about it, but also on its acceptability to other 'rational agents'. This may be the basis of a quite different attitude to rationality and truth. The notion of truth does indeed presuppose a single reality about which some valid statements can be made, but it also presupposes an interaction between those who are able to consider something true or false.

Here I would like to quote Julian Roberts, who remarked in a penetrating study of the 'philosophy of reflection' and of German philosophers of the twentieth century :

> *Knowledge 'grows' in discontinuity and dialogical confrontation with the unfamiliar. Monologically, it merely consolidates itself... In this respect, the 'interest' of knowledge... lies in the dialogue with other worlds... 'I' need to know whether 'you' know things that can destroy my universal generalisations, or disrupt my implications.... we could say that any interest in 'truth' presupposes interaction between a plurality of knowledge bearers (Roberts 1992:286-287, author's emphasis).*

In this approach to truth and rationality, attempts to state the truth which deviate from our own attempts are no threat, but they help us to refine and improve our own perception. The acceptance of imperfections in our own perceptions and statements implies a recognition of the value of different perceptions. If it is next recognized that these different perceptions must somehow be affected by the different ways in

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1. Cf. the case of king (and St.) Louis IX saying that a Christian should defend his faith against the Jews by thrusting "his sword into their entrails, as far as it would go", referred to by Bronkhorst in his lecture (forthc., ms p. 6). Legends surrounding the fate of Diṅnāga and his works suggest that in ancient South Asia too the rational means to make the other consent to one's perception of the truth were sometimes supplemented by more physical ones.

which the perceivers are situated in the reality about which truthful statements are attempted, the object of these statements starts to appear in a different light. We have no more a monolithic reality in a simple and straightforward relation with a truthful statement. Reality has rather become a landscape of which different persons may have quite distinct, but equally valid, perceptions.[1] Although one may try to arrive at a perception which transcends the individual differences, any concrete perception of the landscape needs a perceiver located at some point, whether this point is in or above the landscape.

4.2.3

This approach to reality, rationality and truth can be called perspectivistic in that it acknowledges beforehand the validity of different perspectives on a given issue. It is true that one may also be eager to know more about different views and their backgrounds on a purely polemical basis, i.e. only in order to refute one's opponents. Moreover, the perspectivistic attitude may combine in certain ways with the polemical motivation of wanting to show that one's own perspective is finally the most valuable one. In any case, it is especially a perspectivistic approach which not only fosters but even necessitates the serious study of different perspectives. It is to be noted that perspectivism in the abovementioned general sense has a solid backgound both in the Western tradition and in the South Asian tradition, a fact which has so far not received the attention it deserves. Moreover, in both cases it is also closely related with the discipline of philology.

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1. The Spanish philosopher José Ortega Y Gasset (1883-1953) seems to have been the first one to use the image of the landscape (cf. below) at least since 1923; later on it is also found with several other writers.

This brings me to the third step in my argument :

That there already is a strong basis for a philosophical approach to modern problems which takes into account different perspectives, including those of the past. As already mentioned, a great amount of extremely precious data concerning human developments in South Asia is available. These data pertain also to sophisticated philosophical discussions in South Asia. Only very few literary traditions, among them the Sanskrit and the Greek-Latin tradition, allow so many competing philosophical perspectives from a distant past to be directly studied in so much detail. Just like other literary traditions such as the Hebrew and Arabic tradition, these two have their roots in elaborate and systematic attempts to come to terms with textual and exegetical problems posed by a set of greatly valued texts, the Vedas in the case of the Sanskrit tradition, Homer's works in the Greek-Latin tradition, the Bible in the Hebrew tradition, and the Koran for the Arabs. These systematic attempts gave rise to a philological tradition, in which it was important to be precise and careful with the precise text and interpretation of the works at the basis of one's (religious and/or ethnic) community. Now, in the course of time both the West and South Asia developed perspectivistic approaches in which it was not enough to be precise and careful with the texts of one's own community; it was equally important to be precise and careful with the views of others and the sources of alternative traditions.

4.3.1

For South Asia one can refer to several Jain authors such as Mallavādin, who presented the most important philosophical viewpoints of his time in the schematic form of a wheel and its spokes (Mallavādin's preferred form of Jainism constitutes the nave), and Siddhasena Divākara (Halbfass 1988:267; cf. some important studies on the latter by Phyllis Granoff); and to the Brahminical grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (on his

'perspectivism' e.g. Halbfass 1988 : 268-269; Houben 1994a and 1995c), in whose work we find a statement which could very well serve as a motto of the perspectivist approach.[1]

489.

The intellect (or 'insight') acquires sharpness by familiarity with different traditional views. What conslusions can be reached by him who only runs after his own reasoning?

4.3.2

In the West the first philosophical pronounciations of perspectivism were made by G. W. Leibniz (17th-18th century)[2]

It is true that the same thing can be represented differently; but there must always be a precise relation between the representation and the thing, and hence between the different representations and the same thing. The perspectival projections, which converge in the circle at conical sections, show that one and the same circle can be represented by an ellips, by a parabole, and by a hyperbole, and even by another circle and by a straight line, and by a point. Nothing appears so different, nor so dissimilar, than these figures; and yet there is an exact relation from each point to each point. Also should it be acknowledged that each soul makes its representation of the universe according to its own point of view, and through a relation which is proper to it; but a perfect harmony is always there. (Leibniz, Théodicee III, 357, after König 1989:366, my traslation.)

And just as one and the same village, looked at from different sides, appears quite different and is as it were multiplied perspectively, it happens similarly that, on account of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are as many different universes, which are nevertheless just perspectives of a single one according to different points of view of each Monade. (Leibniz, Monadologie 57, after König 1989:366, my translation.)

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1. *Prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ*
   kiyad vā śakyam unnetuṃ svatarkam anudhāvatā
   Cf. Halbfass 1988: 268, referring to the first line of this verse : "This statement sounds almost like a motto and a programmatic justification of the future doxographies, in particular if we consider the perspectivistic approach of the Jains." These verses may have been written by a student or commentator of Bhartṛhari.
2. For this section I am greatly indebted to the rich and insightful article on Perspectivism by G. König (1989).

The idea of the importance of the 'point of view' or 'Sehe-punckt' was picked up by J. M. Chladenius and Ch. A. Cruisus.[1] It was Chladenius who subsequently applied Leibniz's insights explicitly to the historical and interpretative sciences in his *Allgemeinen Geschichtswissenschaft* 1752) :

The point of view (Sehepunckt) is the inner and outer state of the perceiver, in so far as a certain and particular way to perceive and consider the occurring things flows from it. (This is) a notion which goes together with the most important ones in the entire Philosophy, which one is nowadays however not yet habituated to put to use, except that Mr. Leibniz himself has used it here and there in Metaphysics and Psychology. In historical knowledge, however, almost everything depends on it. (Chladenius, *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. by R. Koselleck, 1985, p. 100f., after König 1989:366, my translation)

According to R. Koselleck, who edited Chladenius work in 1985, the insight of the importance of the 'point of view' as being of crucial importance for historical knowledge was a "breakthrough, as the relativity of the formation of historical judgments was since then no more a reproach against finding a historical truth, but its preconditition;" although Chladenius still adopted an objectivistic realism, according to which historical truths remain ever the same, "he nevertheless opened up the ways which lead to a reflecting historiography, which takes into account the history of influence and reception as an element of historical truth" (R. Koselleck, after König 1989:366, my translation).

Again more philosophical employments of the notion of the 'point of view' were made by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) who stated that "the perspectival (*das Perspektivische*) is the fundamental condition of all life" (Nietzsche, *Jenseits von*

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1. Cf. Chaladenius Einleitung zur richtigen *Auslegung vernünfftiger Reden und Schriften*, 1742, and Crusius' *Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlassichkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss*, 1747, cited in König 1989:366.

Gut und Böse, Vorrede, after König 1989:367, my translation), and José Ortega Y Gasset (1883-1955), according to whom "reality offers, like a landscape, infinitely many perspectives, which are all equally true and have equal rights (;) the only perspective which is wrong is the one which claims to be the only one" (José Ortega y Gasset, after König 1989:367, my translation). Perspectivistic notions such as 'standpoint', 'horizon' and related ones are also of crucial importance in the works of authors like Husserl (1859-1938), Heidegger (1889-1976) and Gadamer (1900), and with these we have come to some important sources of Wilhelm Halbfass. Although Halbfass is critical of several of their views (e.g. regarding the Husserl's sharp distinction between 'European mankind' and 'the Indian and all the other oriental traditions,' Halbfass 1989:157), a deep methodical influence readily acknowledged by Halbfass—is discernible on almost every page of his work.

4.3.3

Extensive further study is needed to give us more detailed information about overlaps and distinctions between the South Asian 'perspectivisms' and those of the West, but even now some general observations can be made on the basis of a cursory review. The South Asian forms got established earlier, they were mostly concerned with philosophical and religious viewpoints, and they led to the development of schematic, ahistorical 'types of viewpoints', in order to conveniently deal with a multitude of relevant views. The Western forms derived their inspiration from philosophy (Leibniz), but were first elaborated with regard to problems of historical interpretation. In philosophy the multitude of viewpoints did not lead to the development of typologies of viewpoints as in South Asia;occasionally it gave rise to a relativism and radical scepticism (Nietzsche). Perspectivism became most important

in philosophies of perception (Husserl's phenomenology of perception) and in philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer). What applies to all forms of perspectivism, including even Nietzsche's radically sceptical perspectivism, is that their taking into account of different perspectives is based on and further necessitates a careful treatment of the sources and manuscripts are particularly important among these concerning the different perspectives. These perspectivisms, in other words, could only arise within philological traditions, which they have subsequently further strengthened, transformed and enriched. The perspectivisms seem to signal a certain maturity of the philological traditions in which they arose.

4.3.4

In his book *India and Europe*, Halbfass has followed the inner necessity of Western perspectivism to take into account more and more perspectives, and has brought this perspectivism to a new developmental stage by including the contributions of India on an equal footing. The 'fusion of horizons' which in Gadamer's work mainly refers to the chronologically vertical situation "when the historically situated author and the equally historically situated reader manage to create a shared meaning" (Blackburn 1994:152) is complemented by what may be called a 'fusion of horizons in a horizontal dimension' of Western and Indian perspectives in the work of Halbfass. It is thus Halbfass's book which has proved extremely stimulating to a great number of authors (Indologists and philosophers alike) with quite diverse specializations.[1] It has demonstrated the strong need for a global approach in philosophy and philology a need which is inherent in the Western perspectivisms although

1. Cf. the volume in preparation by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz (eds.) Beyond Orientalism : the impact of the work of W. Halbfass on Indian and cross-cultural studies, Amsterdam : Rodopi.

both this need itself and the complexity of the tasks involved have till recently been covered up by rhetorics on an alleged superiority and exclusiveness of 'Western' science and philosophy. The basis for contributions in the direction indicated by Halbfass are the Western perspectivisms together with their matrix, the Western tradition of philology and its philological skills, techniques and conceptual tools.

4.3.5

It can be argued that Western scholars have so far studied the South Asian sources mainly for the sake of acquiring new data for the Western tradition of philology and other branches of learning. Although Halbfass and a few others did make some relevant contributions[1], too little attention has been paid to the philological skills, techniques and conceptual tools with the perspectivist attitude of philosophy as its pinacle which have evolved and have been developed in South Asia. It is these philological skills, techniques and conceptual tools, however, which have conserved, transmitted, and to a considerable extent also created the data which have been so happily accepted by Western scholars. A case in piont is the set of notions referring to different types of philosophical and scientific texts, namely *sūtra, vārttika, bhāṣya.* These notions concerning how a certain type of text is or rather how it should be have given direction to centuries of South Asian philological activities. Yet, in the most elaborate studies presently available on the 'Sūtra-literature', namely a number of publications by Louis Renou,[2] we see that

1. Here, I think of Halbfass valuable studies of the hermeneutically crucial concepts of darśana, ānvīkṣikī vis-à-vis 'philosophy', and dharma vis-à-vis 'religion', Halbfass 1988:263-348, and of the Sanskrit doxographies, Halbfass 1988:349-368.

2. E.g., Renou 1947, 1963. For a recent discussion sec Houben forthc. b. Important contributions focusing on the Sūtra in Jaina literature are : Balbir 1987, Caillat 1994.

the author limits himself to studying the relevant texts directly, and builds on this basis his own theories on what the term *sūtra* 'originally' meant, on the defining character of the Sūtra-literature, its basic types, etc. This is in itself of course entirely legitimate. However, hardly any attention is paid to the concept which ancient South Asian authors and redactors themselves had of 'a *sūtra*.'[1] That matters are considerably more complicated than surmised till now is clear from some recent studies by Bronkhorst, in which he shows that the concept of *vārttika* underwent considerable changes in the South Asian tradition since the time of Bhartṛhari (5th century).[2] The fluctuating content of the notion of *vārttika* has important implications for the precise interpretation of the concepts of *bhāṣya* and *sūtra* in different periods of South Asian philological activity.[3]

4.3.6

This brings us to the final remark to be made here : it is not only Western perspectivism which has an inherent necessity to take more and more perspectives into account including the rich South Asian material concerning philosophical perspectives; and it is not only the Western philological tradition which provides a basis for such a global approach. It is also the traditional South Asian perspectivism in all its varieties which has an inherent necessity to take more and more perspectives

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1. Thus, von Hinüber (1994:137 n. 27) quite rightly observed : "Die Wortgeschichte von Sanskrit sūtra-im Sinne von Text bedarf noch einer genauen Untersuchung vor allem hinsichtlich der Chronologie der Verwendung des Wortes."
2. See especially Bronkhorst 1990.
3. Cf. now also Houben forther. b, which starts from Bhartṛhari's understanding of the notion of *sūtra* (mainly on the basis of his *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā*) and places it in the larger historical context of the theory and practice of the Sūtra-genre in the Sanskrit traditon.

into account, including the extremely challenging perspectives propounded by modern thinkers with a Western backgound. And the South Asian philological tradition (cf. preceding section) provides perhaps a stronger basis for such an enterprise than so far realized.[1] The twelve-spoked wheel of philosophical views of Mallavādin could be confronted with modern ones, and perhaps some of the latter may turn out to be subsumable under some of the ancient ones. And if one accepts with Bhartṛhari (or his pupil who is perhaps the author of the verse in question) that "the intellect (or, 'insight') acquires sharpness by familiarity with different traditional views" (cf. note 24) there seems no reason to exclude Western views from one's investigations. Bhartṛthari's method of representing philosophical discussions of his time not merely as fights by means of arguments, but rather as clashes between systems with each their own sets of presuppositions (*āgama*), supporting perceptions (*pratyakṣa*), and arguments (*tarka*) (cf. Houben 1995c), may lead to

1. While Western scholars in the nineteenth century were amazed to discover, for instance, systems of logic and atomistic theories in ancient South Asia, the existence of a philological tradition seems to have been very much taken for granted. The case is perhaps somewhat similar to the case of 'rationality', as described by Bronkhorst (forthc., ms p. 4) "The fact that scholars have not expressed surprise at the discovery of a strong rational tradition in India may be due, ironically, to the Western background of modern scholarship.... European scholars, and those influenced by them, may have found it self-evident to find something similar in India." The modern perception of the ancient South Asian linguistic presuppositions has often remained inadequate and Distortive, e.g. with regard to the factor time in language (an absolute eternalism which was defended only by a certain group of thinkers is sometimes erroneously attributed to all South Asian or all Brahminical thought about language, cf. Houben 1994b; the inadequacy of such a view with regard to Pāṇini was demonstrated in a recent paper by G. Cardona, "Escape Rules in Pāṇini : Sūtras of the Type *anyebhyo'pi dṛśyate*," X World Sanskrit Conference in Bangalore, English Abstracts p, 412-413). This is one of the factors which has placed also the philological tradition of South Asia in an unnecessarily unfavorable light.

interesting results if applied to philosophical discussions of the last century. Here, too, we see both the need and the basis for a global approach to philosophical problems.

4.3.7

But for this approach to be realized we probably have to wait till the age-old South Asian śāstric tradition of the Brahminical disciplines, which in the course of time underwent so many transformations when external and internal conditions made this necessary, is able to reorient itself in a new, modernized (as explained before, not any more just Westernized) world.[1] The linguistic, rhetorical and philological techniques and devices which were developed to enable the thinkers of a philosophical system to represent their knowledge in a compact, objectified and (also orally) reproducible way (making use, for instance, of the *sūtra*-cum-*bhāṣya* style), for the sake of polemical discussion and for the sake of transmission, contributed to a considerably 'exosomatic' tradition of knowledge,[2] which, at

1. One of the major obstacles for this necessary reorientation is perhaps the myth of the eternality and unchangability of the śāstric tradition, a myth which has been created and maintained both by Western Indologists (cf. Bronkhorst 1989) and by a number of exponents and defenders of the tradition. When finalizing this article I come across the following citation from Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru which criticizes the mentioned myth as follows : "What we regard today as tradition is itself the product of a continuous evolution. In our religion we have had reformers and rebels challenging earlier beliefs and thus changing accepted values. .. Tradition is not static, it does not mean being caught in the past... Only that society can be alive which alone absorbs new challenges and ideas and refuses to let old prejudices and the weight of the past inhibit its attitude and direction." (Brochure of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, Delhi 1994:73)
2. The expression 'exosomatic' refers to Popper's use of the term (e.g. 1994:130-153) with regard to knowledge which does not remain implicit but is objectified and reproducible and thus conducive to cummulative progress. (The importance of the kind of objectification and reproducibility which is achieved by the development of an artificial, technical language e.g. for linguistics, mathematics, etc. was argued by Staal 1995, who referred to both examples from 'the West'

least in some periods, allowed for dynamic progress through continuing dialectics and refinements. But at present, the tradition seems to have wholly stagnated. What is needed now is not so much a stronger protection of the disciplines (śāstras) in their present state too much protection will prevent creative developments such as have taken place in the transition periods of the past, and this can only lead to further stagnation and decay.[1] What is needed is enlivenment of the tradition, and in this respect a project such as the so-called Pandit-Philosopher project (PPP) may be considered a promising enterprise (though it is so far perhaps too small-scale to be sufficiently effective), as it "attempts to bring together traditional pandits and scholars in Western philosophy in order to establish a dialogue between ancient Indian philosophy and Western philosophy, and especially to revive the Indian tradition of philosophy."[2]

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and from South Asia.) But Popper did not realize that some of his ideas of how science should function and be progressive had already become reality in the South Asian tradition. Under historical conditions which are difficult to reconstruct, Jaina, Buddhist and Brahminical 'systems of knowledge' took concrete shape in the centuries before and after the beginning of the CE, and acquired as it were their own body (with *sūtras* or *kārikās*, etc., as the bones and *bhāṣyas*, *ṭīkās*, etc., as the flesh), and soul (the contents of the teachings). The 'body-soul' combination had its own continuity and life-span (and its own life-crises), independent from the limits of the bodies of the propounders and transmitters of the system. The polemics between the systems forced their adherents to make more and more of the presuppositions and intuitions in their system explicit. The explicated and objectified knowledge did not have to die with the death of its bearers and propounders. As interesting as the periods of progress are here the periods of serious stagnation of the ancient South Asian sciences and disciplines.

1. To speak in terms used in the pandit discussion (*paṇḍita-pariṣad*) at this seminar : what is most needed with regard to what is left of the living tradition, is not so much *śāstrasaṁrakṣaṇam*, but rather *śāstrasaṃjīvanam*.
2. Bhate 1996:396. The project is supported and implemented under the guidance of Prof. M. P. Rege, President of Prajna Pathashala Mandal, Wai, Maharashtra.

5.

Conclusion. The future of Indology : some recommendations

In the preceding sections, we have on the one hand gone far beyond the boundaries of Indology, but on the other hand we did not touch on all of its aspects. Still, we did deal with some of its principal traditional concerns, viz. philosophy and philology. As promised at the beginning, I will now return to Indology or South Asian Studies and conclude with some concrete 'recommendations', which are reformulated extractions and explications from the preceding considerations.

5.1

The first recommendation concerns the presence of Indological or South Asian Studies at universities.

No university in the world, which, in accordance with the meaning of the word university, attempts to be a place of universal learning, can afford to be without a department of Indology or South Asian studies, which deal with the extraordinary rich data concerning the linguistic, literary, social political etc. past and present of South Asia.

These studies deserve to be undertaken for the sake of their so far only partly explored high value for the linguistic, social and human sciences etc., and for philosophy, both on account of the direct data and on account of the richness of 'idea-o-diversity' and perspectives on reality preserved in the sources, even though the countries which today occupy the geographical area of South Asia do not belong to the economically most interesting ones. A special protest should be pronounced against the tendency to measure studies like Indology or South Asian Studies with the same standards (e.g. number of students) as massive and economically more demonstrably useful studies such as management studies, computer science etc. "Oak bark is measured by pound, but cinnamon per gram" (to paraphrase a line of Dutch poetry, cited by a recent governmental committee to investigate the state of Indology and other "Small Letters" at the Faculties of Letters of Dutch universities). Even a relatively small department in Indology or South Asian Studies can contribute greatly to the above mentioned disciplines and thus greatly widen the scope of learning at the university.

5.2

The second recommendation concerns the great amount of precious data which need to be protected even though they cannot yet all be studied in detail today or in the near future.

Whatever ideological and intellectual wars have been fought, are being fought, and will be fought around the data of Indology or South Asian Studies, it is of great importance that these data—manuscripts, archeological objects, etc. which are to be considered an extraordinarily rich world heritage of universal value, be protected with the utmost care, in whatever Asian, European, North American or other country they are presently kept; and they are to be made accessible to bona fide research workers from all countries.

At the seminar some special problematic situations were briefly mentioned which would deserve diplomatic actions on institutional or government level to be undertaken: the access to a great collection of Sanskrit manuscripts in Nepal to Indian scholars, and the access to a great collection of Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in Tibetan monasteries in the People's Republic China to scholars outside China. Because access to existing editions and secondary sources is important for fruitful work on manuscripts, we mention here also the desirability of publications of Western Indologists becoming more easily accessible to scholars in India and other Asian countries (a point emphasized at the seminar by Prof. H. Hock).

5:3

The third recommendation concerns the need to make rational justifications for Indology or South Asian Studies, which are not always expressed in sufficiently convincing ways, more visible.

A more active participation in the academic marketplace and especially also a theoretical alertness with regard to recent scientific developments is needed if Indology or South Asian Studies are to survive the present-day unfavorable conditions happily. This more active participation implies that researchers in this field do not remain satisfied with unearthing part of the richness of the goldmine on which they are sitting—the rich

amount of data but refine their findings in theoretically relevant and challenging ways. Only if some valuable 'fully processed' results—rather than just the raw material—can be presented at the academic marketplace can it be expected that the academic world supports the efforts required for further digging after gold.

In order to concentrate the efforts of serious researchers on potentially fruitful topics, and in order to avoid unnecessary overlap of efforts, common research projects should be designed and announced (making use of the medium of the E-mail Indology list) which are not just dataoriented, but which are also promising with regard to the theoretical (including philosophical) relevance of the results. (In a forthcoming publication, Houben forthc a, I identify eight landmarks in the history of semantics in the Sanskrit tradition which have not yet been sufficiently studied in their historical and philosophical dynamics; other topics for research projects have been mentioned and discussed at the seminar). To be discouraged because of their generally low theoretical relevance are studies of the type "X and Y on Z" where X is a well-known 'Western' author, Y a not-so-well-known Indian author, and Z some general philosophical or religious topic. Cf. discussion in note 18.

5.4

The three recommendations mentioned so far all pertain to the whole field of Indology or South Asian Studies, from the distant past to the present, from all possible angles of approach, philological, archeological, etc., and with regard to all kinds of data, linguistic, social etc. The fourth and fifth recommendation pertain to Sanskrit studies, an important subfield of Indology or South Asian Studies, which, however, is also relevant to areas outside South Asia (e.g. South East Asia, Central Asia). The fourth recommendation concerns more specifically the traditional study of the Sanskrit sources.

An enlivenment of the Brahminical disciplines or *śāstras*, in an open-minded and at the same time well-founded way, taking into account their own history of creative transformations when external and internal conditions made this necessary, is to be preferred to their mere conservation and protection, which may be expected to lead to contrary results, viz. further

stagnation and decay. Cf. section 4.3.7

5.5

The fifth and final recommendation concerns the study of Sanskrit at universities, especially those outside India and Nepal.

In the 18th, 19th and first half of the 20th century the academic teachers and students of the Sanskrit language could be excused for limiting themselves to the study of grammar and books, in view of the available methods of language learning, and the absence of or difficulty of access to recorded speech. Now, at the advent of the 21st century, these excuses are no longer valid and Sanskrit courses at universities should comprise a component of 'spoken Sanskrit' in addition to the study of grammar and classical texts, at least during one year, both for didactic reasons (better and fuller mastery over the language), and in order to facilitate and stimulate the communication between two rare species on this planet : traditional śāstrins[1] and students of ancient Sanskrit sources.

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1. Here I am thinking of any person... whether with Brahminical or Jaina or any other background in the Sanskrit tradition who 'possesses', i.e. has full command over, one or more *śāstras* (*śāstra* + in).

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Oriental Studies, Indology and Epistemology

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
I

In this paper I want to deal with a particular aspect of the general question as to whether, in which respects and to what extent Indian Studies might possess potential relevance for academic and non-academic fields other than Indology itself. By focusing on the topic of Indology and Epistemology the issue of the significance of Studies on India and Indian culture for concerns of theoretical philosophy is highlighted. My thesis is that even those branches of Indian Studies which are not concerned with Indian Philosophy possess potential relevance for the field of epistemology provided that a broadened notion of epistemology is hypostatized. On the other hand, although it is relatively easy to make it plausible that such a relevance exists in principle on account of the way in which the subject matter of studies on foreign cultures and societies is systematically related to epistemology, the question as to whether the principle relevance can actually come to fruition with respect to Indian Studies and how it could be exploited is difficult to settle. At any rate, a differentiated answer appears to be called for in this regard and precisely for this reason the problem of the significance of Indology for epistemological issues and vice versa can have a bearing upon questions pertaining to the way in which Indian Studies should proceed in the future and how priorities concerning projects of research can be justified.

II

Since my claim to the effect of a principle relevance of Indian Studies for epistemology relies on a specific understanding of the concept of 'epistemology' an explication is required. In contradistinction to some explanations to be found in 'Dictionaries of Philosophy' which suggest that 'epistemology' is equivalent to 'theory of knowledge' or that epistemology is concerned with (some kind of) knowledge about knowledge, I will assume a somewhat broader notion which is, however, sufficiently closely related to the narrower notions in order to exempt this understanding from the reproach of representing an undue and arbitrary extension of a current term. For the first principle of extension consists in assuming that not merely knowledge itself, but also the ingredients of knowledge according to the 'classical' definition of knowledge as justified true belief, i.e. belief and justification, belong to the concern of epistemology in the sense which will be hypostatized here. Moreover, it will be assumed that phenomena which are closely related to belief and which typically occur as states preceding the adoption of beliefs or succeed states of holding a belief, in particular entertaining a thought, doubting, discarding an opinion and similar ones, constitute the subject matter of epistemology according to the pertinent understanding.

On this basis one can establish a subcategorization of epistemology which will be used as a foil for the subsequent discussions. The following 'genealogical tree' is meant to give a rough sketch embodying distinctions that are pertinent in the present context :



Some comments appear to be required :

(1) With the distinction between the subcategories labelled by the terms 'descriptive', 'normative' and 'analytical' we refer to different kinds of 'epistemological enterprises' without presupposing any judgement concerning the question as to whether or not they are justified. The first category pertains to undertakings which investigate actually occurring states of affairs pertaining to epistemological phenomena in accordance with the hypostatized concept of 'epistemological'. This comprises not only epistemic phenomena which are possible objects of epistemology according to the pertinent sense of the

term but also states of affairs which actually arise in the context of doing epistemology or ensure from epistemological enterprises themselves. Typical topics of this category are e. g. beliefs which are actually held by particular persons or actually occurring ways of justifying certain opinions etc. The decisive point is that descriptive epistemology does not address questions of justification of those phenomena which function as the objects of investigation. In contradistinction to this normative epistemology is concerned not only with the justification of what actually occurs but also with epistemic states which only potentially occur. Most representative topics in this connection would be the question as to whether particular opinions are adopted on justified grounds as well as the general issue under which conditions the adoption of an opinion is justified. We suppose the existence of further varieties apart from descriptive and normative epistemology, because both notions together do not seem to exhaust everything which is relevant here. The term 'analytical epistemology' is meant to refer to enterprises like the definition of 'knowledge' or other important epistemological key-terms, the question as to whether current epistemic concepts are suited as analytical tools for dealing with certain epistemological or non-epistemological problems and similar issues. We do not claim that no alternative subcategorizations on this level are equally possible.

(2) The distinction between (i) 'objective', (ii) 'subjective' and (iii) 'reflexive' has been introduced here in order to make reference to another differentiation between three types or aspects of epistemology which appears to possess not little importance. We distinguish between 'objective', 'subjectice' and 'reflexive' aspects in the fields of descriptive epistemology in the way that the first variety should refer to epistemic states of subjects whose description is at stake in

some context, whereas the second and third varieties refer (a) to investigation pertaining to epistemic states of the describing subject(s) in general and (b) to investigations related to those particular epistemic states of subjects engaged in the undertaking of doing descriptive epistemology which either attain special relevance in this context or originate from being engaged in those tasks. Accordingly, the distinction is used here in order to refer to the difference between (i) beliefs and opinions held by persons whose beliefs and opinions function as the objects of description in the pertinent context, (ii) beliefs and opinions that are embraced by the desribing subject(s), but whose existence is not due to the fact that the relevant persons are engaged in some particular enterprise of descriptive epistemology and (iii) those particular belief-attitudes which are not only shared by the describer or the describers but also owe their existence to the pertinent undertaking of describing beliefs that are actually held by others or even oneself. It should go without saying that it could be equally legitimate to define 'reflexive' beliefs in a way that makes them a special variety within the broader category of 'subjective' beliefs.

(3) The fact that the distinction between (a) content, (b) propeties, (c) origination and (d) causation has been mentioned in order to provide for a subcategorization in the field of actually held beliefs and opinions is not meant to entail that it cannot be applied in other areas too. Here it refers in the first place to the difference between the questions : (i) Which beliefs and opinions are actually held (by some person or certain groups of persons)? (ii) Which properties, like strength of conviction, clarity and explicitness or internal consistence, do the pertinent beliefs and opinions exhibit?, (iii) What can be said about the origination of certain beliefs and opinions, e.g. the motives and reasons which were *de facto* relevant for their adoption? (iv)

Which methods and ways are actually used in order to prompt other subjects to adopt certain beliefs, to reinforce beliefs which are actually held, to make others change their minds etc. These questions possess obvious normative analogues. The distinction is neutral with respect to the tripartition between 'objective', 'subjective' and 'reflexive' and the fact that it has been connected only with the 'objective' variety in the above 'genealogical tree' is merely due to the purpose of simplifying the picture.

(4) Although distinctions which could be labelled by the terms 'material' and 'formal' can be equally drawn with respect to contents and properties of beliefs or opinions, they have been specifically connected here with the two categories of 'origination' and 'causation'. The reason is that we suppose that the distinction possesses distinctive relevance in the present context with respect to origination and causation of beliefs. Regarding the origination of opinions (1) specific causal factors, (2) individual rules or regularities according to which or in conformity with which individual opinions have been actually adopted and (3) formal properties of the process of adopting particular opinions as well as of the rules and regularities belonging to the previous category deserve to be distinguished. Analogously, one can differentiate regarding the causation of opinions by other persons between (1) specific factors which have been created in order to cause others to believe something, like drawing one's attention to certain facts, rational arguments, psychologically efficient considerations etc. (2) individual strategies employed for persuading others in some particular situation and (3) more general and formal properties of ways of making others believe something, in particular formal properties of entities belonging to the preceding categories. The items mentioned under (a) and (b) in the last line serve only for

illustration and no claim is implied to the effect that the list is exhaustive.

III

A connection between Oriental Studies and Indology in particular and Epistemology according to the notion represented by the above table is immediately obvious : Indology and Oriental Studies are epistemological undertakings of a particular sort. This holds good at least for the traditional conception of Indology and other Oriental disciplines, although the relevant component of the traditional concept has often remained implicit and it appears probable that a considerable number of undertakings in the field of philological research have been performed without a clear methodological consciousness of what one was actually doing. But there can be hardly any doubt that traditional Indology and other related disciplines conceived themselves as being concerned at least among other things with beliefs and opinions held by other subjects. In the German speaking area it has been in the first place the term 'Geistesgeschichte' which exhibits the concern of traditional Indology and the so-called 'Oriental disciplines' with the topic of actually held beliefs and opinions. This facet was never the only concern, however. Dealing with the interpretation of texts not only problems of the history and development of individual documents, but also the question as to what particular expressions can express by virtue of the linguistic rules of a particular language and the issue of what an individual writer intended either to express or to convey by certain expressions as well as by acts of producing a certain inscription are pertinent concerns of traditional philology. To be sure, these issues are seldom neatly kept apart from each other and from the related, but principally different enterprise of inferring states of beliefs and opinions from utterances and productions of inscriptions.

But there can be hardly any doubt that the ascertainment of actually held beliefs has practically always been considered as one of the tasks of traditional Indology by its representatives.

Nevertheless, the above table reveals also that the concern of the mainstream of traditional Indology was strongly biased, if it is viewed on the foil of the notion of descriptive epistemology. For it appears hardly deniable that most emphasis has been laid on the content of actually held beliefs and in particular on their material aspects, in other words, the variety (1) (a) (i)) appears to have been granted much more attention than any other subcategory. Partly this is well explainable and reasonable. For it seems that the identification of contents possesses priority at least with respect to the aspects of properties and the origination of beliefs. How could we ascertain properties like strength and entrenchment of beliefs or matters concerning their origination if we had not previously identified the content and in some sense the most essential fact of beliefs? It is not that we claim that issues regarding properties or origination are in principle never decidable without prior identification of content, but it appears difficult to deny that in general at least questions of the former sort can hardly be successfully dealt with without having solved issues of content whereas the reverse does not hold true to the same extent. However, even if we grant this, it only follows that it is reasonable to take identification of content as one of the starting points of research, but not that it must constitute the only starting point and that the situation must remain like that also in the future. For, firstly, it appears that the issue of 'causation', i.e. the topic of inducing other people to adopt opinions, is not logically tied to the identification of the content of beliefs of the inducer or any other subject in the same way as properties like strength or entrenchment or even their origination. It must be generally said that a negligence of neatly differentiating between

the issues of holding and of inducing beliefs constitute a major methodological deficiency of the tradition which feels itself committed to what is called 'Geistesgeschichte' or 'history of ideas.' It is usually tacitly supposed that what a certain document, say a Yogācāra-text, apparently claims to be true constitutes also something which is held to be true by its producer(s). This assumption is certainly not unreasonable. But to presuppose it without any argument can also be dangerous. For the range of possible functions of producing a text is not confined to the expression of what one believes to be true; it embraces also making others believe that something is true.[1]

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1. This is connected with uncertainties concerning what the enterprise of so-called 'Geistesgeschichte' really is about. Should one assume that it is concerned (a) with opinions that foreign subjects, in particular producers of texts, actually held or adhered to, (b) with views and beliefs which are tried to be propagated in particular by utterances and production of texts, (c) with thoughts entertained by other persons in so far as the fact that they have been entertained by certain subjects is primarily documented by utterances or texts or (d) with all those issues together? To be sure, vagueness in this regard can remain harmless under certain circumstances and in special contexts of investigation, but in other contexts it is certainly not any more admissible to be sloppy in that respect. If e.g. questions of origination are at stake it matters indeed whether the issue concerns held beliefs, propagated views or entertained thoughts. The question as to what are the causes of the circumstance that some opinion has been adopted or has been held is altogether different from the question as to whether some opinion is tried to be propagated and both questions in their turn are essentially different from the question as to why a certain thought has been entertained in some way— e.g. envisaged as being possibly true, taken into consideration and discarded as probably false etc.—by some subject in some particular situation. Corresponding to this distinction also the methods of research and the type of considerations which are suited as arguments can differ considerably.

Normally both aspects might go hand in hand. But there is no guarantee that this must always be the case. Anyhow, the issue of what beliefs the producer of an inscription intends to induce as well as the issue of what beliefs an utterance or an inscription is (objectively) apt to induce can be often successfully dealt with independently of the identification of beliefs held by the utterer or the producer himself. Moreover, the apparent methodological priority of the identification of content with respect to issues of properties and origination is counterbalanced by the circumstance that investigations concerning properties and origination are suited to bestow relevance on the task of identification of content. Seen in isolation, it is difficult to recognize any ultimate significance and depth in the mere ascertainment of particular contents of states of belief. But as soon as the issue of identification of content is connected with other properties and the topic of the origination of opinions, perspectives of greater theoretical relevance open up. Only in this context problems of a more general nature can be dealt with as e.g. the question as to whether some of the beliefs which are most deeply entrenched in subjects belonging to 20th century Western culture tend to be deeply entrenched beliefs also in other cultures, whether there are correspondences between strength of belief and particular social mechanism of enforcement, to which extent particular mechanisms of adopting opinions are specific for particular cultures, whether the ordinary concept of belief as well as other commonsense notions are apt as descriptive and analytical tools with respect to unfamiliar cultural milieus etc. If there are both non-trivail and well-founded answers to such questions, descriptive epistemology would possess relevance for analytical epistemology. Possibly such answers are significant even for normative epistemology, if, contrary to the position held

by some modern philosophers, normative enterprises in this field can be justified. Moreover, the detection of actually existing norms for the formation of opinions in different cultures promises to shed light on the issue of the cultural relativity of epistemic norms irrespectively of whether or not normative epistemology as a discipline transcending the limits of some particular culture is possible. Therefore one is entitled to say that Oriental Studies, and by the same token Indology, can be credited with a potential relevance for more general and philosophical issues of epistemology, provided that those disciplines can contribute to answers to questions of the above portrayed sort.

IV

The crucial problem is : Can such a contribution be realistically expected? Let us disregard the question as to whether those who are active in the field of Oriental Studies are capable and willing to fulfill such tasks and concentrate ourselves on the issue whether it could be expected that those disciplines are in a position to make contributions of the above mentioned sort if the required competence and willingness existed. It appears evident that undertakings dealing with historically remote periods are generally and on principal grounds in a worse position in this regard than projects that are concerned with historically less remote periods. This follows simply from the fact that remoteness in the historical dimension generally, though not unexceptionally, correlates with scarcity of preserved documents. Moreover, investigations concerning epistemic states of subjects belonging to the past are bereft of a number of important methodological tools like questioning, observing other aspects of behaviour than utterance of linguistic expressions or producing texts, making inferences from what is known from other persons being acquainted with or belonging to

the same milieu as the subject(s) concerned, drawing conclusions from political, social and physical facts known to prevail at the time at which a person lived whose epistemic situation is at stake etc.[1] To be sure, historical remoteness does not entail that one must be entirely bereft of all of those means of access. For example, apart from texts also other long-lasting testimonies like paintings, sculptures, buildings, articles for everyday use refer to other sorts of behaviour than linguistic behaviour and social and physical facts prevailing at past times can partly be ascertained by other methods than those which presuppose knowledge of epistemic states of other subjects. But there can be no doubt that the degree in which such methods are available tends to diminish in proportion with historical remoteness.

Referring to Indology this circumstance bestows priority on studies concerned with modern India at least in certain regards and the threat resulting from this fact for the variety of Indology which dedicates itself to historically remote periods deserves not to be underestimated. Perhaps we must realistically acquiesce in attaining only piecemeal knowledge about opinions and beliefs held at the period where the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* were composed which is at any rate insufficient in order to engage in more ambitious descriptive epistemological projects. Even with respect to questions pertaining to

1. Apart from tools which are normally inapplicable for principal reasons whenever issues of the remote past are at stake we are not seldom bereft of certain possibilities due to contingent circumstances prevailing in past cultures. The fact that we cannot rely on sources like letters, diaries, autobiographies etc. is sometimes probably not due to historical remoteness entailing the loss of a considerable number of source-material but rather to the circumstance that such sorts of documents were simply not (or at least only seldom) produced during earlier historical periods of certain cultures.

considerably later periods like the origination of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness much remains highly speculative, if one considers the matter more closely, and this appears not to be due to insufficiency of research and of scholarly competence but to more principal restrictions.

One should take care, however, not to derive from this a too sweeping and unqualified devaluation of studies on past stages of Indian culture as compared to studies on modern India. First of all, we must be reminded that issues of epistemology constitute only one of many aspects of potential relevance. I am even inclined to go so far as to claim that quasi-ethical principles like appreciation of persons and achievements of the past who deserve to be duly appreciated constitute a pertinent dimension of justifying research. Secondly, the principal restrictions which have been the topic of the preceding paragraph concern in the first place questions of content, properties and origination of opinions and beliefs actually held by others, i.e. the subcategories (1) a) (i),(a) and (b). Subcategory 1) (a) (i) (d) in particular questions pertaining to the way in which opinions are tried to be propagated and induced are not necessarily affected by those limitations, at least not to the same extent. Even if it should turn out e.g. that it will never be possible to ascertain the real origins of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness to a satisfying degree of safety, nothing precludes us to investigate the methods which have been employed in order to make this doctrine appear plausible and acceptable on the basis of preserved texts. To be sure, limitations of the preserved material might hamper the possibilities of drawing generalizations. Nevertheless, it does not appear unrealistic to derive from the investigation of strategies of persuasion exhibited by texts that certain ways of adopting opinions were considered as regular or presupposed as

norms. For it is plausible to assume that methods employed in order to convince or persuade others reflect views concerning how beliefs use to be adopted or how opinions should be formed. Moreover, descriptive epistemology, according to our anylysis, is not exhausted by enterprises referring to beliefs embraced by foreign subjects. It comprises also the varieties which had been labelled by the terms 'subjective' and 'reflexive'. The advantages which studies on contemporary features of foreign cultures and societies enjoy with regard to 'objective' epistemology might be compensated by a greater relevance of studies relating to historically remote periods in 'subjective' and 'reflexive' respects. This is so because historical remoteness tends to correlate with unfamiliarity and deviance from what is usual and normal in more familiar circumstances. Again, there are surely exceptions to this rule, but in general such a correspondence can be assumed. One of the reasons why this circumstance is relevant for 'subjective' epistemology lies in the fact that certain principles of reasoning rely on experience and must be expected to be associated with special cultural traditions. This is, by the way, already foreshadowed in Ancient Indian theories of inference and is explicitly reflected by a number of recently developed theories of commonsense reasoning which are current under the title 'Non-Monotonic Logic(s)' Probably a correspondence exists between the degree to which our own epistemological framework is challenged and the degree of unfamiliarity with and unusualness of the phenomena which are made objects of cognitive enterprises. Therefore investigations of older historical phases of foreign cultural traditions, in particular stages which have not yet been assimilated to modern ways of thinking, promise to bear yield for subjective epistemology which cannot be expected from studies on contemporary issues. In addition to this, the very fact

that enterprises of descriptive epistemology concerning historically remote epochs are usually confronted with special difficulties can entail particular relevance for 'reflexive' epistemology. As long as tasks of descriptive epistemology can be easily fulfilled there is relatively little reason to expect that their performance will shed much light on general problems of doing descriptive epistemology. The situation is, however, different, if the enterprise itself is beset with difficulties. E.g. the problems of reconstructing from the textual material beliefs and opinions held by the followers of Buddhism in its most ancient phases or by the historical Buddha himself probably deserve to be connected with the topic of reflexive epistemology. Seen in this light, the dogmatic and too simple-minded manner in which such topics are sometimes treated appears quite deplorable. On the other hand, it must be admitted that because of the fact that issues of 'reflexive' epistemology have hardly been investigated in the field of Oriental Studies up till now it is quite difficult to assess the fruitfulness of such projects at present.

V

Concerning epistemology fields of research exhibiting a combination of potential abundance of pertinent data with unfamiliarity of subject-matter represent an optimal situation. Unfortunately, in the area of Indology lucky coincidences of this sort appear to be rare. On this account Indology might be in a somewhat disadvantaged position in comparison to disciplines like anthropology. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that studies on advanced civilisations possess dimensions which are normally lacking in fields dedicated to the investigation of less sophisticated cultures and societies. Indology is even privileged on account of the fact that theoretical epistemology belongs to its own subject-matter due to the

circumstance that highly developed and quite sophisticated epistemological theories have been created in ancient India. Their study promises to possess at any rate relevance for epistemology in general. No matter which philosophical position one tends to adopt with respect to the aspirations of a general normative epistemology, the subject- matter of the manner of the formation of opinions is surely one of the most momentous and relevant topics to which Indology could contribute in more than one respect.

Indology and Rationality

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

The first announcememt of the present 'International Seminar on Indology : Past, Present and Future' contains some challenging questions, which I would like to cite in context. We read there :

Indology is, of recent, being looked at as an East-West encounter; philosophers of this century express their view that the time has come to reach beyond 'occident' and 'orient.' In his study, *India and Europe*, W. Halbfass observes :

In the modern planetary situation Eastern and Western 'cultures' can no longer meet one another as equal partners. They meet in a westernized world, under conditions shaped by Western ways of thinking....

If this is true, is 'European' or 'Western' discourse the destiny of Indology? Will the Neo-Hindu attempts to 'actualize' ancient Indian teachings for the present succeed in establishing a stronger alternative? Will there ever be an 'Indian discourse' in Indology? Could such a discourse serve as the best solution for the present predicament?

There is of course no way of denying that Indology was initially a European enterprise, carried out by European scholars, either in India or in Europe, either with the help of Indian pandits or without them. In this sense, Indology originally was characterized by 'European' or 'Western' discourse. Many of its themes and preconceptions were determined by the European Context. I have dealt with a few of them in an earlier publication.[1] One is the conviction that the oldest literature of India, i.e. the Veda, must be extremely old. This conviction

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1. 'L'indianisme et les préjugés occidentaux.' *Études de Lettres*, avril juin 1989, pp. 119-136.

seems to find favour with some modern Indian scholars, but for its origin we may have to look at the European romantic period. The idea that India is, and has always been, a place of spiritual wisdom, too, is very old in Europe. It dates back to the Greeks, and has persisted for some two thousand years.

However, even though Indology was originally characterized by European concerns and preconceptions, and even though it may have a hard time to rid itself of these, I am reluctant to call Indology in general 'European' or 'Western discourse'. We all know that, for reasons that are very difficult to determine with precision, some extremely important historical changes took place in Europe, or in North America, before they spread elsewhere. The 'scientific' and 'industrial revolutions' took first place in Europe, but obviously transcend any regional culture. The first cars were produced in the United States, but the most efficient car makers at this moment may well be the Japanese. Computers, too, were invented in the West, but the most competent programmers at present may well be Indians.[1] What I mean to say is that the developments just mentioned are global developments, which for reasons that are far from evident

1. Similarly Gellner, 1995 : 4: "This inequality of cognitive styles does not engender a hierarchy of peoples and cultures. It is not the by-product of the genetic equipment of any particular population pool. The population or culture where this style was born would have been wholly incapable of producing it a few generations earlier than it actually occurred; and since it has happened, otherpopulations have acquired this style with ease, and some of them have conspicuously surpassed the originators of science, when it comes to the business of technological application of the New Science. The new knowledge is not the reward or mark of some general excellence. Nevertheless, the asymmetry of cognitive and productive performance is the most important single fact about our world."

started in particular regions. Other contributions to global culture have begun in other parts of the world: gun powder perhaps in China, the decimal place value notation perhaps in India. All these developments and discoveries are not just expressions of some regional culture. They transcend it, and may indeed occasionally prove to be more fruitful in cultures different from the one that invented it.

Scholarly discourse, as I see it, is one such thing. It is global rather than confined to one culture. It may have begun in Europe, but it is essentially no more European than any of the other things I have just mentioned.[1] It is not my intention to try to define what it consists in. This I willingly leave to others. One element of scholarly discourse—and of scientific discourse in general—I would however like to emphasize: its readiness to accept criticism, and its attempts to deal with it. This is what I call 'rationality'.[2] This use of the term may seem to be somewhat unusual, but is not without precedents; the philosopher of science Karl Popper used it in the same manner.[3] Rationality in this sense is, I believe, a vital ingredient of all scientific and scholarly discourse. I realize that rationality alone may not be sufficient to obtain the results of science and scholarship. The European Middle Ages had a tradition of

1. Albrecht Wezler and Michael Witzel, in their Foreword to the Series Indian Philology and South Asian Studies (1995: vii) speak of "Western norms and approaches" as distinguished from the "Indian śāstric sciences." It would seem to be more appropriate to speak in this context of "modern norms and approaches" or the like, the more so since the two authors find fault, on the very same page, with Western methods in the 19th century.

2. This idea of rationality has little to do with the presence or otherwise of logical rules like the law of the excluded middle, and even less with the economic rationality emphasized by Max Weber and others; see on all this most recently Goody, 1996: 11 f. (chapter 1: "Rationality in review").

3. See Popper, 1959: 149f.

rationality, i.e. of critical debate (be it that its scope was rather limited)[1], but this by itself was apparently not enough to set off the scientific revolution in the European Renaissance. Other factors were required, and much historical reasearch may still be needed before we will know exactly which ones they are.[2] In fact, one of the exciting tasks of historical research, as I see it, is to throw light on the developments—among them the scientific revolution—that within a few centuries changed the surface of the earth virtually beyond recognition (whether for better or for worse).

2. Let me briefly touch here upon one other aspect of at least some scholarly discourse, but one which should interest us Indologists in particular : the interest in the history, and beyond that in the origin, of the ideas and institutions we study. Is this a feature which merely betrays the Western beginnings of our field of study? Is the quest for origins nothing but a heritage from the European romantic period, that should be discarded as soon as possible?

Recently Paul Harrison, a Buddhist scholar who teaches in New Zealand, published—in connection with his research into the origins of Mahāyāna— some reflections on the usefulness of this kind of investigations. Let me cite some parts:[3]

Why indeed are we so interested in the origins of the Mahāyāna? Well, the fascination with origins, beginnings or sources does appear to be a kind of scholarly universal. Part of this—and this much is clear enough—is the idea that if we can understand the beginnings of something, we are better placed to understand the whole thing, as if its essential character were somehow fixed and readable in the genetic encoding of its conception. There is no doubt that such a view is problematic, i.e. it may not be the case that understanding the beginnings of the Mahāyāna (or even the beginnings of Buddhism

1. See Eamon, 1994: 15-90.
2. For a useful survey of the literature, see Cohen, 1994.
3. Harrison, 1995 : 49

as a whole) will give us privileged access to the mysteries of the later tradition, but I think the idea is still sufficiently compelling to result in a kind of methodological cliché.

Harrison next emphasizes the personal and private need for knowing origins. He may be right in all this, but I have the impression that he overlooks one crucial point.[1] Scholarship is not only concerned with collecting data, but also with understanding them. Besides the question 'What?' there are the equally important questions 'why?' and 'how?'. Scholarship can for example establish that there were Christians in India before the arrival of the Eropeans; this is a fact. To explain this fact only one type of answer can satisfy us: information as to how they got there. No other kind of answer would work, and this has nothing to do with European influence on scholarship. More generally, human institutions of all kinds are characterized by the fact they may of their features (or at least some) are there simply because they were there earlier and no one bothered, or dared, to change them. Some of these features may have played a different role in earlier situations, and that many have been introduced at first for again different reasons. This does not mean that only history allows us to understand human institutions, but it does mean that, in order to reach as good an understanding as possible, at least some questions have to

1. Harrison sums up his ideas on this matter in the following words (1995-50) : "As I see it, then, our fascination with the origins and early development of the Mahāyāna can be explained in terms of all these factors. That is to say, understanding this topic successfully will indeed heop us to understand Buddhism better, it will help us grasp the lineage of East Asian Buddhism, and our own personal religious ancestry, if we happen to follow an East Asian Buddhist tradition; it will no doubt be productive of academic 'merit'; and it will yield considerable intellectual satisfaction. Yet these factors do not exhaust the question; there is always something left, some seductive magic that the subject holds for us as individuals."

be addressed that involve the history of the institution concerned.[1]

3. Let us now return to rationality. Rationality in the sense described above is not only found in Europe in the centuries preceding the present globalisation of science and scholarship. More in particular, it is not a foreign product that was introduced into India with modern scholarship. India has had a long rational tradition which has not, in my opinion, received the attention which it deserves. I am aware that the history of Indian thought is a rich field of research, with many specialists, some of them focusing on the history of logic, others on other aspects of critical thought. But how many researchers have ever expressed surprise about the fact that India has a rational tradition at all? Yet this may be far from self-evident. Do all cultures have rational traditions? Is it self-evident that people enter into debate rather than ignoring, or aggressing, each other? I have the impression that rational traditions may be the exception rather than the rule. Even major cultures can survive for centuries, nay millennia, without them. The most striking example may be China. Sinologists such as A. C. Graham and Fransois Jullien have commented upon the absence, or disappearance, of a rational tradition in China.[2] We know of course, thanks to the researches of Joseph Needham and others, that China has made many important discoveries in the field of technology, but evidently this was possible without the presence of a strong tradition of rationality.

1. For a critical discussion of this issue with special reference to early Vaiśeṣika, see Houben, 1995.

2. Cp. Graham, 1989:142 "About 300 b.c. the Later Mohists undertake the enterprise of grounding the whole Mohist ethic in the analysis of moral concepts. This surely is rationalism as we find it in Greece, the plainest example in the Chinese tradition. But the Sophists have already provoked the reaction of the Taoist Chuang-tzŭ (c. 320 b.c.),

The fact that scholars have not expressed surprise at the discovery of a strong rational tradition in India may be due, ironically, to the Western background of modern scholarship. The European rational tradition, as is widely known, goes back to ancient Greece, and has continued—with more or less serious interruptions—until today. European scholars, and those influenced by them, may have found it self-evident to find something similar in India. If this is indeed the case, we may have here an example of how scholarship can be limited, and indeed prejudiced, by its historical background. It also suggests that new perspectives may show up if scholars from altogether different cultural backgrounds, and preferably with not too much Western cultural baggage, join in. What may we expect for Indology once there will be many Chinese trained Indologists (or for that matter for Sinology when many Indians will turn to this field of study)? I do not know the answer, but I do believe that a variety of approaches, questions and points of departure cannot but enrich the fields concerned. Note that this would be an enlargement of Indology in a rational direction, for rationality means: looking for suggestions and criticism from all directions.

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who will have a much more lasting influence in Chinese thought. To use a terminology which we shall explain later, Chuang tzŭ's position is anti-rationalism' (denial that reason is the right means to see things as they are) rather than 'irrationalism' (which allows you to see things as you like). After 200 b.c. Chinese thinking channels in the orthodox Confucian direction (ethical, practical, conventional) and the unorthodox Taoist (spontaneous, mystical, disreputable). The former is often 'rational', in that it checks its synthesizing by analysis, but not 'rationalistic' in the sense of Later Mohist or Greek thought, which tries to detach rational demonstration wholly from common-sense synthesizing; the latter remains anti-rationalist as philosophical Taoism, and its continuation as Ch'an or Zen in Chinese Buddhism." Further Jullien, 1995, For a recent discussion of the issue, see Goody, 1996: 26f.

This is, incidentally, also my answer to the question raised at the beginning: do we need Western or Hindu Indology? My answer is : we need both, and much more, on condition that mutual criticism is seriously considered, not rhetorically, but by trying to understand the other's position and the arguments and evidence that support it.

How do we explain the presence of a tradition of rationality in India? Note that we are, once again, confronted with a question that appears to demand an answer in terms of origins. When did this tradition of rationality begin? We have relatively little difficulty in understanding that a rational tradition, once established, can maintain itself for a certain length of time. But how did it start? Rationality is conspicuous by its absence in Vedic literature, including the Upaniṣads. It is true that the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads record a number of famous debates. But they cannot in any way be called rational in our sense of the term. They constitute, in fact, school examples of the very opposite. Not one, in these debates, is ever convinced by the arguments of his opponent, nor is the attempt made to bring this about. The winner of a debate, as Walter Ruben pointed out long ago (1928), is not the one who knows better, but the one who knows more. Logical argumentation is completely absent. Apodictic statements are accepted without resistance. Indeed, the teacher need not present arguments in support of his teaching, because the very idea that he might by mistake teach something that is incorrect, does not seem to have occurred to the thinkers of the Upaniṣads. Every thought is correct, but it may be insufficient, and may therefore have to be subordinated to the knowledge of the winner. Asking too many questions, on the other hand, can have dire results. Depending on the interpretation one puts upon the expression concerned, one's head may be shattered, or one may loose one's head in a

physically less violent manner.[1] As to the problem why simple questioning may carry such grave consequences for the unsuccessful participant, Michael Witzel (1987:409) reminds us that the Vedic examples all deal with knowledge which is 'secret' in one way or another; it may be known only to an eminent person, a teacher who will not pass it on readily even when he is questioned; or it is known to a class of ritual specialists who will not share their esoteric knowledge with rival groups.

Rationality in the sense described above does not, therefore, seem to be present in Vedic literature, not even in the early Upaniṣads. When and why did it begin? This question has, to my knowledge, never been seriously addressed. Yet it seems to me a question of the greatest interest and importance. Unlike their Upaniṣadic predecessors, the classical philosophers of India assiduously studied the works and arguments of their opponents, so much so that it is often hardly possible to understand texts belonging to one current of thought without knowing something about practically all the other ones. The ongoing debate between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas is a well-known example,[2] but by far not the only one. And even though the thinkers concerned may not be keen to admit this, it seems more than likely that they very often borrowed ideas from each other, modifying them so as to make them fit into their new surroundings.[3] Why did these thinkers go through all this

1. See Witzel, 1987, and Insler, 1990.
2. Documented in Shastri, 1964.
3. It will not be necessary to emphasize that this picture of the development of Indian thought goes against the traditional Brahmanical view of things. See in this connection Pollock, 1985, and the passage from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjari* which it cites on p. 516 : "All sciences have existed, precisely like the Vedas, from the first creation. People, however, ascribe them to one or another human author who has sought to abbreviate or expand them."

trouble? Couldn't they just ignore each other? To my knowledge no such intense intellectual interaction ever came about between Hindus and Moslims in later centuries. And indeed, Christians and Jews lived together for many centuries in Europe, yet their intellectuals hardly seem to have taken much notice of each other's views (with some few notable exceptions);[1] unless, of course, we take the kind of interest into consideration which was expressed by king Louis IX (canonized as St. Louis) by saying, after a theological debate between Christians and Jews at Cluny, that the best way for a Christian to defend his faith against those people was 'to thrust his sword into their entrails, as far as it would go.'[2] The Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina thinkers of classical India, on the other hand, were apparently greatly interested (i.e., intellectually interested) in each other. Why?

In this connection I would like to draw attention to a passage in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*.[3] Here Uddyotakara criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of No-Self (anātman). One of the arguments he presents is that the Buddhists, by believing this, go against their own sacred texts. At this point Uddyotakara cites a text which it is not possible to locate in the surviving versions of Buddhist *sūtras*. But apparently the cited passage was not well-known to the Buddhists in Uddyotakara's time either, for he says: "Don't say that this is not Buddha word; it occurs in the *sarvābhisamaya sūtra*." The point I wish to make is that Uddyotakara took his opponents position so seriously, that he was concerned to prove that it could not be in accordance

1. For some exceptions, see, e.g. Eco, 1995: 119 f.

2. Olschki, 1960 : 181 as cited in Batchelor, 1994: 83-84.

3. Bronkhorst, 1997.

with their own sacred tradition. And in order to prove this, he made what seem to be extensive searches in their sacred literature. Why did he do so? He could have saved himself much time and trouble by just ignoring the position of the Buddhists. What could he gain by this? The only answer that seems appropriate is that Uddyotakara, and his intended readership, weighed off the different arguments against each other. We do not know whether many people actually changed allegiance in the light of such arguments, but the very fact that they were studied shows that thoretically the possibility of a change of mind was not discarded.

4. Note that the conviction that Indian philosophy is based on a rational tradition, i.e., a tradition of argumentation, rather than on mere revelation or inspiration, has methodological consequences for modern scholarship, too. A rational system of philosophy—or at least one which tries to be rational, to answer objections not by just quoting authority, but by taking the objections seriously—may be expected to be more or less coherent. When one is nonetheless confronted with some elements that do not fit in, one is then tempted to think that this is a leftover from an earlier stage of the system, which was coherent. This is the method applied by Erich Frauwallner, with impressive results as a whole.[1]

However, this method is based on the presupposition of rationality, which is no doubt vailid for much of Indian philosophy during its classical period, but which is less certain for Indian philosophy in its early period and for schools of thought which had not joined the rational tradition. We have seen that Vedic literature appears to antedate the period of Indian rationality. And we do not know when exactly this changed.

1. Houben, 1995: 722, 740, 742 f, 744 n. 43.

Indeed, it is unlikely that there is such a generally valid date at all. The Italian scholar Raffaele Torella has pointed out in a recent publication (1994): Introduction) how an initially obscure school of Śaivism mangaged, from the 10th century c.e. onward, to emerge into the open and escape from a merely restricted circle of adepts owing to the efforts of a series of remarkable thinkers— among them Somānanda and Utpaladeva. These thinkers carried out various tasks; Torella mentions exegesis of the scriptures, the reformulation of their teaching and the organizing and hierarchizing of their contents, extracting a homogeneous though varied teaching from the diverse texts; purging it, without changing its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle— in other words, of all that was bound to create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance—by attenuating the sharper points or removing every actually concrete aspect, and finally translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its addressees and engaging in a dialogue that would not be afraid to confront rival doctrines. In other words, this school of Kashmir Śaivism joined the rational tradition of India as late as the 10th century, even though it is known to have existed as a religious movement well before this time. Other schools may have joined this tradition at other times, before or after the 10th century, or they may have chosen to remain aloof throughout their history.

5. With this in mind we may look at the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. Several scholars have pointed out a peculiar feature of the classical system. Eli Franco (1991 : 123 f.), like Paul Harrison a scholar working in the southern hemisphere, describes it as follows : "One of the reasons why many of us feel uneasy with the Sāṃkhya philosophy is that we are never quite sure where we stand and whether the ancient teachers were talking psychology or cosmology. Typical psychological

and individual terms like congnition, ego, mind, sense organs, and even hands feet, tongue, anus and penis, become trans-individual and obtain cosmological dimensions."[1] Franco, following the methodological principle just described, looks for an explanation of this strange situation in the historical background of the classical system :

This somewhat confusing state of affairs is certainly the result of a long historical development. Sāṃkhya has probably started as a cosmology of two players, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, as male and female, passive and active, principles. This is quite clear from the very terms used for soul and matter—man and the procreating (woman)—as well as from the old metaphors which compare matter to an actress or a dancer and soul to a passive spectator, or to the chaste woman who is surprised naked by a stranger, etc. However, at a certain stage, probably under Vaiśeṣika influence as pointed out already by H. Jacobi, the plurality of the souls was introduced into the system. And this created the imbalance which is so peculiar to and characteristic of Sāṃkhya. Indeed, shouldn't every soul have its own mind, its own senses, etc.? What does it mean that two hands, two feet, one tongue, one penis and one anus are common to all of us? The next logical step was of course, to introduce a plurality of *prakṛtis* and to allow as many *prakṛtis* as there are *puruṣas*. And as is well-known, the Sāṃkhya teacher Paurika has taken this step... But Paurika's opinion did not prevail; it was rejected once and for all by the extremely influential Vārṣagaṇya, perhaps because he felt that admitting the plurality of *prakṛti* would be detrimental to its logical proofs, which were based on an opposition between the plurality of the products and the uniqueness of their manifested cause.

There can be little doubt that classical Sāṃkhya is the result of a long historical development. But I fail to see why the

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1. Hulin (1978 : 73) speaks of "le paradoxe d'un Ego cosmique, producteur des sens et des elements materiels subtils, et non plus, semble-t-il, forme de la conscience de soi chez un individu concret." He then continues: "Cependant, aussi objective et depersonnalise soit-il, l'ahamkāra n'en conserve pas moins, a l'interieur du systeme sāmkhya, une face indivuduelle, subjective, puisqu'on lui associe constamment l'abhimāna, cette fonction de sur-estimation (de soi) qui lui sera desormais automatiquement attribuee. Comme on ne saurait evidemment pas se contenter de juxtaposer les deux aspects, cosmique et individuel, le probleme se pose immediatement de concevoir leur mode d' articulation." Parrott (1986) makes a brave, but unconvincing, attempt to solve the difficulty.

earlier forms of Sāṃkhya must necessarily have been coherent. Supporting evidence for this can certainly not be derived from the fact that its descendant, i.e. classical Sāṃkhya, is not coherent. Indeed, if we assume that a rational tradition came to be established in India some time during the development of pre-classical Sāṃkhya, we would expect more coherence the more we move forward in time. Given that even classical Sāṃkhya harbours a major inconsistency, what reason is there to expect that the earlier forms of Sāṃkhya fared any better?

Let me emphasize at this point that the historical study of thought does not have to presuppose rationality. In situations where this assumption seems justified, it can be of the greatest help in historical reconstructions. But also non-rational traditions of thought can be studied historically. This is not the occasion for an in depth discussion, but I have to make the point to avoid misunderstanding.

Let us return to Sāṃkhya. Franco and others think that this school of thought was originally a cosmology, including a player who presumably was something like a world-soul.[1] Certain thinkers then made the revolutionary step of introducing the notion of a multiplicity of souls in the place of the one world-soul, but did not dare to replace the single *prakṛti* with plurality of *prakṛtis*.

I do not know what evidence is supposed to support the claim that Sāṃkhya was originally only a cosmology. All

1. Van Buitenen, 1988 : 60 (originally published in 1957) observes : "There will be no one at present who seriously doubts that Sāṃkhya began by being theistic, in other owrds, by positing a cosmic person whose self-creation took place in series of evolutions ... " But E. H. Johnston had still maintained (1937 : 17) : "Early Sāṃkhya was in fact little concerned with the cosmos..." The question to be raised below is : do we have to make a choice?

attempts to determine the earliest from of Sāṃkhya that I am aware of have been highly speculative, with far from certain results. Less uncertain is that the term Sāṃkhya in the *Mahābhārata* refers to a method to reach liberation through knowledge. What kind of knowledge could have this effect? Edgerton offers the following specification in the Introduction to his took. *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy* (1965:41) : "The epic is like (the Upaniṣads) in regarding the soul as the essential part of man. But in emphasizing its distinction from what is body or non-soul, it often undertakes to analyse matter. The soul is unitary, undifferentiated, without qualities, and generally regarded as really inactive. It is immortal; when the body dies, the soul merely passes into another body; and it cannot be affected by anything physical.... All acts are commonly said to be done by material nature, which appears in manifold forms and is constantly subject to change." Edgerton then distinguishes, and briefly describes, two different ways in which matter is analysed. One is by describing the three 'strands' (*guṇa*) which compose it. The second is 'vertical' and 'quasi-volutionary' : it approaches the classical enumeration of twenty-three or twenty-four 'essences' (*tattva*), the soul being number twenty-five.

What is most interesting in this observation is its beginning. Epic Sāṃkhya is a method leading to liberation through knowledge, and it can be so because it teaches that the soul, i.e. the essential part of man, is inactive, and different from all that acts. This, of course, makes perfect sense against the background of the doctrine of *karma*. Actions lead to rebirth; the realization that one really does not act frees one from their effects. It seems to me more than likely that these epic conceptions are among the forerunners of classical Sāṃkhya. But these epic forerunners are not, or not only or even primarily, cosmologies. Quite on the contrary, they concern not the

universe, but the individual. If, therefore, we stick to our rationalistic presupposition, we might have to assume that Sāṃkhya originally had a plurality of *puruṣas* and an equal number of *prakṛtis*.

Such a conclusion might have to be drawn if we believe that already the forerunners of classical Sāṃkhya were rational in the sense described above. But what reason is there to do so? Is it not equally conceivable that in those early days Sāṃkhya discourse concerned two different levels of reality at the same time? Examples of parallelisms between, and of indentifications of, macrocosm and microcosm are numerous, both in Indian and in non-Indian religions. A well-known example comes from Buddhist cosmology. Here the universe is thought of as consisting of three layers, the *kāmadhātu*, the *rūpadhātu*, and the *ārūpyadhātu*. These layers are thought of in spatial terms, yet the *rūpadhātu* and the *ārūpyadhātu* correspond to attainments in meditation. Here too homology or rather indetification, between the profoundly personal and the cosmological is to be seen.[1] Examples from Vedic literature, and even from classical Indian medicine (Āyurveda) are not lacking.[2] The importance of homologization of the body with the macrocosm in Yoga and Tantrism has been emphasized by Mircea Eliade and others.[3] Epic Sāṃkhya is inseparable from Yoga. Equally close to the historical predecessors of classical Sāṃkhya, the *Bhagavadgītā*

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1. See the discussion in Gombrich, 1996: 83 ff.
2. See, e.g., *Carakasamhitā*, *Sūtrasthāna*, chapter 12, and Filliozat, 1933.
3. See Teun Goudriaan in Gupta, Hoens and Goudriaan, 1979: 57 f. : "The doctrine that the human body corresponds to, is even identical with the universe is seldom systematically expounded but nearly always self-understood." "Microcosmic symbolism is especially prominent in the passages which deal with kuṇḍaliniyoga..." very common... is the outright equation of the body... with the world or universe, We also find many statements to the purport that gods, heavens, hells etc. are all present in the body..."

describes how Kṛṣṇa reveals to Arjuna the whole universe inside himself.[1] Such identifications of different realms—usually the personal and the cosmological, microcosm and macrocosm—are not 'rational' in our sense, because they can

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" A consequence of the 'cosmization' of the individual is that the body is made to encompass the world of the gods in particular ways." etc. Padoux (1990 : 78 n. 122) observes, similarly : "Saiva cosmogony often appears as a 'cosmization' of psychological experiences and vice-versa." Heilijgers-Seelen (1994 : 20 f.) draws attention to the fact that the five *cakras*, which are situated in the body, are given dimensions inspired by cosmological theories. A later commentator, she points out on p. 25 (with n. 20), distinguishes the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, where the text commented upon makes no such distinction.

1. *Mhbh* 6.33 (*Bhag* 11) Surprisingly, the Bhagavadgīt may be without the contradiction that mars classical Sāṃkhya. It appears to distinguish between the individual and the 'godly' level both of which interact in parallel but different ways with *prakṛti*. See e.g. *Bhag*. 3.27-28, 30 (tr. Edgerton) : "Performed by material nature's strands (guṇa) are actions, altogether; he whose soul is deluded by the I-faculty (*ahaṃkāra*) imagines 'I am the agent'. But he who knows the truth, great-armed one, about the separation (of the soul) from both the strands and action, the strands act upon the strands'—knowing this, is not attached (to actions) On Me all actions casting, with mind on the over-soul, being free from longing and from selfishness, fight, casting off thy fever." (*prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇaih karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ/ ahamkāravimūdhātmā kartāham iti manyate// tattaivit tu māhābaho guṇakarmavibhāgayoḥ/ guṇā guṇeṣu vartanta iti matvā na sajjate// mayi sarvāṇi karmāṇi saṃnyasyādhyātmacetasā/ nirāśīr nirmamo bhūtvā yudhyasva vigatajvaraḥ/ /*); and contrast this with *Bhag* 9.9-10 (tr. Edgerton) : "And Me these action do not bind, Dhanaṃjaya—participating as one indefferent, unattached to these actions. With Me as overseer, material nature brings forth (the world of) moving and unmoving (beings) by this motive force, son of Kuntī the world goes around," (*na ca māṃ tāni karmāṇi nibadhnanti dhanamjaya/ udāsīnavad āsīnam asaktaṃ teṣu karmasu// mayādhyakṣeṇa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaram/ hetunānena kaunteya jagad viparivartate//*).

evoke tricky, or even unanswerable, questions, like the ones raised by Franco with regard to Sāṃkhya. Yet many religions, especially the ones in which rationality as here defined plays a less important role, have proved able to ignore or bypass such annoying questions. Why shouldn't we accept that this is precisely what the pre-classical Sāṃkhyas did?

It will be interesting to point out that the second flourishing of Sāṃkhya in the second millennium of the common era made an effort to rectify the lack of coherence that characterized the classical school. Clearest in this respect is Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on *Sāṃkhya sūtra* 3.10. It has been known for long that *Sāṃkhya sūtra* was composed (or compiled) late, long after the *Sāṃkhya kārikā* and most of its commentaries; its present form may date from the fourteenth or fifteenth century. Vijñānabhikṣu himself wrote in the sixteenth century. He speaks in this passage of the single (*eka*) subtle body (*linga*) which is formed at creation and is an adjunct (*upādhi*) of Hiraṇyagarbha. This single subtle body subsequently divides into many (*nānā*) individuals, just as the single subtle body of a father becomes multiple in the form of the subtle bodies of his sons and daughters. This division of the subtle body of Hiraṇyagarbha is caused by the difference of *karma* of the individuals.[1] It is true that Vijñānabhikṣu has a tendency to impose his own views on the Sāṃkhya philosophy, in particular

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1. Vijñānabhikṣu on Sāṃkhya sūtra 3.10 (p 190) : *nanu liṅgaṃ ced ekaṃ tarhi kathaṃ puruṣabhedena vilakṣaṇa bhogāḥ syus tatrāha vyaktibheda/ yady api sargādau hiraṇyagarbhopādhirūpam ekam eva liṅgam, tathāpi tasya paścād vyaktibhedo vyaktirūpeṇāṃśato nānātvam api bhavati/ yathedānīm ekasya pitṛliṅgadehasya nānātvam aṃśato bhavati putrakanyādiliṅgadeharūpeṇa/ tatra kāraṇam āha : karmaviśeṣād iti/ jīvāntarāṇām bhogahetukarmāder ity arthaḥ/* Cp. Grabe, 1889:211.

the idea of a creator god. But his interpretation of *Sāṃkhya sūtra* 3.10 to the extent that one subtle body is subsequently divided into many individuals seems correct.[1] A. B. Keith comments (1924:108) : "the *sūtra* evidently regards the whole process (of primary creation) as being a cosmic one, the principle of individuation producing cosmic organs, and elements, and the corresponding individual principles being derived from the cosmic. It is characteristic of the difficulty of the doctrine, and of its absurdity, that the explanation of the derivation is nowhere given: the *sūtra* (iii, 10) merely says that from the one psychic apparatus many were produced by reason of the difference of the works, an explanation which is subject to the disadvantage that it begs the question, since the distinction of works presupposes individuals, and individuals presuppose separate psychic apparatuses with which to perform works.[2] This criticism may be justified. But here at least one knows at every step exactly what is being talked about, psychology or cosmology. So whatever further difficulties this position may entail, Franco's criticism, which I cited earlier, is no longer applicable here. We now know what is being talked about, but we are left with difficulties of understanding concerning the mechanism of the process described.

The lack of coherence of classical Sāṃkhya did not escape the eye of critic like Rāmānuja either. Rāmānuja, who

1. SS 3.9-10 : saptadaśaikam liṅgam/ vyaktibhedaḥ karmaviśeṣāt/. Aniruddha, though explaing SS 3.9 in a somewhat peculiar manner, agrees with this interpretation.

2. The "probable explanation of the effort to fill up the system", as Keith (1924 : 108) sees it, is "the fact that the *kārikā* itself evidently allows organic nature to be in some way directly connected with nature, and not merely, as it should consistently be, derived for each individual from the fine elements which form part of his psychic apparatus." Īśvarakṛṣṇa could have avoided so many difficulties, if only he had asked Keith to write the *Sāṃkhya kārikā*!

wrote his *Śrī Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma sūtra* in the 12th century, points out that if there is one active material (*prakṛti*) for many inactive souls, all the actions of the former would provide experience to all the souls, or to none at all. He adds that the Sāṃkhya belief according to which the souls are of infinite size even exludes the possibility to answer that one soul is closer to a particular action than another. For this very reason a restriction even of the inner organs etc. to single souls is not possible, based on which there would be assignment of different actions to different souls.[1] Recall that 'inner organ' is a technical term in Sāṃkhya covering the three elements *mahad*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*. The 'etc.' after 'inner' (*antaḥkaraṇādi*) in Rāmānuja's statement refers without doubt to the 'sense organs, and even hands, feet, tongue, anus and penis' mentioned by Franco in the passage cited above.

6. In order to drive home the point that the assumption of irrational elements in classical Indian philosophies is far from unreasonable, I will now draw attention to a similar contradiction as the one found in classical Sāṃkhya in the thought of an altogether different thinker of classical India. Bhartṛhari is often said to be a, or the, philosopher of grammar, but this does not do him full justice. Apart from the many schools of thought whose ideas he used to create his own system of thought, it should here be emphasized that he has been claimed by non-grammarians, too. At least one Buddhist is reported to have composed a commentary on his *Vākyapadīya*, and another one (I-ching) thought that Bhartṛhari was a Buddhist

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1. Rāmānuja, Śri Bhāsya on Brahma Sūtra 2.3.36 : ātmano kartrtve prakrtes ca kartrtve tasyāh sarvapurusasadharanatvāt sarvāni karmāni sarvesām bhogāya syuh, naiva vā kasyacit/atmanām vibhutvābhyupagamāt samnidhānam api sarvesām avisistam/ ata eva cāntahkaranādinām api niyamo nopapadyate, yadāyattā vyavasthā syāt/

himself. And the influence of Bhartṛhari on Kashmir Śaivism is not to be ignored either. However that may be, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* confronts us with the same problem which also characterizes classical Sāṃkhya: It is not always clear whether the universe or an individual person is the subject of discussion.

In Bhartṛhari's view of the world only the absolute, sometimes called Brahma, is real; the phenomenal world is not real. The multiplicity of the phenomenal world is primarily explained with the help of two factors: *śakti* (energy, power) and language. The very first verse of the *Vākyapadīya* describes the relation between the absolute and its *śaktis*:[1] "It seems to be separate from its *śaktis*, even though it is not separate (from them)." No complete enumeration of these *śaktis* is given in the Vākyapadīya, but one gets the impression that they include the categories of *Vaiśeṣika* (or something corresponding to them).[2] Prominent among them are, in any case, 'direction' (*diś*) or 'ether' (*ākāśa*), 'time' (*kāla*), 'inherence' (*samavāya*), and 'substance etc.' (*dravyādi*). The role of language in the creation of Bhartṛhari's world is well-known. He goes to the extent of saying that the Veda is the creator (or organizer; *vidhātṛ*) of the (phenomenal) world. This close link between words and things explains the 'supernatuarl' effects of certain words or combination of words: they can destroy poison, or produce merit which leads to heaven.[3] In all this the individual plays no role.

The picture changes when we consider what the *Vākyapadīya* has to say about *vikalpa*. This word is used in various meanings, among them 'division', 'imagined division',

1. Vkp 1.2cd : aprthaktve pi saktibhyah prthaktveneva varate.
2. This is suggested by Vkp 3.1.23 (... dravyādayah sarvāh saktay (ah) and explicitly confirmed by Helārāj's commentary.
3. On language in Bharurhari, see Bronkhorst, 1996.

or 'analytical imagination.' The things (*bhāva*) of this world are produced by *vikalpa* (*vikalpotthāpita*; *VP* 3.3.82), even though their essence (*tattva*) is beyond *vikalpa* (*vikalpātītatattva*; *VP* 3.6.25). Reality (*tattva*) is *avikalpita* 'without *vikalpa*', but it attains the form of vikalpa (*vikalparūpaṃ bhajate taṭtvam evāvikalpitam*: *VP* 3.2.8). Real knowledge (vidyā) is free from the *vikalpas* of the traditions (*anāgamavikalpā.... vidyā*; *VP* 2.233). For this reason, "he who knows that should not mentally analyze (*viklp*), like the explanation in usual practice by common people of things the essence of which is inexplainable."[1] This last remark suggests that there is a link between *vikalpa* and language. At the same time it assigns the activity of mentally analyzing clearly to the individual : the individual 'who knows that' should stop mentally analyzing. This means of course that the individual 'who knows that' can indeed stop dividing the world into objects. Note in this connection that verse 3.7.41 attributes the division of the world into objects to the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*):[2] "Heaven, earth, wind, sun, oceans, rivers, directions; these are divisions of the reality belonging to the inner organ which (none the less) are situated outside." The fact that the individual can have control over his analytical imagination (*vikalpa*) allows him to put an end to this division of the world and reach liberation.[3]

The confusion is obvious. Either each individual divides the world into objects and whatever else fills the phenomenal world, or this division concerns all individuals at the same time,

1. *Vkp* 2.142 : *asamākheyatattvānām arthānāṃ laukikair yathā/ vyavahāre samākhyānaṃ tatprajño na vikalpayet //*
2. *Vkp* 3.7.41 : *dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ/ antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāḥ //*
3. On liberation in Bhartṛhari, see Bronkhorst, 1996a.

and is then transpersonal. If the powers of Brahma, or the Veda, create the world, it is hard to see how each or any, individual can undo this. Rather than finding some more or less far-fetched explanation for this difficulty, it seems likely that Bhartṛhari speaks in his *Vākyapadīya* about different levels of reality—the individual and the universal—at the same time. In doing so, he makes himself vulnerable to the same kind of criticism as classical Sāṃkhya. But by doing so, he strengthens our impression that the contradiction in Sāṃkhya is not the outcome of some historical development in which rationality somehow lost out. No, this contradiction was, if anything, a survival of pre-classical Sāṃkhya, which was not yet rational, in the sense that it did not yet, or not yet as much as later, try to immunize itself against criticism from outsiders.

The case of Bhartṛhari is particularly interesting for the following reason. I pointed out earlier that certain thinkers of Kashmir Śaivism joined the rational fold rather late, in about the 10th century of the common era. I mentioned the names of two of these thinkers, Somānanda and Utpaladeva. The former of these two, Somānanda, was rather critical of Bhartṛhari, but Utpaladeva appropriated his thought and incorporated many aspects of it in his own. However, Utpaladeva manages to avoid the contradiction which mars Bhartṛhari's ideas. He does so by claiming that God's creation is essentially free from language, whereas the individuals, *vikalpas* impose upon their experience of the world the categories of language. Liberation of the individual takes place through the suppression of his or her *vikalpas*. Since the underlying world, created by God, is in itself not determined by these *vikalpas*, and by language in general, the liberation of one individual does not imply the destruction of the universe. Here then we see how Bhartṛhari's thought came

to be 'rationalized' even further by a later thinker who makes use of it.[1]

7. Here I wish to draw attention to one further current of Indian thought, the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. It is well-known that this school turned to idealism at some point of its history, but it is less generally realized that this idealism poses a serious difficulty of interpretation. It is Thomas E. Wood who has drawn attention to this difficulty in a recent publication (1991). He formulates the problem, and its solution as he sees it, in the beginning of his book in the following words (p.ix-x) :

> First of all, the *Vijñānavādins*... were not solipsists. Secondly, the *Vijñānavādins* did not believe that the world was in God's mind, nor did they believe it was in the mind of an Absolute.... Consequently, the *Vijñānavāda* doctrine that the world is 'nothing but mind' does not mean that the world is the manifestation or creation of some infinite or absolute mind.
>
> If the world is mind only, and if the Vijñānavādins were neither solipsists, theists, nor absolutists, whose mind did they think the world was in? The answer is as follows : The world exists (at least at the level of relative truth) in a multiplicity of independent minds.... the experiences of these minds— or at least the experiences they have in the normal waking state—are co-ordinated with each other because these minds are in immediate, mind-to-mind contact... The world we seem to see in our waking state is in fact just as unreal as the things we dream about at night. The only difference is that objects seen in the normal, waking state are collectively hallucinated, whereas the things seen in dreams are not.

The solution which Wood ascribes to the Yogācāras he documents with references to texts such as Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and its autocommentary. "(Vasubandhu's) view is that the representations (*vijñapti*) of the various mind streams mutually influence each other. Thus, he says, the characteristics or differentations (*viśeṣa*) of one mind stream arise because of the *viśeṣas* of the representation of another mind stream

1. See, for details, my review article of Raffaele Torella's *The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's vṛtti* (Bronkhorst, 1996b).

(*saṃtānāntara*), and not because of the characteristics of an external object."[1] However, Yogācāra turned to its idealist position well before Vasubandhu, and there is no reason to think that Vasubandhu expressed the views of those preceding him. It seems far more likely that he 'rationalized' the views of his predecessors. Earlier *Vijñānavāda*, it would seem, somehow did not yet face the difficulties inherent in an idealism without God or Absolute. If this is correct, it provides us with a further case where two different levels of reality, the individual and the universe, are confused. Further research may throw additional light on this issue.

8. Back to Sāṃkhya. I realize that classical Sāṃkhya can no longer be called 'non-rational'. During its classical period it had become a school of thought which fully participated in the rational developments that were taking place. Indeed, the contributions of Sāṃkhya to Indian logic have been studied, especially by Erich Frauwallner.[2] And there can be no doubt that the classical Sāṃkhyas had become aware of the somewhat contradictory nature of their doctrine. Some, like Paurika, tried to solve it by postulating as many *prakṛtis* as there are *puruṣas*.

Why, then, were the contradictory elements maintained? Why was Paurika's point of view not accepted? Franco suggests that it may have been rejected because admitting a plurality of *prakṛtis* might be detrimental to its logical proofs, which were based on an opposition between the plurality of the products and the uniqueness of their unmanifested cause. I do not know

1. Wood 1991: 177. A note (n. 7 on p. 357) cites the auto-commentary on Vimsatikā 18: sarvesām hi sattvānām anyonyavijñaptyādhipatyena mitho vijñapter niyamo bhavati yathāyogam/ mitha iti parasparatah / atah samtānāntaravijñaptiviśeṣāt saṃtānāntare vijñaptiviśeṣa utpadyate nārthaviśeṣāt /.

2. Frauwallner, 1958.

whether this is the, or a, correct explanation of the situation, but I do think that an explanation, or explanations, must be looked for along such lines. Besides tradition, there must have been internal reasons to the system—rational reasons, if you like—which induced the Sāṃkhyas to hold on to such contradictory elements. The logical proof of *prakṛti* may have been one of them. Another one, I would like to suggest, is that the presence of one material and many spiritual principles can be used as an argument against idealism. This is what is done in *Yogasūtra* 4.15-16 and in the *bhāṣya* thereon. The *Yogabhāṣya* observes that one material reality (*vastu*) is shared by many minds (*citta*). This material reality has not been imagined (*parikalpita*) by one single mind, nor by many minds; stated differently: it is not imagined at all, it is real. It is therefore independent (*svapratiṣṭha*). The text goes on to explain that different minds derive from this single material reality pleasure, sorrow, confusion, or indifference, depending upon the presence in each mind of virtue (*dharma*), vice (*adharma*), ignorance (*avidyā*) or correct insight (*samyagdarśana*). Material reality and the minds go in this way their separate paths. This is precisely what *sūtra* 4.15 states: *vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ*. The *bhāṣya* on 4.16 adds that objective reality is common to all *puruṣas* and independent, whereas the minds, which too are independent, belong each to one *puruṣa*.

9. By way of conclusion, let me repeat that India has a long rational tradition. The study of this tradition is likely to be rewarding, as I have tried to show with the help of some examples. At least as important is that this shared tradition of rationality, both in India and in the West, should enable researchers to work together rather than against each other. The main characteristic of a rational tradition is that no one can claim to have privileged access to the object of study, that everyone is

ready to listen to criticism and to consider it seriously. In the end there is no point of view to be defended, for every point of view should be abandoned in the face of sufficient contrary evidence. Mutual criticism is to be encouraged, for it is the only way to make progress, to move closer towards the aim of our scholarly endeavours, in whatever way we define them.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
AS	Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern
BEI	Bulletin d'Études Indiennes, Paris
Bhag	Bhagavadgītā
EB	The Eastern Buddhist, Kyōto
HdO	Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden 1952 ff.
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge Mass.
IsMEO	Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Roma
KlSchr	Kleine Schriften (in der Serie der Glasenapp-Stiftung,), Wiesbaden, Stuttgart
Mhbh	Mahābhārata, crit, ed. V. S. Sukthankar u.a., Poona 1933-41 (*BORI*)
N.S.	Neue Serie, New Series
PICI	Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Paris
SOR	Serie Orientale Roma, Roma
SS	Sāṃkhya Sūtra (for the edition, see Vijñānabhikṣu)
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
Vkp	Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadiya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Leipzig, then Wiesbaden.

Indology beyond Sanskrit — but also including Sanskrit

HANS HENRICH HOCK

The crucial significance of Sanskrit in Indian tradition is well-known and is in large measure responsible for the extent to which traditional Indological studies have been dominated by Sanskrit and by the study of texts and traditions preserved in Sanskrit. At the same time, Indian tradition has also been shaped by languages other than Sanskrit, both Indo-Aryan and non-Indo-Aryan, as well as their speakers. While traditional Indology has paid some attention to the possible influence that speakers of non-Indo-Aryan languages may have had on the early history of Sanskrit, Sanskrit-oriented Indology has been less concerned with influence in the opposite direction, or — even more important — with the interactions between non-Indo-Aryan languages and Indo-Aryan languages other than Sanskrit, including Middle Indo-Aryan or even Medieval and Modern Indo-Aryan. As a consequence, Indological studies have tended to be isolated from general studies of Indian history and tradition and, in the process, from the 'real world' out there.

To remain relevant in the modern world Indology has to branch out to include texts and traditions in all of the languages of India or, at least, to relate Sanskrit-based studies to more general issue in India history and tradition. In my persentation I present the results of recent research that point to one way in which such an 'opening-up' can go. (It is gratifying to note that several other presentations at the Seminar likewise attempted to show that traditional, Sanskrit-oriented Indology can be meaningfully related to more general issues in Indian tradition.)

As is well-known, since the early nineteenth century certain features found in the earliest, Vedic attestations of Sanskrit have

been attributed to Dravidian influence; and that influence has generally been conceived of as unilateral, from Dravidian on Vedic/Indo-Aryan. These features most prominently include the contrast between dental and retroflex illustrated in (1). (See e.g. Emenueau 1956 and 1980 and the survey of the issues and controversies in Hock 1996 a.)

(1) Sanskrit pāta- 'flight' : pāṭa- 'portion'

The claimed influence of Dravidian on Vedic/Indo-Aryan has become a matter of modern political controversy in modern India. On one hand, the neo-Dravidian movement (especially in Tamil Nadu) has embraced the claim of Dravidian influence on Vedic as evidence that the Dravidians were the original inhabitants of India and were pushed back and suppressed by the conquering Indo-Aryans, while at the same time subverting the language of the Indo-Aryans — in a situation quite parallel to the more recent British subjugation of India. On the other hand, the 'Hindutva' movement claims that the Indian subcontinent is the original home of both Indo-Aryans and Dravidians, that there were no significant ethnic and linguistic differences between Aryans and non-Aryans in early India, and that therefore the hypothesis of Indo-Aryan migration and of Dravidian influence on Indo-Aryan must be rejected.

Research that I have conducted recently suggests a more complex situation than the commonly assumed unilateral 'subversion' of Indo-Aryan by Dravidian, namely linguistic 'convergence' or mutual influence, involving not only Dravidian and Vedic but also vernacular, 'Proto-Prakrit' dialects of Indo-Aryan, Iranian languages, and possibly other linguistic groups as well. In fact, under the hypothesis that I have developed, the controversial and possibly insoluble issue of whether there was contact between Indo-Aryan and Dravidian speakers in prehistoric and early historic times becomes immaterial, since linguistic

convergence does not require direct contact but can take place via intermediaries.

Moreover, the situation under which this convergence took place seem to have been fundamentally different from that involving the British in modern India. The British entered India as a colonial power, bent on subjugating a population which was by most Britishers considered to be racially different and therefore inferior. The evidence which has often been cited in favor of attributing similar views and actions to the early Indo-Aryans is of doubtful quality. In fact, to project modern, 'race-' based colonialist attitudes to prehistoric and early historic contexts probably is an anachronism.

While these and other findings may seem to lend some support to the 'Hindutva' position, there is evidence that casts doubts in the Hindutva movement's claim that there was no linguistic or ethnic difference between speakers of Indo-Aryan and non-Indo-Aryan languages in early India.

Finally, the most relevant for present purposes, the lines of communication between Indo-Aryan and Dravidian that can be hypothesized for early Vedic times become much clearer in later times, beginning with the time of the Aśokan inscriptions and continuing at least into medieval times. These lines of communication are reflected in three different zones of north-south relationships between Prakrit and later Indo-Aryan on one hand and early and medieval Dravidian on the other. One of these zones is in the east and includes the Gangetic plain in the north and the Deccan areas to the south; the second zone embraces most of the remaining Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages, ranging roughly from the Indus basin to the western coast of India; and a third zone includes the languages of the northwest (mainly in present-day Pakistan), including the Dravidian isolate language Brahui. Needless to state, the existence of these three zones of

communication raises interesting and significant questions regarding the history of the Indian subcontinent.

In this paper I summarize and illustrate some of my recent findings, in the hope that the evidence uncovered will persuade others that it is possible to 'open up' Indological studies to include linguistic traditions other than Sanskrit and that, moreover, such an opening-up can yield insights that are interesting and challenging for students of the history and traditions of the Indian subcontinent.

Let me begin with the question of the earliest interaction between Indo-Aryan and non-Indo-Aryan speakers ('Aryan' and 'non-Aryan' for short).

A very widespread view of this interaction, going back to at least the end of the nineteenth century, is that the Aryans invaded India, either as marauding bands or in a manner comparable to the British in modern times, and that like the British, they subjugated and suppressed an indigenous population that was different in terms both of 'race' and of language. This view was considered to be supported both by historical linguistic and textual evidence.

The most widely cited textual evidence consisted in Rig-Vedic characterizations of the non-Aryan *dāsas* or *dasyus* as infidel (*adeva*, *adharma*) etc., as well as in a few passages which seemed to depict the non-Aryans as 'black' or 'dark'. For the latter, see for instance examples (2) and (3); passages of the type (3) were considered especially persuasive, since they seem to refer to the 'black skin' of the indigenous population.

(2) *pañcāsát kṛṣṇā́ ní vapaḥ sahásrā*
átkaṁ ná púro jarimā́ ví dardaḥ (4:16:13cd)

Geldner: 'Fifty thousand Blacks you defeated. You slit up the forts like age (slits up) a garment;'

(3) ā́ryaṁ prāvad . . . svàrmiḷheṣv . . . !

. . . *tvácaṁ kṛṣṇā́m* arandhayat (1.130.8)

Geldner: 'Indra helped the Aryan in the battles for the sunlight . . . he made the black skin subject . . '

Now, the use of terms such as *adeva* leaves no doubt that the Aryan composers of the Rig-Vedic hymns felt there to be a deep chasm between themselves and the non-Aryans. However, attempts to read 'racial' interpretations into the few Rig-Vedic passages of the type (2) and (3) must be considered with a fair amout of skepticism. In some passages, such as (2), a 'racial' reading is possible only by overriding the actual evidence of the text. For instance, in (2), Geldner (1951) gets his reading by assuming that *kṛṣṇā́* owes its form to 'attraction' by *sahásrā;* but a more natural interpretation, without doing violence to the text or questioning the Vedic poets' control of grammar, would be to read *kṛṣṇā́* as *sandhi* for *kṛṣnā́ḥ* and modifying *púro,* in the meaning 'black forts'. In this case, of course, there is no longer any reference to skin color.

Even for the three passages in which 'black' and 'skin' occur together—RV 1.130.8 (see (3) above), 9.41.1c, and 9.73.5cd — a 'racial' reading is by no means required. First of all, note that only 1.130.8 offers the combination of 'black' and skin in a context with relatively clear reference to human beings; in 9.41.1c and 9.73.5cd the context is not sufficient to choose between the 'racial' interpretation of people like Geldner or an alternative reading 'the black cover, i.e. darkness' suggested by Graβmann (1872). Secondly, there are three other passages in which *tvac* 'skin' clearly does not refer to human (or animal) skin, but to the surface of the earth. And one passage, RV 4:17:14, talks of *kṛṣṇá . . . tvacó budhné* 'in the dark bottom of the skin' and *rájaso . . . yónau* 'in a womb of darkness', where there can be no question of

human (or animal) reference, but a reference to the depth below the surface of the earth is a definite possibility. Finally, one passage provides striking supporting evidence for the Vedic poets' metaphorical use of the notion 'skin' in reference to the surface of the earth; this is the expression *rómā pṛthivyā́ḥ* (1.65.8), literally 'the body-hair of the earth', but clearly designating 'the plants'. That is, the preponderance of the Rig-Vedic evidence either fails to provide unambiguous evidence for a 'recial' interpretation of the combination of worlds meaning 'black' and 'skin' or furnishes clear evidence for a non - 'racial' interpretation — as referring to a dark surface of the earth.

In this context it is probably significant that the Rig-Veda makes a well-known consistent contrast between the light world of the Aryans and their Gods (or desired by the Aryans), and the dark world of their supernatural opponents of their Gods. See for instance the selected summaries in (4). Note especially the first four passages in which the light world of the Aryans is explicitly contrasted with the world of the non-Aryans which, by contrast, would have to be dark.

(4) RV 1: 117: 21: The Aśvins blow over the dasyu and win *broad light* (*uru jyotis*) for the Aryan (sim. 7:5:6)

RV 2.11.4cd: Indra, the shining one, is to subdue the Dasic tribes by means of the *sun*

RV 2.11.18: Indra uncovered the *light* for the Aryan, the Dasyu remained sitting on the left

RV 3.34.9: Indra has won the *sun* . . . slaying the *dasyus* he furthered the Aryan side

RV 2.21.1: Indra wins everything, booty, the *light of the sun* . . .

RV 2.27.14: The poet prays that he may get to *broad* ... *light*

RV 1.86.10: Hide the darkness . . . , run over every Artin, make the *light* that we desire.

It is therefore interesting that in (3) we find a reference to *svàrmiḷheṣu* 'the battles for the sun' within the same verse, and the continuation of (2) likewise contains a reference to the light of the sun; see (5). A similar contrasting use of words meaning 'light' is found in almost all the other passages in which 'black' or "dark" has been taken to refer to human beings.

(5) *sū́ra upāké tanvàṁ dádhāno*
ví yát te céty amṛ́tasya várpaḥ 1 (4.16.14ab)

Geldner: 'Taking your stand next to the *sun* so that the figure of you, the immortal, strikes one's eyes'

As I argue elsewhere in greater detail (Hock 1996c), under the circumstances it is perfectly possible to read 'black' or 'dark' in passages such as (2) and (3) as referring to the 'dark world' of the non-Aryan opponents and there is nothing that compels us to interpret the words as referring to skin color. Put differently, words meaning 'back' or 'dark' probably were used to characterize non-Aryans in negative terms much in the same way as such words as *adeva*. (Note modern parallels such as the white hats of the 'good guys' *vs.* the black hats of the 'bad guys' in 'Western' movies.)

Similar arguments can be raised against identifying prehistoric conflicts between different ethnic groups with modern conflicts between colonialist and indigenous, non-European populations. There is ample evidence that in prehistoric and early historic times, both 'civilized' empires (such as the Roman one) and 'barbarian' ones (such as that of the Huns) were truly multiethnic, multilingual, and multicultural. War-time alliances might pit members of the same linguistic and ethnic group against each other (such as the Germanic allies of the Huns against the

Germanic allies of the Romans). Put differently, we find no compelling evidence for the exclusionary, racist ideologies that characterize early modern western colonialist expansion. In fact, Appiah (1987) convincingly demonstrates that the racism found in modern societies is itself a fairly recent innovation, arising in the context of European colonialism.

The view that the relationship between *āryas* and *dāsas/ dasyus* was similar to what we find in other early historic societies is supported, first, by the well-known fact that the Rig-Vedic 'battle of the ten kings' arrays *āryas* and *dāsas* on both sides of the fight. Second, as is also well-known, a number of hymns refer in one breath to *ārya* and *dāsa* enemies (6.22.10, 6.33.3, 6.60.6, 7.83.1, 10.69.6); note similar reference to *jāmi* and *ajāmi* enemies (1.111.3, 4.4.5, 6.19.8, 6.25.3, 6.44.17, sim. 10.69.12) and one reference to *jāmi* and *ajāmi* allies (1.100.11). Third, a Dāsa Balbūtha Tarukṣa is mentioned as patron of a singer in 8.46.32, and in 6.45.31 ab, a patron Bṛbu is said to have risen high above the Paṇis (another common group inimical to the *āryas*).

Evidence of this type casts doubt on the analogy between the early relationship of Aryans and non-Aryans and the modern relationship between the British and the indigenous population of India, an analogy that one way or the other underlies the view that Darvidian subverted early Indo-Aryan by introducing into the latter features such as the retroflex : dental contrast.

Proponents of 'Hindutva' have come to similar conclusions, in so far as they claim that the difference between Aryans and non-Aryans was purely a moral or social one. But to my knowledge they have done so without a detailed examination of the textual evidence. Moreover, the texts offer clear linguistic evidence in Dāsa names such as Balbūtha Tarukṣa and Bṛbu, as well as in many other words, which show that the Aryan : non-Aryan

difference was not just a social (or 'moral') one, but also a linguistic one.

Significantly, the relationship between Aryans and non-Aryans that results from these findings is consonant neither with the Darvidian-nationalist nor the Hindutva view. Here as elsewhere, a *madhyamayāna* seems more appropriate.

In other recent work I show that the developments leading to the retroflex : dental contrast in example (1) are more likely to result from convergent, developments involving both Indo-Aryan and Dravidian and possibly other languages as well, than from unilateral subversion of Indo-Aryan by Dravidian; see Hock 1996b for detailed discussion. Significantly for present purposes, on the Indo-Aryan side the developments involve the interaction between *r* and a following dental stop, yielding alveolar stops in early, Vedic Prakrits. Vedic Sanskrit offers only indirect traces of this development in that combinations of *r* plus dental stop appear either as dental or as retroflex, often in reflexes of the same word; see (6), especially b. and c. I suggest that these different outcomes are different reflexes of earlier alveolars (such as *ṯ*); see the summary of developments in (7).

(6) a. RV kartá 'cavity, hole' > RV kāṭá 'cavity, depth'

b. RV vikṛta 'changed; misshapen' > RV vikaṭa 'hideous, terrible'

c. * kṛta-vat 'having the lucky throw in gambling' > RV kitava 'gambler'

(7) rt > ṯ > t or ṭ (depending on regional dialect)

Later Indo-Aryan texts including the Aśokan inscriptions likewise show either dental or retroflex, but as is well-known, here we have clear evidence for geographically different outcomes, attested both in the Aśokan inscriptions (Map I) and in Modern Indo-Aryan (See Turner 1924, 1926).

Significantly, the geographical distribution of dental vs. retroflex outcomes of our hypothetical Vedic Prakrit alveolars has a close parallel in the geographical distribution of dental and retroflex outcomes of the well-established Dravidian alveolars; see the composite Map II.

As I argue in Hock 1996b, this parallelism is best explained as resulting from convergent developments between Dravidian and Indo-Aryan, and these developments continue earlier convergent changes that led to the development of a triple contrast dental : alveolar : retroflex in both Dravidian and Indo-Aryan.

What is significant for our purpose is that the three discernible zones in Map II suggest three different zones of north-south relationships between Indo-Aryan and Dravidian (and possibly other languages) during the first millennia b.c. and a.d. One of these zones is in the east and includes the Gangetic plain in the north and the adjoining Deccan areas to the south; the second zone embraces most of the remaining Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages, ranging roughly from the Indus basin to the western coast of India and its hinterland; and a third zone includes the languages of the northwest (mainly in present-day Pakistan), including the Dravidian isolate language Brahui.

Further evidence that these three zones of convergent developments between Indo-Aryan and Dravidian must be historically significant comes from the very similar geographical distribution of the shared change of late Middle Indo-Aryan and Dravidian retroflex *ḷ* and *ṇ* to dental *l* and *n*; see Map III, as well as Map IV which consolidates in simplified form the patterns observable in Maps II and III. (See Hock 1996d for further references and discussion.)

Needless to state, the existence of these three zones raises interesting and significant questions regarding inter-linguistic and

inter-ethnic communication in the history of the Indian subcontinent.

In addition, however, they also furnish support for the view that Indology can branch out to include, beside the Sanskrit tradition, the texts and traditions of all of the languages of India and, in so doing, relate Sanskrit-based studies to more general issues in Indian history and tradition.

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
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
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
Maps




Map I: Development of *r* + dental stop in the Aśokan inscriptions



Map II: Development of *r* + dental stop in the Aśokan inscriptions and Modern Indo Aryan (according to Turner) compared with the Dravidian development of alveolar stc (mainly geminates).



Map III: Modern isoglosses for the distribution of retroflex and dental (alveolar) nasals and laterals



Map IV: Combined isoglosses for dental vs. retroflex nasals and laterals and dental vs. retroflex outcomes of earlier alveolar stops

Orientalism vis-a-vis Classical Sanskrit Literature

C. RAJENDRAN

There is no dearth of books written by specialists, both Indian and Western, on Classical Sanskrit Literature which has enraptured the minds of Great European scholars and poets like schlegel and Goethe. Neverthless, a feeling persists that Sanskrit literature has not been given its due in Indological Study as yet, which has made tremendous progress among other things, in comparative philology, mythology, literary chronology and Vedic literature. Jawahar Lal Nehru writes :

So while the study of Comparative philology has progressed and much research work has been done in Sanskrit, it is rather barren and sterile from the point of view of a poetic and romantic approach to this language. There is hardly any translation in English or any other foreign language from the Sanskrit which can be called worthy of or just to the original. Both Indians and foreigners have failed in this work for different reasons. That is a great pity and the world misses something that is full of beauty and imagination and deep thinking, something that is not merely the heritage of India, but should be the heritage of the human race.

Nehru was writing in 1945, but things do not seem to have progressed much even in the post-independent India. Thus Professor warder writes (1970) in his preface to the monumental series on *Indian Kavya Literature :*

Previous publications on Indian Literature in Western Languages have at best sketched its history (ie, attempted to clarify the chronology) and at worst given extremely misleading judgements on its nature.

This rather depressing scenario raises some fundamental problems about the status of Indology in the past. While Indology

has registered tremendous progress in Vedic studies, history, comparative philology and other branches of Sanskrit legacy, the same cannot be said of Indian creative writing typified as classical Sanskrit literature. Indological perceptions of Sanskrit literature has often a baffling ambivalence with Western opinion swinging from ONE extreme to another from uncritical adulation to unmerited condemnation; even Goethe is not fully exempt from this tendency.

The present paper argues that a review of Indological studies from the point of view of the perceptions embodied in *Orientalism*, the seminal work of Edward Said would enable us to comprehend the growth and development of Indology, its theoretical assumptions and its perceptions on classical literature. By the term Orientalism, Said denotes the attitudes reflected in the discourse of the West about the East, consisting of a huge body of literary, topographical, anthropological, historical and sociological texts of the colonial past. According to Said, Orientalism signifies the corporate institution for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the East, authorising views of it, describing it, teaching it, setting it and ruling it. In fact it is a colonial perception of the East as constructed by the West, whereby the two are made to relate to each other as in a object-subject relationship. Since Orientalism reflects a larger cultural disposition on a variety of issues concerning the orient, its impact on Indological studies deserves a closer look for assessing the course of development of this academic discipline. This becomes self-evident when we realise that Indology took its shape and grew as a result of the encounter of the East by the West, during colonial times.

The impetus for Orientalist studies in the West came from the works of the egalitarian theoretician Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805) who translated the Upaniṣads into a mixture of Latin, Greek and Persian. According to Schwale, he 'interjected a vision of innumerable civilizations from ages past, of an infinity of

literatures; moreover the few European provinces were not the only places to have left their mark in history.'[1] During the same time, Warren Hastings, the Governor General of British India found it necessary to encourage the study of Sanskrit in the project of drawing up a code of laws for the Hindu subjects of the East India Company. In 1785, Charles Wilkins published a translation of the *Bhagavadgītā* which was the first English translation of a Sanskrit classic. However, it was Sir William Jones, the multilinguist, poet, jurist, polyhistor, and classicist who actually 'domesticated' and 'turned the orient into a province of European learning' with his indefatigable work. His wide range of interests included law, politics, mathematics, medical science, poetry, rhetoric and the like. It was the seminal remarks made by William Jones in the inaugural meeting of the Asiatic Society of Bengal which actually paved the way for the origin of the new science of comparative philology.

The multifarious function of Orientalism is summed up by Said thus :

> Under the general heading of the knowledge of the orient, and within the umbrella of western hegemony over the orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex oriental suitable for study of the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoreitical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instance of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character.

The history of Indology amply proves the point since the major concerns of Orientalists engaged in research activities often had larger cultural/civilizational ramifications. One of the pre-occupations of the Early Indologists with Comparative philology and Vedic literature could be explained by the fact that exploration of an alleged common past of the Indians and Europeans could

1. *Quoted in Orientalism*, p. 77

even legitimatise the colonial presence of the British in India. In fact even some prominent Indian thinkers like Keshab Chunder Sen referred to the British presence as representing "a reunion of parted cousins, the descendants of two different families of the ancient Aryan race."[1] The linguistic entity 'Aryan' here came to be wrongly taken as a racial category, and furthered the notion of Aryan superiority in countries like Germany.

The East-West dichotomy, an important stereotype of Orientalism, considerably influenced the Indologist's perception of Indian Culture. Cromer theorises the fundamental differences between these cultures thus :

> .... want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness is in fact the main characteristic of the oriental mind.
>
> The European is a close resoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic; he is by nature sceptical and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description.[2]

The impact of this type of conceptualisation involving East-West polarity in Indology is curious. On one hand, it resulted in romanticising India as the home of the idyllic community of gentle and passive people given to meditation and other worldly thoughts with an absence of aggression and competition.[3] In keeping with this it is remarkable that the Romantic Revivial of Germany coincided with the discovery of Sanskrit and the publication of the seminal work *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians* (1808) by the German poet and Philosopher. Friedrich Von Schlegel. The Germans, who had no colonial engagement in the

1. Quoted by Romila Thaper, *Interpreting Early India*, P.8.
2. Quoted by Siad, *op.cit.*, P. 38.
3. Romila Thapar, *op.cit.*, P. 5.

orient unlike the French and the British idealised the other-worldly, spiritual and timeless India and greeted Indian Classics[1] like *Upaniṣads* and *Abhijñāna śākuntala* with euphoria. On the other hand, the alleged unwordliness of outlook characterising the East was taken as a valid reason for Western despotic interference and domination of it by Oriental strategists like Balfour, who argues:

Is it a good thing for these great nations. I admit their greatness - that this absolute government should be exercised by us ? I think it is a good thing.

We do find a change in the initial euphoria generated by the discovery of Sanskrit literature which gave away soon enough to hostile and unsympathetic attitudes of the 19th century. Lin Yutung writes :

But the great age of Western appreciation of Indian literature and philosophy, the age of Sir William Jones, Fray Bopp and Sir Edwin Arnold has passed. The enthusiasm that came with the discovery of Sanskrit and the founding of the science of Indo-Germanic philology, directly inspired by it, soon evaporated.[2]

G.T. Garratt comments on this phase thus :

His (Sir William Jone's) successors soon began to adopt that slightly hostile and superior attitude which characterised the work of Englishmen writing on Indian subjects, From about 1836, this tradition had become firmly established. India was the 'Land of Regrets' in which Englishmen spent years of exile amongst a people half savage half decadent.

In this shift of perspective, the alleged traits of oriental characteristics which won approbation earlier came to be severely criticised. Reviewing the work of scholars engaged in the study of Indian literature, Professor Warder writes :

The scholars who tried to supply information of Indian literature applied whatever critical ideas they had picked up from their environment, accordingly taking Western (Greek, etc.) models as the only possible standard of good literature; unluckily they had picked up the Western tradition of criticism at its narrowest, as formulated during the +19. To them it appeared obvious that if Indian literature differed to any extent from the Greek or English

1. See Orientalism, P. 33.
2. *The Wisdom of India*, Pp. 12.

models, it must be inferior to precisely that extant. This cultural arrogance, accepted from their environment by scholars often most modest as individuals, was in some cases, especially in British writers, inflated to the most overweening proportions by the hot wind of colonialist and imperialist propaganda, this also docilely and dutifully accepted from their environment. It was an article of faith in British public opinion that Britain must rule India, hence anything that appeared to strengthen that faith, for example that the Indians were not competent to rule themselves or that Sanskrit literature was decadent, was readily believed.

The writings of Professor A.B. Keith illustrates the case in point. There cannot be any second opinion about the academic brilliance and wide ranging scholarship of Keith, but the attitude reflected in his work like *Sanskrit drama* and *A history of Sanskrit Literature* is to say the least so lukewarm and uniterested that it provoked Prof. D.H.H. Ingalls to remark that "for the most part he disliked Sanskrit literature."[1] Ingalls, among other things points out that knowledgeable as he is of Indian poetical tradition, Keith does not apply its canons anywhere in his evaluation of Indian masters. In order to have an idea of the tone and tenor of Keith's general attitude to Sanskrit poetry and drama, we can cite his evaluation of Kālidāsa, by far the greatest of Indian poets :

Admirable as is Kālidāsa's work, it would be unjust to ignore the fact that in his dramas as in his epics he shows no interest in the great problems of life and destiny. The admiration of Goethe and the style of the Shakespeare of India accorded by Sir William Jones, the first to translate the *Śākuntala* are deserved, but must not blind us to the narrow range imposed on Kālidāsa's interests by his unfeigned devotion to the Brahmanical creed of his time . . . . . he was incapable of viewing the world as a tragic scene, of feeling any sympathy for the hard lot of the majority of men, or appreciating the reign of injustice in this world.

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1. Quoted by Masson and Patwardhan, *Santarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*, Introduction. p. III.

Reviewing Sanskrit drama in general, Keith writes :

> Limited by the nature of the intellectual movement which produced it, the Sanskrit drama could never achieve the perfection of Greek Tragedy or Comedy.

It is needless to say that such an evaluation imposes certain basic assumptions on an alien literature which has its own distinct cultural background. It reflects a general outlok during colonial times which was at one and the same time indulgently patronising and calculatedly cultivated for the subjugation of other nations and peoples.

In the present post-colonial period, we have to ask ourselves whether we have freed ourselves from this colonial hangover. An alternate perspective has started emerging slowly in cultural studies with the advent of new movements like Deconstruction and Feminism. Said's attempt of defining Orientalism itself is a product of this changed atmosphere where colonial perceptions are sought to be corrected and supplanted by a global vision of human culture wherein polarities like East/West are no longer regarded as absolute terms. Time seems to be ripe to look upon Sanskrit literature as a part of the human legacy with both its strong and weak points. Saussure's thought emancipated cultural studies from their chronological pre-occupations. Structuralist and post-structuralist perceptions can be pressed into service for a proper apprisal of Sanskrit literature also. Perhaps a time may come when Sanskrit literature comes to the manistream literature from the cloisters of the specialists. Imaginative translation and studies of classics of this great literature are the need of the hour to rescue Indology from the crises of Orientalism in a post-colonial world.

Fifty years of Vedic Research
Retrospect & Prospect

S.K. LAL

In this Golden Jubilee year of our independence, I think it proper to take a stock of the works done in the field of Vedic studies during the last fifty years from 1946 to 1996. This is also roughly the period when four volumes of Professor R.N. Dandekar's *Vedic Bibliography* (volumes II - V) appeared. The four volumes together consist of 4155 demi-size pages (excluding the two indexes : Authors and Words) comprising 33, 278 entries of books, monographs, articles on Vedic topics. One can gauge the enormous work done during the past fifty years in the field.

My paper is divided into two parts : Retrospect and Prospect. For the rotrospect part, I fully rely on the four volumes of the Vedic Bibliography.

It may be noted that Sanskrit studies in the West started with the serious studies of Vedic language and literature. Nearly 200 years ago, Henry Thomas Colerbrooke wrote a lengthy paper in 1805 "On the Veda, or Sacred Writings of the Hindus" (published in the *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. 8, pp. 369-476), and thereby became the first Vedist.

Looking at the large number of authors, Indians and foreigners, of over 33, 000 books/monographs/articles just mentioned, it is very satisfying to note that Vedic studies have been and or being carried out throughout the world on a large scale. To support this, I would like to furnish some data regarding the scholars who have made valuable contributions to Vedic studies. Here I may mention that the terms like 'westerners' or 'western scholars' are no longer relevant now, for, we have Sanskrit scholars in Japan, China, Russia, etc. Therefore I shall

be using the terms foreigners and Indians.

Total Number of Authors from 1946 to 1996

	Foreigners	Indians	Total
1946 - 60	844	1083	1927
1961 - 72	1271	2193	3464
1972 - 83	1633	3100	4733
1983 - 73	1304	2861	4165
	5052	9237	14289
	35.35%	64.65%	

The scholars have studied the Vedic literature from different points of view and different angles; thus a rich variety of textual, topical, linguistic, and mythological studies of the Veda has been presented. The *Vedic Bibliography* has 87 sections (excluding Indus-Valley Civilization) covering different aspects of Vedic studies. These 87 sections have been abridged under 19 groups :

	Groups	Section
1.	Ṛgveda	4
2.	Atharvaveda	3
3.	Sāmaveda	2
4.	Yajurveda	2
5.	Brāhmaṇas	7
6.	Upaniṣads	3
7.	Vedāṅgas	7
8.	Vedic literature as a whole	5
10.	Lexical works	1
11.	Literary study	3
12.	Linguistic study	8
13.	Religion and mythology	10
13.	Philosophy	8

14.	Sociological studies	9
15.	Arts and sciences	5
16.	Study of words	1
17.	Study of concepts	1
18.	History of culture	4
19.	Miscellaneous	3

I now furnish section-wise data of works of scholars. For the sake of convenience, some of the sections have been merged together.

	Sections	Books/Monographs/Articles
1.	Studies on the Ṛgveda	1430
2.	Studies on the Atharvaveda	472
3.	Studies on the Sāmaveda	159
4.	Studies on the Yajurveda	362
5.	Studies on the Brāhmaṇas	374
6.	Studies on the Āraṇyakas	68
7.	Studies on the Upaniṣads	1761
8.	Studies on the Vedāṅgas (Only on Pāṇini 1088)	1968
9.	Anthologies, collection of essays, exegesis, commentaries, etc.	680
10.	General study of the Vedas	929
11.	Poetry, Style, Figures of speech	196
12.	Metre, accent, music	330
13.	Linguistic studies	957
14.	Vedic grammar and Grammatical studies	579
15.	Studies on Indo-European languages	1142
16.	Religion and mythology	2050

17.	Studies on Vedic divinities	1480
18.	Legends and myths	508
19.	Rituals, rites, cults and festivals	1242
20.	Philosophy, cosmology, metaphysics, ethics, etc.	2239
21.	Arts and sciences	1119
22.	Study of words	2074
23.	Study of concepts	1190
24.	Study on Indo-European and Aryans	946
25.	History and culture	2175
26.	Geography	208
27.	Bibliographies, catelogues, etc.	346

The scholars who have made the most valuable contributions, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the Vedic studies are as follows :

Foreigners	Books/Monographs/Articles
Jan Gonda	346
Louis Renou	205
Manfred Mayrhofer	139
Toporov V.N.	114
Paul Thime	112
W. Wust	104
G. Dumézil	100
F.B.J. Kuiper	100
V. Pisani	100
J.F. Staal	93
Karl Hoffmann	83
George Cardona	88

T. Burrow	74
J. Filliozat	74
W. Ruben	74
T.Y. Elizarenkova	73
Klaus Mylius	73
J.C. Heestermann	58
H.W. Bailey	53
A.K. Coomaraswamy	51
Asko Parpola	51
Harman Lommel	49
Malamoud Ch.	47
Michael Witzel	47
R. Morten Smith	46
N. Tsuji	44
Wilhelm Rau	42
H.W. Bodewitz	42
Bongrad-Levin G.M.	41
V.V. Ivanov	41
Albrecht Wezler	41
Nakamura Hajime	38
Hara Minora	37
W. Norman Brown	36
Johannes Bronkhorst	34
M. Eliade	32
Arthar A. Macdonell	31
M. Biardeau	31
Dumont Louis	31

Hans - Peter Schmidt	31
F. Max Müller	30
Heinrich Zimmer	28
Emeneau M.B.	25
Paul Kiparsky	23
W. Kirfel	23
W. Caland	22
A.L. Basham	21
Stella Kramrisch	20
A. Debrunner	16
Dumont P.E.	14
H. Lüders	14
A.B. Keith	14
Maurice Bloomfield	13
M. Winternitz	7
Indians Books/Monographs/Articles	
Sadashiv A. Dange	152
R.N. Dandekar	146
Yudhisthira Mimamsaka	129
V.S. Agrawala	122
C.G. Kashikar	121
S.D. Satavalekar	111
M.A. Mehendale	99
G.U. Thite	89
G.V. Devasthali	75
V. Raghavan	72
P.S. Sastri	72
B.R. Sharma	72

Vishva Bandu	70
Madhav Deshpande	65
Bhagavad Datta	58
G.B. Palsule	51
V.V. Bhide	50
Suniti Kumar Chatterjee	44
TMP Mahadevan	44
B.R. Modak	44
Avinash Chandra Bose	42
V.M. Apte	38
N.G. Chapekar	38
Sri Aurobindo	37
V.G. Rahurkar	37
S.D. Joshi	36
S. Radhakrishnan	34
P.T. Raju	34
Suryakanta	33
H. Heras	32
Madhusudan Ojha	31
H.D. Velankar	30
N.J. Shende	29
E.R. Sreekrishna Sharma	25
V.W. Karambelkar	20
Lokesh Chandra	16
K.R. Potdar	12
Anirvan	10
Dipak Bhattacharya	9

It may be mentioned that the above list is prepared in a numerically descending order. It is not easy, nor desirable, to evaluate a scholar without being subjective, and the evaluation certainly does not depend on the number of books or articles written by him. However, for general information, a few remarks of general nature may be made.

Undoubtedly, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, Prof. Gonda was the greatest Vedist. His multifarious and singular contribution to the Vedic studies, textual, text-critical, exegetical, linguistic, philological, mythological, and so on and so forth is incomparable. Renou's Vedic and Pāṇinian studies are indispensable for a Vedic student. It may be recalled that he was one among those who formulated the Sanskrit dictionary on historical principles. Mayrhofer's grammatical and exegetical studies are the tools most reliable and helpful for Vedic studies. Which Vedic student can afford to overlook Prof. Thieme's Pāṇini and the Veda. In the field of Vedic rituals and sacrifices, Staal and Heestermann and Bodewitz have contributed immensely. Staal's Agni : The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar in two volumes comprising of over 1500 pages is a massive contribution to Vedic sacrificial lore. Coomaraswamy, though a scholar of the Arts, has not contributed insignificiantly to the Vedic studies. Lüder's work on Varuṇa (two volumes) is an authority in itself. And are we not infinitely indebteded to the 'Scholar Extraordinary' Professor Max Müller ?

Among the Indian scholars, Prof. R.N. Dandekar has the top rank. The sheer enormity and single-minded devotion of Prof. Dandekar to his life long project of Vedic Bibliography puts one in awe. His five volumes, covering a period of nearly seventy years since 1931, consist of nearly 5000 demi-size pages. Besides this, he has contributed significantly to Vedism, Hinduism, and related topics. His views on Vedic divinities such as Indra, Varuṇa,

Pūṣan, and the *Original Home of the Aryans* are some of the master pieces of Vedic Research. Prof. Dange has studied Veda primarily from symbolical and comparative mythological points of view. Among the traditional Vedic sholars, Pandit Satavalekar, Pandit Madhusudan Ojha, and Pandit Yudhisthira Mimamsaka occupy high positions. Among many others, two works of V.S. Agrawala, *India as known to Panini*, and the *Sahasrākṣarā Vāk* are important contributions. Translations into English of Soma hymns by S.S. Bhawe, and Agni and Indra hymns by Velankar are regarded as authoritative. N.G. Chapekar and V.G. Rahurkar have studied Vedic seers. In the field of Atharvavedic studies, the names of V.W. Karambelkar and N.J. Shende stand prominent. Undoubtedly Prof. C.G. Kashikar is the greatest authority on Vedic sacrifices and rituals. He has contributed immensely to the Śrauta studies. His critical edition and translation of the *Bhāradvāja Śrauta Sūtra*, critical edition of *Vārāha Śrauta Sūtra* and the gigantic work in many volumes of the *Śrauta-kosha* are just a few to mention. Lokesh Chandra has put Vedic scholars in deep debt by his complete text of *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, and the text, translation and study of the *Sāṅkhāyana Śrauta Śutra* (text with Caland and Raghuvira). K.R. Potdar's study of the Āpri-hymns of the Ṛgveda and the Atharvaveda, and the *Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda* are the major contributions. P.S. Sastri has published a number of papers towards the study of Ṛgvedic poetry and figures of speech therein. Prof. B.R. Sharma has critically edited almost all the Brāhmaṇas of the Sāmaveda. Last, but not the least, who can proceed a step further in the long journey of Vedic researches without Acharya Vishva Bandhu ?

It would be clear from the above that much work has been done in the field of Vedic studies. But there is still much to be done. This forms the second part of my paper, viz., Prospects.

Happily, this is the one field where the scholars have

engaged themselves the most and have produced a great number of works. I may, however, make some general observations and some suggestions in this regard.

Many of the Vedic texts still remain untranslated. To give a few examples : the *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā*, the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* and the *Kapiṣṭhala-kaṭha- Saṃhitās* have been published, but not translated. *Taittirīya Brāḥmaṇa* has been partly translated by Dumont, but the *Sāmaveda Brāhmaṇas*, and most importantly, the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, remain. Prof. Bodewitz is working on the translation of the JB.

Most of the European scholars know two or three languages besides English. Not so in India. We are deprived of the works of the great savants like Renou, Thieme, Oldenberg, Ludwig, Grassmann, Geldner, to mention a few. It will be beneficial to a large number of teachers, students, and researchers if the works of these scholars are translated into English.

There have been great traditional Vedic scholars in India, who have written either in Sanskrit or in Hindi. Pt. Satavalekar has translated all the four Saṃhitās, major Brāhmaṇas, and Upaniṣads into Hindi. Besides, he has written a large number of books and articles in Hindi. It is deplorable that Panditji is not studied even by Indian scholars, or by foreign scholars, both because of Hindi. I am sure, if Panditji is translated into English, or French, or German, he will emerge as the greatest Vedic scholar.

There is a happy news that Dipak Bhattacharya has finalised the press copy of the entire *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* (Orissan version), and the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, is publishing it. When published, it would be interesting to make a comparative study of the Atharva-veda (Śaunaka), and Paippalāda in both Kashmirian and Orissan versions.

There are certain words in the Ṛgveda and elsewhere in other Vedic texts which are found exclusively in those texts, and not found at all anywhere else in the post-Vedic classical literature. It will be worthwhile if such words are collected, studied, and an exclusive dictionary is prepared. This brings us to another type of words, namely hapax-legomena. We all know *agastya* which occurs in many places in many Vedic texts. But we also find *agasti* (meaning the same *agastya*) only once in AV 4.29.3. We all know *mitrāvaruṇā, indrāvaruṇa, agnisomau*, etc. in the Saṃhitās, but there is *bhavarudrau* only once in the AV 12.4.14. Later on *Bhava, śarva, rudra* become synonyms. Hence hapax-legomena words should also be collected and studied on the basis of cognate Indo-Europeans words.

There is a dictionary of synonymns in Sanskrit by Amara Simha. It is in old style. It will be worth and very useful if some scholars come together and work for a Sanskrit thesaurus, on the pattern of some thing like *Roget's Thesaurus* for English language. If prepared, it will help immensely in the advancement of Sanskrit learning, particularly writing and speaking.

Vedic study is, indeed, infinite. A lot has been done; a lot remains to be done. We are reminded here of Bhāradvāja. He had obtained three life-times of 100 years each from Indra to study the Vedas. But all that he could learn in 300 years was just an atom from the three mountains, the three Vedas. Indra asked, "What would you do, if I were to give you another life time ? The sage answered, "I shall study the Veda."

Interpretation of Interpolations in Critical Editions

M. SRIMANNARAYANA MURTI

The lower and higher textual criticism provided a new dimension in the analysis of the classical texts. We are able to reconstruct a given text as close as possible to the author's autograph. On the basis of such critical edition, we are able to trace the sources of the author. This has provided an ample opportunity to traverse into the remote past of the nation and to get links to the text tradition even in the cases of large gaps due to the loss of several works. According to the standard norms, the scribal errors and interpolations are also faithfully recorded in the foot-notes or end-notes, by which each manuscript used in collation is fully described. While the scribal errors arise because of the lack of skills in scribes to identify the correct shape of the letters in his exemplar, the interpolations are voluntary emendations or additions made in the text by the learned scholars.

I

The texts get interpolated because of three reasons, namely,

1. revision made by the author himself,
2. incorporation of verses from other texts, and
3. interposition of new compositions of anonymous writers into the text.

The epics and *purāṇas* are manipulated by interpolations in order to update the information by incorporating the contemporary social, political, philosophical and religious concepts, without distorting the social values. This is exactly what is meant by *upabṛṃhaṇa* 'expansion'.[1]

The themes of interpolations are more powerful and effective, like folk-songs, than the recasts like ornate poem,

drama, lyric and prose. In recasts the themes of the epics and *purāṇas* are retold by the creative writer with several modifications to make the events depicted appear close to the contemporary society. Thus the events are brought down to the contemporary society with the result new wine is put in old bottle; for, the characters of the epics and ornate literature are different from the sociological point of view. In the interpolations the anonymous writer transfers the contemporary society into the past by incorporating the contemporary situations and socio-religious practices into the epic or purāṇic period, unmindful of the incongruity. But in both the cases contemporaneousness of the epic themes, with the readers, listeners, viewers and connoisseurs, is the main reason for the survival of the epics and *purāṇas* all through centuries.

Contemporaneousness is possible only when the social values remain unchanged along with the changing social norms. The norms change and indeed their variability is a mark of life in the society. The unchangeability of the social values is the stamp of unbroken continuity of the national mentality. The social values which are accepted by all the residents in all periods are the touch stone of culture.

There is only one difference between the interpolation and recasts. The interpolations enjoy the same status of the folk-songs.[2] The authors of the interpolation and folk-song go into oblivion, but their compositions get the status of *śruti* and quickly absorbed into the tradition. The authors of the recasts remain remembered, but their work stand as *smṛti* and become collateral to the *śruti*. Thus the study of interpolations gives many unknown facets in the cultural history, which otherwise are obscure and provide many revelations regarding the source of several works.

II

Let us examine, for illustration, the following two passages from

the *Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa* which are interpolations according to the critical edition of the Oriental Institute, Baroda. All these verses are commented upon by Rāma, Śivasahāya and Govindarāja in their commentaries called *Tilaka, Rāmāyaṇa- śiromaṇi* and *Bhūṣaṇa* respectively. The Gorakhpur edition of the Gita Press also contains these verses with Hindi translation.[3]

The first passage is from the *Bālakāṇḍa* in connection with the marriage ceremony of Rāma with Sītā :

ततो राजा विदेहानां वसिष्ठमिदमब्रवीत् ।
कारयस्व ऋषे सर्वामृषिभिः सह धार्मिक ॥
रामस्य लोकरामस्य क्रियां वैवाहिकीं प्रभो ।
तथेत्युक्त्वा तु जनकं वसिष्ठो भगवानृषिः ॥
विश्वामित्रं पुरस्कृत्य शतानन्दं च धार्मिकम् ।
प्रपामध्ये तु विधिवद् वेदिं कृत्वा महातपाः ॥
अलंचकार तां वेदिं गन्धपुष्पैः समन्ततः ।
सुवर्णपालिकाभिश्च चित्रकुम्भैश्च साङ्कुरैः ॥
अङ्कुराढ्यैः शरावैश्च धूपपात्रैः सधूपकैः ।
शङ्खपात्रैः स्रुवैः स्रुग्भिः पात्रैरर्घ्यादिपूजितैः ॥
लाजपूर्णैश्च पात्रीभिरक्षतैरपि संस्कृतैः ।
दर्भैः समैः समास्तीर्य विधिवन्मन्त्रपूर्वकम् ॥
अग्निमाधाय तं वेद्यां विधिवन्मन्त्रपुरस्कृतम् ।
जुहावाग्नौ महातेजा वसिष्ठो मुनिपुङ्गवः ॥
ततः सीतां समानीय सर्वाभरणभूषिताम् ।
समक्षमग्नेः संस्थाप्य राघवाभिमुखे तदा ॥[4]

The second passage is from the *Ayodhyākāṇḍa* in the context of Rāma's proposed coronation :

ततः प्रभातां रजनीमुदिते च दिवाकरे ।
पुण्ये नक्षत्रयोगे च मुहूर्ते च समागते ॥

वसिष्ठो गुणसम्पन्नः शिष्यैः परिवृतस्तथा।
उपगृह्याशु सम्भारान् प्रविवेश पुरोत्तमम्॥
सिक्तसंमार्जितपथां पताकोत्तमभूषिताम्।
संहृष्टमनुजोपेतां समृद्धविपणापणाम्॥
महोत्सवसमायुक्तां राघवार्थे समुत्सुकाम्।
चन्दनागुरुधूपैश्च सर्वतः परिधूपिताम्॥
तां पुरीं समतिक्रम्य पुरन्दरपुरोपमाम्।
ददर्शान्तःपुरं श्रीमान् नानाध्वजगणायुतम्॥
पौरजानपदाकीर्णं ब्राह्मणैरुपशोभितम्।
यष्टिमद्भिः सुसम्पूर्णं सदश्वैः परमार्चितैः॥
तदन्तःपुरमासाद्य व्यतिचक्राम तं जनम्।
वसिष्ठः परमप्रीतः परमर्षिभिरावृतः॥
स त्वपश्यद् विनिष्क्रान्तं सुमन्त्रं नाम सारथिम्।
द्वारे मनुजसिंहस्य सचिवं प्रियदर्शनम्।
तमुवाच महातेजाः सूतपुत्रं विशारदम्।
वसिष्ठःक्षिप्रमाचक्ष्व नृपतेर्मामिहागतम्॥
इमे गङ्गोदकघटाः सागरेभ्यश्च काञ्चनाः।
औदुम्बरं भद्रपीठमभिषेकार्थमाहृतम्॥
सर्वबीजानि गन्धाश्च रत्नानि विविधानि च।
क्षौद्रं दधि घृतं लाजा दर्भाः सुमनसः पयः॥
अष्टौ च कन्या रुचिरा मत्तश्च वरवारणः।[5]
चतुरश्वो रथः श्रीमान् निस्त्रिंशो धनुरुत्तमम्॥
वाहनं नरसंयुक्तं छत्रं च शशिसन्निभम्।
श्वेते च वालव्यजने भृङ्गारं च हिरण्मयम्॥
हेमदामपिनद्धश्च ककुद्मान् पाण्डुरो वृषः।
केसरी च चतुर्दंष्ट्रो हरिश्रेष्ठो महाबलः॥
सिंहासनं व्याघ्रतनुः समिधश्च हुताशनः।

सर्वे वादित्रासङ्घाश्च वेश्याश्चालङ्कृताः स्त्रियः॥
आचार्या ब्राह्मणा गावः पुण्याश्च मृगपक्षिणः।
पौरजानपद श्रेष्ठा नैगमाश्च गणैः सह॥
एते चान्ये च बहवः प्रीयमाणाः प्रियंवदाः।
अभिषेकाय रामस्य सह तिष्ठन्ति पार्थिवैः॥
त्वरयस्व महाराजं यथा समुदितेऽह्नि।
पुष्ये नक्षत्रयोगे च रामो राज्यमवाप्नुयात्॥[6]

III

The *Keśi-sūkta* in the *Ṛgveda,* the Rohita and Śunaḥśepha story in the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* and the *Āruṇaketukāgni* ritual in the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* confirm the inference for the existence of offering oblations to the divinities through the media of Air, Water and Fire — the well recognized media for combustion of energy according to modern science. The nomadic Āryans migrated from place to place and offered their oblations on time, justifying the name *karma-bhūmi* for the land, in Air, Water or Fire as available on hand. The intensive agricultural operations by deforestation and preponderance of Fire ritual in preference to Air and Water promoted colonization and formation of kingdoms resulting in conflicts within the native groups of the Āryans and also with the residents.[7] From the phenomenological point of view the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa* is contemporaneous with the *Śuklayajurveda* and its auxiliaries (*Vedāṅgas*).[8] The whole text reflects the agricultural operations and cultivation of paddy and barley. The sacrifies is found all through the text as a prime religious ritual for obtaining every thing mundane or spiritual. There were temples called *Devatāyatana*[9] or *Devāgāra,*[10] the prayers done wherein are only complementary to the Fire sacrifice.

The epics and *purāṇas* maintain the kings, who belong during their times to the class of Kṣatriyas, as the model for all

social, political and religious institutions.[11] In course of time the power of the state transferred to the non-Kṣatriyas, who gave perhaps due to socio-political reasons, prominence to the temple worship, which led to the development of *bhakti* movement and *bhāgavata* cult, subordinating the Fire sacrifice to the temple worship. The Vedic sacrifice is represented symbolically in the temple worship. The Air and Water sacrifices were also amalgamated with Fire sacrifice and all the three are restored in the worship of four images of the deity called Dhruva, Snapana, Utsava and Bali *beras.*[12] The Dhruva-bera is the principal and fixed image of the god in sanctum installed permanently by invocation through water. As this image cannot be moved, three movable images are made to be taken to the places where different rituals take place. The Kautuka-bera is taken to the Fire-place where Fire sacrifices are conducted and oblations are offered to the deity through Fire. The Snapana-bera symbolizes the water worship and to it all the sacred ablutions are offered. And to the Bali-bera all the foods are directly offered by placing before the deity symbolizing the Air-worship.

This transition brought two changes. First, the institution of worship got universalized and perpetuated without interruption and any individual without any reference to caste, cadre and wealth can take part in it at his choice.[13] Second, the king became not only the main trustee or *yajamāna* to the temple but also a model for temple ritual.[14] Besides the fire oblations, water ablutions and air offerings, 'services which are done to the king' (*rājopacārāḥ*)[15] also came to be introduced in the temple ritual. Accordingly a new image called Utsava-bera is introduced to symbolize the kingly gestures.[16] The Utsava-bera or 'Festive image' is adorned with very rare and precious diamond studded jewels all over the image including the palms of the hands, the diamond crown and the diamond sword or bow. Very expensive, elegant super-fine and

selective clothes are recommended to the image.[17] The services like awakening the god, ablutions with fragrant and medicated water,[18] applying beautifiers, ornamental decoration, entertainments by courtesans,[19] artistes, dancers and musicians,[20] delicious foods and recipes are offered. Applying incense and fragrant sandal paste and garlanding the neck and head with wreaths of fragrant flowers also include in the service of the image.[21] Thus *dhūpa, dīpa and pūja*[22] with flowers have acquired the same status of *homa*. To bring further amalgamation, the *Vimānārcanā-kalpa* prescribes a homa with lotus, erecting a separate fire-place called Pauṇḍarīka or Padṃa Agni.[23] An *āsthānam* 'assembly' is arranged in the sanctum.[24] A ride to the pleasure garden on the outskirts of the city is arranged for this festive image with a large convoy comprising of an elephant, a horse, an ox and so on with recitations of the *Vedas, stotras* in praise of the gods. Just as the *vijayotsava* is celebrated by the king on his triumph in his wars, *brahmotsava* is celebrated to the image every year on the birth star of the king with all pomp and show.[25] Through his services he becomes close to his subjects. So the *Marīçi-saṃhitā* prescribes :

एवं ग्रामं प्रदक्षिणीकृत्य शकुनसूक्तेनालयमावेश्य आस्थानमण्टपे सिंहासने विष्टरे वा देवं संस्थाप्य पाद्याद्यैरभ्यर्च्य मुखवासं दत्वा राजवदुपचारं कृत्वा शुद्धस्नपनविधिना संस्नाप्य अभ्यर्च्य महाकविः प्रभूतं वा निवेद्य पानीयाचमनमुखवासं दत्वा द्वितीयाहः प्रभृति नित्यं सायंप्रातर्नित्यार्चनान्ते द्विगुणार्चनं हविर्निवेदनं कुम्भदेवाराधनं होमं बलिदानं च कृत्वा सायंप्रातः एवमेवोत्सवं कारयेत् ॥ Paṭala 53, p. 354.

IV

Further during the process of amalgamation of the Āryan and non-Āryan or Vedic and non-Vedic traditions, several non-Vedic temples in South India were converted into the Vedic fold of worship. In this process certain religious materials and practices of the natives were also absorbed in the Vedic materials and practices and vice versa. Some of them got also universalized all

through the length and breadth of the country. Of them a mention may be made of *akṣata* 'unbroken (rice)', *aṅkurārpaṇa* 'germinating sprouts of grain'.

The very term *akṣata*, by virtue of its being a negative compound (*nañ-tatpuruṣa*) presupposes the exclusion (*paryudāsa*) of something which is *kṣata* 'broken' and used in the sacrificial ritual. The *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra* (2.17) of the *Śuklayajurveda* prescribes a sacrifice called *Sītā-yāga* in which a cooked mess (*sthālīpāka*) made out of broken (*kṣata*) or pestled rice or barley is offered to the anthropomorphic gods of agriculture in the furrows of the paddy or barley field respectively. Here the field is considered as a medium to carry (*vāhinī*) the oblations to gods and hence it is metaphorically called *Agni-kṣetra* (the field which is like Agni).[26] There are also other agricultural grains like *tila* 'sesamum', *sarṣapa* 'mustard' and *māṣa* 'black grains'.[27] Of these the paddy and the barley, and more particularly the former, are the staple food. Not only that, it was the time when economy was changing from cattle to agricultural produce. Thus the property of a person came to be valued in terms of paddy as well as cattle. Hence the compound *bahuvrīhi* is used as a nomenclature for the class of epithetised compounds. Now in contradistinction to broken (*kṣata*) rice, the cleaned, sorted and unbroken[28] (*akṣata*) rice and barley came to be used in the temple ritual. Out of the eight grains recommended for temple ritual,[29] the unbroken rice grains are mixed with barley (*yava*), mustard (*sarṣapa*) and black-gram (*māṣa*), and the whole is technically called *akṣata*.[30] Water with the mixture of these *akṣata*-grains is called *akṣatodaka*[31] and it is one of the sacred waters prescribed for ablutions to the bathing image (Snapana-bera).

Tila and other grains are however used in the *Aṅkurārpaṇa*. The *Aṅkurārpaṇa* is a rite in which all the eight grains, or whatever grains are available, are germinated in *pālikā, śarāva* and

kumbha. [32] It is an important preliminary rite to be performed in both Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava temples in South India and also in domestic rituals like marriage, to mark the beginning of the ceremony with a prayer for successful completion.

V

Disappearance of *tila* in *akṣatas* can be explained through the obsequies of Daśaratha in the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa :*

प्रेतकार्याणि यान्यस्य कर्त्तव्यानि विशांपतेः।
तान्यव्यग्रं महाबाहो क्रियतामविचारितम्॥
तथेति भरतो वाक्यं वसिष्ठस्याभिपूज्य तत्।
ऋत्विक्पुरोहिताचार्यांस्त्वरयामास सर्वशः॥
ये त्वग्नयो नरेन्द्रस्य अग्न्यागाराद्वहिष्कृताः।
ऋत्विग्भिर्याजकैश्चैव ते हूयन्ते यथाविधि॥
शिविकायामथारोप्य राजानं गतचेतनम्।
वाष्पकण्ठा विमनसस्तमूचुः परिचारकाः॥
हिरण्यं च सुवर्णं च वासांसि विविधानि च।
प्रकिरन्तो जना मार्गे नृपतेरग्रतो ययुः॥
चन्दनागुरुनिर्यासान्सरलं पद्मकं तथा।
देवदारूणि चाहृत्य क्षेपयन्ति तथापरे॥
गन्धानुच्चावचांश्चान्यांस्तत्र गत्वाथ भूमिपम्।
तत्र संवेशयामासुश्चितामध्ये तमृत्विजः॥
तदा हुताशनं हुत्वा जेपुस्तस्य तदृत्विजः।
जगुश्च ते यथाशास्त्रं तत्र सामानि सामगाः॥
शिविकाभिश्च यानैश्च यथार्हं तस्य योषितः।
नगरान्निर्ययुस्तत्र वृद्धैः परिवृतास्तथा॥
प्रसव्यं चापि तं चक्रुऋत्विजोऽग्निचितं नृपम्।
स्त्रियश्च शोकसंतप्ताः कौसल्याप्रमुखास्तदा॥ [33]

In the same style we find an interpolation with the

description of the obsequies of Rāvaṇa in the *Yuddha-kāṇḍa* :

क्षिप्रमर्हति धर्मेण त्वं यशोभाग्यथा भविष्यसि।
राघवस्य वचः श्रुत्वा त्वरमाणो विभीषणः॥
संस्कारयितुमारेभे भ्रातरं रावणं हतम्।
स प्रविश्य पुरीं लङ्कां राक्षसेन्द्रो विभीषणः॥
रावणस्याग्निहोत्रं तु निर्यापयति सत्वरम्।
शकटान्दारुरूपाणि अग्नीन्वै याजकांस्तथा।
तथा चन्दनकाष्ठानि काष्ठानि विविधानि च।
अगरूणि सुगन्धीनि गन्धाश्च सुरभींस्तथा॥
मणिमुक्ताप्रवालानि निर्यापयति राक्षसः।
आजगाम मुहूर्तेन राक्षसैः परिवारितः॥
ततो माल्यवता सार्धं क्रियामेव चकार सः।
सौवर्णीं शिबिकां दिव्यामारोप्य क्षौमवाससम्॥
रावणं राक्षसाधीशमश्रुवर्णमुखा द्विजाः।
तूर्यघोषैश्च विविधैस्तुवद्भिश्चाभिनन्दितम्॥
पताकाभिश्च चित्राभिः सुमनोभिश्च चित्रिताम्।
उत्क्षिप्य शिबिकां तां तु विभीषणपुरोगमाः॥
दक्षिणाभिमुखाः सर्वे गृह्य काष्ठानि भेजिरे।
अग्नयो दीप्यमानास्ते तदाध्वर्युसमीरिताः॥
शरणाभिगताः सर्वे पुरस्तात्तस्य ते ययुः।
अन्तःपुराणि सर्वाणि रुदमानानि सत्वरम्॥
पृष्ठतोऽनुययुस्तानि प्लवमानानि सर्वतः।
रावणं प्रयते देशे स्थाप्य ते भृशदुःखिताः॥
चितां चन्दनकाष्ठैश्च पद्मकोशीरचन्दनैः।
ब्राह्मया संवर्तयामासू राङ्कवास्तरणावृताम्॥
प्रचक्रू राक्षसेन्द्रस्य पितृमेधमनुत्तमम्।
वेदिं च दक्षिणाप्राच्यां यथास्थानं च पावकम्॥

पृषदाज्येन संपूर्णं स्रुवं स्कन्धे प्रचिक्षिपुः।
पादयोः शकटं प्रापुरूर्वोश्चोलूखलं तदा।
दारुपात्राणि सर्वाणि अरणिं चोत्तरारणिम्।
दत्वा तु मुसलं चान्यं यथास्थानं विचक्रमुः॥
शास्त्रदृष्टेन विधिना महर्षिविहितेन च।
तत्र मेध्यं पशुं हत्वा राक्षसेन्द्रस्य राक्षसाः॥
परिस्तरणिकां राज्ञो घृताक्तां समवेशयन्॥
गन्धैर्माल्यैरलंकृत्य रावणं दीनमानसाः॥
विभीषणसहायास्ते वस्त्रैश्च विविधैरपि।
लाजैरवकिरन्ति स्म बाष्पपूर्णमुखास्तथा।
स ददौ पावकं तस्य विधियुक्तं विभीषणः।
स्नात्वा चैवार्द्रवस्त्रेण तिलान् दर्भविमिश्रितान्॥
उदकेन संमिश्रान्प्रदाय विधिपूर्वकम्।[34]

The obsequies described in the *Rāmāyaṇa* are related to the Kṣatriyas who performed sacrifices. Thus these funeral rites are called *pitṛmedha* and treated as part and parcel of the *Śrauta*-ritual falling within the preamble of sacrifice. But in course of time, when the Kṣatriyas are taken over by the non-Kṣatriyas and the Bhakti movement put the Vedic sacrifice at low profile, the obsequies are dealt with more as a domestic rite and treated as inauspicious. Thus *tila* and the wet-rice are considered as fit to be used in *pitṛmedha*. In South India *sarṣapa* lost its religious importance for its being not grown regularly for extracting oil.[35] Further to keep contrast from *Pitṛmedha* the wet-rice coloured with turmeric came to be used in the temples and in auspicious domestic ceremonies like marriage. Today *akṣata* means rice coloured with turmeric powder.

VI

The above interpolations which were made voluntarily by an unknown poet of merit, signify that all these social norms are of

the post-Vedic religion with regard to marriage and coronation of the deities as well as human beings. The *Rāmāyaṇa* tradition is basically Yājñaic, while the interpolations are Āgamic. The Āgamic tradition could be very old and not inimical with the Yājñaic tradition. Both of them fall within the framework of same value system with deviating norms. So Patañjali uses the word *āgama* for the *Veda* and Vedic tradition,[36] and Bhartṛhari considers that Vyākaraṇa is an *āgama,* a *smṛti* and a *śāstra.*[37] The extant Āgama works are not very old and hence they cannot directly be compared with the Vedic works. The amalgamation which took place in different epochs is so synthetic that each layer cannot easily be analysed. The interpolations may help in this direction.

References

1. इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत्।

   बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद् वेदो मामयं प्रहरिष्यति ॥ *Mahābhārata,* 1.1.269.

2. See my paper, 'Rāmāyaṇa Theme and Social Change', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal* 36, pp. 71-81.

3. The editions followed in this paper are :

   Rām (B): *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa* (Critical Edition) vol. I-VII, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1960-1975.

   Rām (M) : *Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki with the commentaries Tilaka of Rāma, Rāmāyaṇa-siromaṇi of Śivasahāya, and Bhūṣaṇa of Govindarāja,* Meharchand Lachhmandas, Delhi, 1983

4. Rām (M). 1.73.18.23. These verses are given in the foot-notes of Rām (B). 1.72.16, p. 379

5. cf. *Vimānārcanākalpa* (VK), *Paṭala* 48, pp. 323 ff., Sri Venkateswara Press, Madras, 1926.

6. Rām (M). 2.14.25-42. These verses are given in the Appendix I,

No. 10 on page 652f.

The procedure for coronation is already known very early in the Vedic period. The arrangements made by the citizens are described in the immediately following *sarga* (Rām (B). 2.13: Rām (M) 2.15) The interpolation is specially designed to reflect the post-Vedic tradition under the influence of temple worship. Cf. VK. 24, pp. 178ff.

A vivid description of the coronation of Rāma is found in Rām (B) 6.128.52-89. In connection with the description of Vibhīṣaṇa's coronation Rām (M). 6.112.19-20 reads :

दध्यक्षतान्मोदकांश्च लाजाः सुमनस्तथा।

आजह्रुरथ संहृष्टाः पौरास्तस्मै निशाचराः।

against Rām (B). 6.110.16 :

अक्षतान् मोदकाञ्ल्लाजान्दिव्याः सुमनसस्तथा।

आजह्रुरथ संहृष्टाः पौरास्तस्मै निशाचराः॥

Cf. घृतमनतीतपञ्चदशाह . . . . . , VK. 48, p. 324.

7. See my Introduction to *kaiṅkaryaratnāvali,* in : *S.V.U. Oriental Journal 29,* pp. 3-39.

8. See my paper 'Green Revolution in the Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal* 37, pp. 61-80.

9. देवतायतनान्याशु सर्वास्ताः प्रत्यपूजयन्। Ram (B). 1.76.11.

See also *ibid.* 7.91.14.

10. देवागाराणि शून्यानि न भान्तीह यथा पुरा।

देवतार्चाः प्रविद्धाश्च यज्ञगोष्ठास्तथैव च॥ Rām (M) 2.71.40.

11. राजा धर्मश्च कामश्च द्रव्याणां चोत्तमो निधिः।

धर्मः शुभं वा पापं वा राजमूलं प्रवर्तते॥ Rām (B). 3.48.9.

12. स्नपनोत्सवबलिबेराणि षोडशोपचारैरभ्यर्चयेत्, VK. 44, p. 305.

13. ....प्रतिमाराधनं समूर्तम्। तच्छ्रेष्ठं यजमानाभावेऽपि अविच्छिन्नं भवति।

VK. 1, p. 5.

14. cf. राजवदुपचारं कृत्वा, VK. 53, p. 354.

15. The services done to the god are divided into 32 in the order as prescribed in : आसन-स्वागता-ऽनुमान-पाद्या-ऽचमन- पुष्प-गन्ध-धूप-दीप-ऽर्घ्या-ऽचमन-स्नान-प्लोत- वस्त्रो-ऽत्तरीय- यज्ञोपवीत-पाद्या-ऽचमन-पुष्प-गन्धा-धूप-दीपा-ऽचमन-हविः-पानीया-ऽचमन-मुखवास-बलि-प्रणाम- प्रदक्षिणाः पुष्पाञ्जलिसहितास्तितिश्चेति द्वात्रिंशदुपचाराः। VK. 42, p. 290.

16. ध्रुवकौतुकस्नपनोत्सवबलिबेराणां सहप्रतिष्ठा चेत् एकशालामेकवेदिं सदैव होममेककुंभं च कुर्यात्। VK.30, p. 218

17. शिविकादियानं वस्त्रगन्धमाल्याद्यैरलंकृत्य देवेशं नानावर्णाम्बरैर्नवैः कौशेयाद्यैः सूक्ष्मकार्पासतन्तुकृतैश्च रत्नयुतमकुटाङ्गदमकरकुण्डल केयूरहारकटिसूत्रोद रबन्धनाङ्गुलीयकमुक्ता दामप्रलंबयज्ञोपवीताद्याभरणैः सुगन्धमाल्यैर्नानाविधगन्धैश्चालङ्कुर्यात्। अज्ञानादर्थलोभाद्वा देवस्यालङ्कारे हीने सर्वहानिर्भवेत्। यत्नेनालङ्कुर्यात्। वस्त्रं जीर्णं स्फुटितमुपयुक्तं वा यो दद्यात् तस्य महत्तरो दोषो भवति। नवं मृदु सूक्ष्मं वस्त्रं यो दद्यात्! स कुलैस्सप्तभिर्युक्तो विष्णुलोकमवाप्नुयात्। VK. 53, p. 352.

18. सुगन्धितैले अधिदैवतं विष्णुमभ्यर्च्य वैष्णवं मन्त्रमुच्चार्य ततोऽभ्यञ्जनं कृत्वा, VK. 54, p. 357.

This type of daily routine beginning with the awakening of king is described in Rām (M). 7. 37.2ff. This is an interpolation in Rām (B) and the whole text is given in Appendix I, No. 4 on page 584. This is clearly an interpolation made on the basis of the services to the image of god, after it got established as a norm in the temple worship.

19. शङ्खध्वनियुतं सर्ववाद्यैः स्तोत्रैः स्वस्तिघोषैः सह यजमानो देवदासी वा तत्पात्रं

शिरसा धृत्वा . . . . , VK. 25, p. 195

गणिका देवदासीर्वाहूय नृत्तमण्डपमध्ये मण्डलमुपलिप्याऽप्सरश्चा- वाह्याभ्यर्च्य ता अप्सरसस्स्मृत्वा प्रोक्ष्य पुष्पं दत्वा नृत्तगेयं च कारयेत्, VK. 42, p. 288.

20. पश्चात् नृत्तगेयवाद्यैश्च रात्रिशेषं व्यपोह्य प्रभाते त्वाचार्यः VK 40, p. 247.k सर्ववाद्यसमायुक्तं देवागारं प्रदक्षिणीकृत्वा, *ibid,* नर्तकान् गायकान् भक्तान् परिचारकांश्च यत्नेनाह्वयेत् VK. 52, p. 345

21. एवं ग्रामं प्रदक्षिणीकृत्य शकुनसूक्तेनालयमावेश्य आस्थानमण्डपे सिंहासने विष्टरे वा देवं संस्थाप्य पाद्याद्यैरभ्यर्च्य मुखवासं दत्वा राजवदुपचारं कृत्वा शुद्धस्नपनविधिना संस्नाप्य अभ्यर्च्य महाहविः प्रभूतं वा निवेद्य पानीयाचमनामुखवासं दत्वा . . . , VK. 53, p. 354.

22. For the worship of the image with flowers see VK. 43, p. 293 ff.

23. पुण्डरीकवत्तपोलोकस्तद्वत्पौण्डरीको भवति, VK. 30, p. 215

24. आलयाभिमुखेऽन्यस्मिन् शुभ्रे देशे वा आस्थानमण्डपं कूटं वा पञ्चहस्तादिभेदेन प्राङ्मुखं दक्षिणामुखं आलयद्वारदिङ्मुखं वा परिकल्प्य . . . ., VK. 52, p. 344.

25. नवाहं सप्ताहं पञ्चाहं वाप्युत्सवः राज्ञो राष्ट्रस्य ग्रामस्य यजमानस्य वा जन्मर्क्षे प्रतिष्ठादिने . . . उत्सवदिनं निश्चित्य, VK. 51, p. 339.

If the order of enumeration is taken as order of preference, the birth star of the king is most auspicious. In other months, on the day on which the king's birth star falls a special *pūjā* is to be performed to the god; . . . राज्ञो यजमानस्य वा जन्मर्क्षेऽपि विशेषपूजां कुर्यात्, VK. 46, p. 311. Thus the king's birth star has become so significant and popular that the king is identified with Viṣṇu, hence the epitome: *nāviṣṇuḥ pṛthivīpatiḥ* has come into vogue.

The Vāstusāstra also prescribes that the residential houses of the subjects should not be bigger than the house of the king.

26. 'Green Revolution in the *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa*', *S.V.U. Oriental Journal* 37, pp. 61-80.

27. They are mentioned in the Atharvaveda, *Ṣaḍviṃśa-brāhmaṇa, Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā, Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* etc.

28. धान्यानि . . . आहृत्य संशोध्य सारं संगृह्य, VK. 48, p. 324. Cf. for *akṣata* as a technical name :

अक्षतं जातरूपं च गावः कन्याः सहद्विजाः।

नरा मोदकहस्ताश्च रामस्य पुरतो ययुः॥ Rām (M). 1.128.38.

Note : This verse is included in the main text of Rām (B) as 1.116.35.

29. शालिव्रीहियवमुद्गमाषप्रियङ्गुतिलतील्वसर्षपाण्यष्टौ धान्यानि। VK. 48, p. 323.

30. तण्डुलं यवसंयुक्तं सर्षपैश्चाक्षतं भवेत्। quoted from the unpublished work called *Arcanādhikāra* in : *Śrīmad-Bhagavadāradhanacandrikā*, Nallur, 1987, p. 136.

31. माषयवसर्षपव्रीहितण्डुलैर्युतं जलं अक्षतोदकम्, VK. 48, p. 324

32. See VK. 26, p. 198. The *pālikā, śarāva* and *kumbha* are the earthen pots differentiated by the difference in dimensions. The grains that are to be used are : शालिव्रीहियवमुद्गमाषप्रियंगुगोधूम-सर्षपचणकतिलतिल्वकमसूराणि, ibid. p. 199. The sprouts are also worshipped by invoking Tārkṣya in them, *ibid.* 49, p. 331. See also *Khilādhikāra*, 16. 19-27.

33. Rām (B). 2.70.11-20 Rām (M). 2.76.11-20.

34. Rām (M). 6.111.102-121. These verses are given in Rām (B) in the Appendix I, No. 69 on page 1093.

35. A general exception to exclude the items which are not available is already obtained in the prescription: धान्यानि —

शालिव्रीहियवमुद्गमाषप्रियंगुगोधूमसर्षपचणकतिलतिल्वकमसूराणि, एतेषामलाभे यथालाभमाहृत्य, VK. 26, p. 199.

36. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1: रक्षोहागमलघ्वसंदेहाः प्रयोजनम्।

37. *Vākyapadīya*, 1.27; 30; 41; 148, 157, 158; 2.3; 233, etc.

What does Indology mean specially for China

DUAN QING

1. A survey about Indology in China.

In Chinese there is a popular set phrase that says : "From the pavilion which is situated nearest to the lake you will be always the first to have view of the moon." The meaning of the phrase is that who is nearest to the source receives always more than the others. China as a close neighbour country to India had received more cultural treasure from India than any other country in the world. During a very long history of cultural exchange Indian culture had influenced Chinese culture in many fields. Today it would not be possible to write down the history of Chinese philosophy, if the writer would not have a profound knowledge of the Buddhist philosophy. Today if we take out all the words from our language that had come originally from Buddhistic texts, we can even not speak our language. From very earlier date to modern time, China has never stopped to take from Indian spiritual treasure. Many great figures of modern Chinese literature were inspired by writings of Tagore. The poems and writings of these Chinese writers are still beloved among young generation of China.

Nowadays the modern technology brings the word together. Foremerly the far off continents for China like Europe, America and Africa can be reached within a couple of hours. It enables Chinese people to learn from all the countries over the world, but still India remains the interested country for China. Three of the highest ranked Universities have set up Faculty of Hindi language and literature, one in Beijing, one in Nanjing and another one in Luoyang. The Hindi students from the three universities can get jobs later in Foreign Ministry, in publishing houses, in trade companies and in institutions for TV and Radio. We publish regularly Journals in Hindi language. We have also Radio Beijing in Hindi language. All the books of Indian

famous modern writers like Tagore and Premchand had been translated into Chinese language. We have Hindi-Chinese Dictionary written by Chinese scholars at Peking University. An enlarged Hindi-Chinese dictionary is also in printing.

As for classical indology, if we consider that China is a big country with more than one billion people, then the number of scholars engaged with classical Indology is really very small. They are as some water drops compared to the ocean. Sanskrit teaching is held only at two institutions, one of them is the Department of Oriental Studies at the famous Peking University, and another is the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academia of Social Science. The number of Chinese scholars dealing with Sanskrit can be counted on your fingers, but still we have to thank two Chinese scholars for the existence of classical Indology in modern China. Both of these Chinese scholars are now above 80 years old. Both of them are highly esteemed in China.

Mr. Professor Dr. Ji Xianlin is one of them. From the year in which Hitler came to power to the end of the second World War he spent 11 years in Gottingen of Germany. In the roar of guns and hungry together with German people he mastered Sanskrit and Vedic, the holy language of India. Some famous German scholars like Seg and Siegling and Waldschmidt were his teachers.

Back to China he had translated Sanskrit books into Chinese language. His translations include the whole *Ramayana*, *Pancatantra*, *Sakuntala* of Kalidasa and *Dasakumaracarita*. He had written in English and German some valuable articles about the origin of Mahayana Buddhism from the view of language. He is also one of the few Tocharian scholars in the world.

In the field of comparative studies about China and India he had also contributed a lot of works. In the age of 85 he showed clearly how the sugar production did come from India to China, and how it had been improved in China. His complete works will be published in 20 volumes within two years.

Another great Chinese Indology scholar is Professor Jin Kemu. He had spent many years in Varanasi. By different Pandits he had mastered Sanskrit and Vedic. *The History of Sanskrit Literature* had been written by him more than 30 years ago of course in Chinese. I think he is the only Chinese scholar who can recite *Raghuvamsa* from memory. He introduced Vedic to Chinese people. The introduction into Panini's grammar had been also written by him. Some prose writings and sidelights written down by him about Indian life he had seen during his many years staying in India are interesting to read. I think he had kept some historic events in his prose about India in the time of fighting for independence.

The German tradition together with the Indian tradition of teaching Sanskrit had brought up the new generation of Sanskrit scholars in China. With a break of more than ten years of cultural revolution in China the young generation of Sanskrit scholars had made many achievements in many fields. The translation of *Mahabharata* is going on. *Manusmrti* has been translated by Mr. Prof. Jiang Zhongxin fifteen years ago. He had also published the transliteration of *Saddharmapundarika* manuscript which is kept now in a monastery in Tibet. We have also Chinese translation of *Bhagavatagita*. The translator is Mr. Zhang Baosheng, a Professor at Peking University. His main research subject is *Samkhya*. He had written several articles about *Samkhya*.

The special feature of Chinese Indology is the comparative study and study about Sino-Indian cultural exchange. A lot of works have been written about Sino-Indian cultural exchange. Last year ten volumes specified on such topics were published with more than 10,000 offprints. All of the 10,000 off prints were sold out within a few months. The editor of this series of books is Mr. Wang Shuying, a professor at institute of Asia and Pacific Studies of Chinese Academia of Social Science. He is planning to publish more books belonging to this series about comparative study and Sino-Indian cultural exchange. The works

are covering many fields of Indian influences on Chinese culture. In Chinese language, in Chinese literature, in Chinese medicine, in old Chines sculptures, in astrology and astronomy, and in many other aspects of old Chinese life, Chinese scholars had found out impressions of Indian influences.

2. China is part of source of Indology.

If we compare our achievements with those of Europe, we must admit that Indology in China had fallen behind that of Europe. It is true that we do not have such good dictionary, composed by Chinese scholars like that of Monier-Williams. We cannot claim even one Sanskrit grammar book written by a Chinese scholar like that of Kielhorn. Sometimes in the world if people talk about Indology, people seem to have forgotten China in this respect . Due to the difficulty of mastering Chinese language indologists in the world often ignore the voices from China. Despite all the above mentioned facts China remains an important country for Indology, because China is an almost untounched source for Indology until yet.

A well-known fact is that there are manuscripts in Sanskrit reserved in monasteries in Tibet. The Thai population in China may also keep some buddhistic Prakrit manuscripts among their buddhistic canons.

A well-known fact is also that the Taklamakan Desert is used to keep disappeared human civilization. At the end of last century and at the beginning of this century archaeologists from western countries had discovered manuscripts written in Brahmi script but belonging to different languages in central Asia. Sanskrit manuscripts were among them. Among them Asvoghosa's *Buddhacarita* had been found. What did it mean for Indology was already valued by great Indology scholars form all over the world. Most of manuscripts found in Taklamakan desert and in Dunhuang caves are kept today in different countries. Sometimes the beginning of one manuscript is to be find for instance in Paris and the other part of the same manuscript is to be found in London.

But the discovery has not stopped. Manuscripts written in already disappeared languages like Khotanese and Tocharian haven't been thoroughly studied. They are keeping some Sanskrit words in hybrid forms the meaning of which otherwise is not mentioned in Sanskrit dictionaries. Some examples may be given here : In the Khotanese manuscript with signature S2471 there are words "mahayana prabhasta". Both *Mahayana* and *prabhasta* are well-known Sanskrit word. We can translate the phrase like : "the Mahayana full of lights ." But what does it mean? The context found in the manuscript did not allow a meaning of buddhistic Mahayana. It is another name for Aditya, the sun. It is a name more according to the iconography of the surya. *Kilahasta* is another example. It is a name for mars. Mars as a personification is often displayed with a *kila* in his hand. I think a new dictionary of Sanskrit shall not neglect such words in manuscripts found originally in China.

Before I came to Pune I deciphered a Khotanese document written on wood. The document is first time known to the world. It was written down in the fourth or fifth century A.D. The document was about selling of a female slave together with her son. But the selling case had not been judged by a secular court but by the court of buddhistic monks. With the discovery of this document we may have a glimpse at the organization inside of buddhistic monastery in ancient Khotan. In this document there are also Sanskrit words in hybrid form. For example, I found *kriyadara <Kryadhara,* in the document it means 'person or monk on duty', *sanacara < sanucara,* 'assistant'. For sanucara we have Chinese equivalent in buddhistic sutras is 助伴.

Mr. Jiang Zhongxin, who is a professor at Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies of Chinese Academia of Social Science is working on a new edition of Suvarnabhasasutra. He had found Suvarnabhasasutra among the manuscripts brought back from Otani's expedition done at the beginning of this century. Parts of Otani's manuscripts are kept today in Museum of Lushun, which is a harbour city in Northeast of China. Mr. Prof. Dr. Wang Bangwei at Peking University is a specialist

for buddistic studies, and he has also some publications about buddhistic manuscripts which may be first time known to the world.

In this year, in Autumn Chinese Archaeologists will search the Area of Dandan Uliq. Since Sir Aurel Stein had left Dandan Uliq at the beginning of this century, nobody was there again. The treasure of a disappeared human civilization was yielded again to the sand of the Taklamakan desert. I do hope that Chinese Archaeologists will bring valuable things from the desert which will relate us many stories about a disappeared human civilization.

Whatever is buried under the sand of Taklamakan desert makes only a small part of what I call the Chinese source for Indology. In the year 148 AD the first buddhistic sutra had been translated into Chinese by a monk from Persia. Since then in ensuing more than a thousand years thousands of hardworking monks from China, India, Persia and Central Asia had translated innumerable sutras from Sanskrit into Chinese. What we found of Sanskrit equivalent texts are really very few as compared to the sum kept in Chinese translations. Today if you want to search about the system and organization among buddhistic monasteries in ancient time, you have to read the *Vinaya* texts kept in Chinese translation. If you want to research buddhistic philosophy, you have better to know the Chinese terms for translating Sanskrit philosophic texts. If you want to study the tantric rituals, you have also to know about the tantric texts kept in Chinese translation. In the first half of the 8th century three Indian monks came to China under Tang-dynasty. They were famous as the three great Purusas in Kaiyuan time under Tang-dynasty. They mainly translated tantric sutras in Chinese. One of the three with the Chinese name Bukong had translated 91 tantric sutras and dharani books into Chinese. What different kinds of Dharanis were to be used for what kinds of rituals? Through study of such Chinese texts some lights may be given on this question.

After a comparative study Professor Jin Kemu at Peking

University had discovered that some monks did follow a system by their translation. With the help of such system it will be not very difficult to recover some texts into Sanskrit. Perhaps in the future some one will do the work of recovering, but still the Chinese source can not be neglected.

We have also ancient books other than buddhistic texts, other than the well-known memories of the Chinese monks. In such books we find also memories about ancient India. Even in Poems we will find some valuable records about facts in ancient India. Only one example may be given here : In the 8th century there was a poet. He was suffering blindness. A Brahman from India healed him with a golden comb. Later the poet wrote a poem to thank the Brahman. Now we can ascertain that the poet had suffered from cataract. The Brahman had used the technique of extraction. But the technique had been invented in such earlier time. I am not sure if it was already otherwise attested.

A Chinese historical scholar, Mrs. Geng Yinzeng had collected records about India and south Asia from different historical books of China. She published her collection in two volumes four years ago. Because the books are written in Chinese, perhaps they are not known to the world.

3. Comparative study will remain in the future a special feature of Indology in China.

In the origin of civilization there is a lot of puzzles both in India and China. Through comparative study of these two cultures we may come near to the real state of the origin of human civilization.

When did the cultural exchange start between India and China? That is still an unsolved question. People had found similarities between the discoveries from Harappa and Mohen-jo-Daro on the one side and archaeological funds from pre-historic time in Gansu of China on the other side. Both India and China have 28 constellations and every constellation has a typical name. That is special for India and China.

In Vedic we find that the principal deity of Vedic ritualism was God Agni, who was understood as a personification of time. More specifically, Agni represented the year, and the most important sacrificial Vedic ritual — the twelve day agni-cayana ritual commemorated the year.

In China one Chinese scholar had found out that in the fourth or third millennium BC before the invention of the moon calendar there was a sidereal calendar popular in China. The sidereal star was called 'fire', in some texts 'big fire'. According to the different situation of the *fire* star on the sky our ancients arranged seeding and harvest. Today sometimes you can see on some procelains from China such a decorative design : two dragons with a fire ball in the middle. The fire ball is a faded memory of the sidereal calendar in very ancient time of China.

I do not have the intention to draw any conclusion for the above question. I am going only to stress the importance of a comparative study between Sinology and Indology. Many examples of similarities of phenomenia in Vedic and in old Chinese poems can be given. Maybe such phenomenia can be explained through a thoroughly comparative study.

Of course the comparative study will help to find more facts which betray the influences of Indian culture on Chinese culture and even other way round. But it is also interesting to see the developments after the cultural influences had taken place. I do believe that even the human imagination needs seed and stimulus from outside. Chains are everywhere to see in any kind of development, and even in the development of human imagination there must be chains. To research the development of human spirit — to such a topic the comparative study between India and China will also yield a lot of significant evidences.

It is true that back in the history China had taken a lot of Indian spiritual treasure. But Chinese had not taken everything. The obvious

evidence is that the Hinduism had not found his way to China. We find also in historic books clearly evidence that rejection had taken place in reference to Indian culture. In the first half of the 8th century performance of translated Sanskrit prahasana was relatively popular in the capital of Tang-dynasty. A minister made report to the emperor of Tang-dynasty that the emperor should prohibit performing of prahasana. The reason he gave was that in Sanskrit prahasana there were descriptions of concubines of a king in detail. That was a bad omen which would reduce to the fall of a dynasty.

Here we can see clearly the confrontation of two different cultures. While in *kavyas* and in narrative literature of India you read beautiful written descriptions of female body, such descriptions people will not find in ancient Chinese poems and literature. It is not a question of moral or unmoral behind. It is a difference of aesthetic ways of thinking behind. There are also religious and ethnic reasons behind. To study rejections in cultural exchange between India and China will also grant deeper and clearer insight into the two great cultures in the world.

Through a comparative study I find out that Indian poets like Kalidasa treated nature in another aesthetic way than most ancient Chinese poets. While you are reading Kalidasa's description of nature, you are purely enjoying the beauty of nature together with the poet. But in ancient Chinese poems you will often find, while the poet described for instance a tree, there must be another significance behind. An ancient Chinese poet often tried to use nature to suggest some relationship in the social life. One example may be given here : A Chinese poet of Tang-dynasty saw a big tree in a mountain valley. He wrote a poem, in which he expressed his sympathy with the big tree. The tree grew up in a valley, although the tree was very tall, it was still lower than a grass on the top of the mountain. While you are reading such poems, you are not invited to enjoy the sight of a big tree. You have to think with the poet.

I came to Pune with the project to translate Kalidasa's *Raghuvamsa* into Chinese. My intention is to introduce the old Indian awareness of nature to Chinese people. Nowadays in China the economic development is going rapidly. What we need is really a common awareness of nature. Besides the relationship between human beings there is also a relationship between nature and the humankind. I hope Kalidasa's works will inspire some creative Chinese writer so that the awareness of nature from ancient India will influence Chinese people so wide and deep that a more beautiful China will exist on the earth. With the good hope I close my paper.

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1. I would like to make a notice here that some data in this paper may not be correct due to absence of necessary Chinese literature in Pune. I wrote this paper in Pune.

The Feasibility of 'Indian Discourse'

USHA BHISE

1. Of late, there has been an awareness that the outlook on what has gone under the label of Indology, has got to undergo change. Indology is a way of looking at India and all that is India, through the looking-glasses of people who are not Indian. As 'West' is a term frequently used in contrast with 'India', I may, hereafter, use the terms 'West' and 'Western' as representing that which is 'non-India' and 'non-Indian'. The discipline of Indology is essentially based on the distinction between India and the West. It serves as the point from which theories are triggered off - theories which speak of Western style for having authority that is backed by a sense of superiority caused by political situation. This mentality is reflected in the behaviour of scholars including scientists, of missionaries, of traders and of soldiers who came to the land called India—the name India itself being of foreign origin.

2. British pepole came here as traders in the first instance and gradually gained sovereignty over the land. India, then, was reduced to the status of a colony of the British Empire. Earlier, in the 15th and the 16th centuries Christian Missionaries came by the sea-route. The rulers as well as missionaries very soon realised that they were face to face with a lofty civilization that was much more advanced and had much more grandeur than their own. Such a situation being unpalatable, the Westerners studied the texts of Indians written in Sanskrit, Middle Indo-Aryan and Vernacular languages with a view to prove logically that their civilization as well as religion was superior to that of India. This was absolutely necessary for the missionaries. They learnt Indian languages and studied Indian texts with the purpose of proving that the objects of veneration of the Hindus were not really so. Father Stephens mastered the Konkani language to such a degree that he could produce a voluminous work called Khrista Purāṇa in that language. In it we

come across statements for pursuading Hindus away from their faith and then showing that Christianity was the antidote. Thus, he speaks about the Bali and Vāmana episode, criticising Vāmana, who is but an incarnation of the Prominent God Viṣṇu, who first enjoyed the hospitality of Bali and, then, trencherously pushed him down to the Netherworld ! Should anybody have respect for such a god?

3. Scholars like Max Müller, who published the Sacred Books of the East Series, had a similar aim before him. It is now an open secret that he wanted to present the Vedic religion as a primitive religion, whose gods were personified forces of nature. This led to various absurd theories about Vedic gods, as for example, Aśvinā being regarded either as Morning and Evening stars or morning and evening twilights or the constellation of Gemini. In recent years the credibility of Vedic texts was challenged by a scholar like Father Estreller, who tried to reconstruct the so-called Palimpsest or the original pure text of the *Ṛgveda*. While writing the *History of Sanskrit Literature*, efforts were made by Western scholars to prove that the Indian culture and literature were not as ancient as they were believed to be. The oldest text, namely, the *Ṛgveda* was placed by them in 1200 B.C. Further, two centuries each were allotted to the subsequent phases of Vedic literature. The dating of Indian literature, in whose case unfortunately, no concrete historical evidence is available, has suffered a good deal because of this tendency. Hand in hand with the dating of literature goes the theory that Aryans came to India from outside. They were identified with the Caucasian Race. They came to India and destroyed a mighty civilization of the dark-complexioned people residing around Mohen-jo-Daro and established their own civilization. As against this, Archaeologists have literally unearthed the secret that there was no destruction of the civilization by foreign invaders but that it was caused by floods. The Vedic people and the Mohan-jo-Daro people belonged to the same race divided into two branches having marginal differences.

4. These distortions and misrepresentations were intentionally made, keeping a purpose in view. Yet there was another group of distortions, misrepresentations and inaccuracies which were unintentional, but caused by the ignorance of cultural background. By way of example, one may point to the interpretation of RV X. 135 in which a human Kumāra reaches the abode of Yama. This was done by Macdonell, who, however, is honest in confessing that the verses are obscure. Speaking about the Kuntāpa sūktas of the AV. Winternitz (Hist. of Lit. Vol. I, p. 149) remarks, "partly they are riddles and their solutions but partly also obscene songs and coarse jokes. Bloomfield (The AV. pp. 100-101) observes that "plainly speaking, the bestowal of dakṣiṇa in many instances must have led to gormandising and drunkenness ..... followed by shallow witticism, by obscene talk and worse ......". According to the Indian traditon recorded in the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa, the Kuntāpa hymns have the magical effect of destroying the defects of the sacrificer which are impediments in the way of achieving heaven. They are certainly not the outcome of drunkenness. Moreover, the Gopatha as well as the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa state that by reciting these hymns, the *rasa* in the sacrificial formulae gets replenished. Thus, the criticism offered by Bloomfield appears to be unjust, as he has either not looked into or ignored the Indian tradition. Similarly, inaccuracies of interpretation have crept into numerous translations due to lack of understanding of the cultural background.

5. Similar lack of understanding manifest itself in the writings of some scholars who are Indian citizens, born on Indian soil but brought up in schools which are dominated by Western outlook. Their thinking is dominated and formulated by that of Westerners; hence, they neglect the basics of Indian conception and judgment. A scholar of Indian Philosophy like S.N. Dasgupta makes a statement that "Śaṅkarācārya was a Buddhist in disguise", unmindful of the fact that the life-mission of Śaṅkarācārya was to re-establish Vedic religion by reversing the spread of Buddhism. Another glaring example of absurdity is the sex-

element introduced by S.A. Dange who poses himself as a Vedic scholar but bases his arguments on works of Western scholars which are ill-suited to the field of investigation chosen by him. Such scholars may well be designated 'aliens' who have wandered astray from the Indian situation.

6. The catastrophe accured because of the passive role played by Indians. Indic studies done under Western authority were passed on to Indian disciples who received them in the given form as severently as the traditional disciple received Vedic instruction from his *guru*, without applying his mind to the validity of the Western-made material that was passed on to him. His mentality was never to question what he was taught in schools opened by British or French or Portugese rulers. The words of the Jesuit Father, although seemingly absurd, were to be honoured as truths. The tolerance or lack of critical vision on the part of Indians resulted in the state of affairs that we have today. There were attempts on part of some rare geniuses of India towards advancing rival theories. By way of example one may quote B.G. Tilak who challenged the Westerners' dating of the Vedic period. A.D. Pusalkar has convincingly proved that the movement of culture was from Indian outwards. It is a matter of delight that modern Archaeology has provided corroborative evidence in this case. Such attempts of Indian scholars were too scanty to reverse the current. The Eastern travellers and scholars visited the West to learn from them and to be impressed by their culture. The counterpart of Indology, namely, a parallel study of Western culture by Indians was not undertaken. Neither did the attempts of Indians to rectify the follies of Western scholars make any considerable impact.

7. As Indology implies the outlook of non-Indians on Indian culture, literature etc., the expression "Indian discourse" involves self-contradiction. It is time for Indian scholars to sit on judgment regarding Indological literature. In order to enable them to do this task effectively, it is necessary that the text-books prescribed in the Universities need

revision. The changing political scenario and the historical awareness of so many peoples of the world have created a favourable atmosphere. West is turning towards East for inspiration or even for therapy. It is, hence, desirable to repeal the wave of orientation that dominated the Western and the Westernised world. The scrutiny of views expressed in the vast Indological literature is necessary for placing before the world, the truths regarding Indian history, culture, literature etc. by getting rid of the distortions made purposefully or unwittingly. May the world realise that the subject of Indology had a corresponding reality. It is a challenge before the future Indian scholars to unveil the truths regarding India.



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R. Irtysh
Caspian Sea
R. Syr Darya
R. Amu Darya
TIEN SH
R. Indus
HIMALA
R. Yamuna